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ABSTRACT 
This thesis attempted to expand knowledge of intentional thought control in several 
directions. The primary aim was to provide an account of intentional thought suppression 
by relating the phenomenon to the methods used to assess the rebound effect, internal 
personality factors and psychopathology. An additional aim was to examine the rebound 
effect from the broader perspective of relating thought suppression to aging, the 
perception of volitional control and memory for future intentions. 
The results indicate that the method used to index the rebound effect may have a large 
impact on whether the effect is found or not. The rebound effect was obtained with the 
original method of assessment (Wegner, 1987) but not with the modified method that is 
currently used in the research. More importantly, the rebound effect was affected by the 
personality variable of state vs. action orientation (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994b). State 
oriented participants demonstrated the rebound effect, whereas action oriented 
participants did not, irrespective of the method used to assess the effect. This finding 
provides support for the new intentional account of the rebound effect proposed in the 
thesis that is based on the Intention Superiority Effect (Kuhl, 1994) and the theory of 
action control (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994b). The results also showed that suppression and 
expression performance in the laboratory did not have a common underlying mechanism. 
Successful expression performance was related to poorer suppression performance and 
visa versa. 
The results of the thesis also question the validity of the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (Wegner and Zanakos, 1994) as a measure of the tendency to suppress thoughts 
in everyday life. In young adults, apart from thought suppression, it also appears to 
measure the tendency to experience thought intrusions (rumination). Moreover, there was 
no relationship between the use of thought suppression in everyday life and actual 
suppression performance in the laboratory. A different pattern of results were obtained in 
a group of older adults (over 65 years). In addition, older adults reported using thought 
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suppression reliably less frequently than young adults (i. e. had lower WBSI scores), and 
displayed much higher levels of repressive coping style than young people, 37% (old) vs. 
9.5% (young). 
Finally, the results showed that thought suppression can also have other ironic effects on 
behaviour and perception. Participants attempting to complete an action while 
suppressing thoughts of the intention to perform this action came to feel as if the act was 
less intentionally performed. In contrast, participants completing actions under thought 
expression instructions rated the actions as more intentional. Furthermore, suppressing or 
expressing thoughts of an upcoming intention did not help one to remember to enact the 
intention with an enhanced frequency relative to thinking about a completely unrelated 
intention. 
Taken together, the findings have important implications for research on thought 
suppression and mental control by showing that the rebound effect is less robust than 
suggested by previous research. Thus, some of the controversy surrounding the rebound 
effect can be explained on the basis of individual differences in personality type (state vs. 
action orientation) as well as the methods used to index the effect. The results also raise 
several important questions for future research in this area (e. g. the validity of WBSI, 
effects of age on thought suppression and repression). 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Current research on thought suppression and mental control: A review 
"What constitutes the difficultyfor a man labouring under an unwise passion of acting as 
if the passion were unwise? Certainly there is no physical difficulty. It is as easy 
physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, to pocket one's money as to squander it on 
one's cupidity's, to walk awayfrom as towards a coquettes door. The difficulty is mental; 
It is that of getting the idea of the wise action to stay before our mind at all. " 
William James 1890 
The above quote from James (1890) reminds us of our own internal struggles. We have 
all, at times, struggled to control our minds. Who has not had the experience of a thought 
occurring to them that is at once both an affront to themselves but worse suggests a 
course of action that one deems instantly abhorrent? One labours against it, suppressing 
the thought in an effort to avoid the associated discomfort but more so in an effort to 
avoid the suggested action. Yet, the thought seems to have a life of its own. It seems 
imbued with a strange power that compels us towards the suggested action in a way that 
seems to negate our own will to resist. Suppression is effective at times, but in moments 
of distraction, the thought returns an unwelcome but familiar occurrence. This may 
continue for minutes, days or even a lifetime. 
This thesis investigates thought suppression from a wide variety of perspectives. The 
starting point lies in the verbally reported consequences of experimenter directed 
intentional suppression with the now classic "white bear" paradigm of Wenger, 
Schneider, Carter & White et al., (1987). Numerous experiments have demonstrated that 
intentional thought-suppression is at best an ineffective method of thought control but at 
worst can bring the very contents one is seeking to avoid to mind with a greatly enhanced 
frequency (Wenzlaff & Wegner 2000). These paradoxical effects of intentional thought- 
suppression have been labelled the rebound effect. At present, the research on mental 
control is in a somewhat confused state. The phenomenon of the rebound effect has been 
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demonstrated on many occasions (Clarke, Ball & Pape, 1991; Roemer & Borkovec, 
1994; Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White 1987) yet other 
studies using similar methodologies have consistently failed to replicate the effect 
(LoSchiavo & Yurak, 1995; Merckelbach, Muris, Van den Hout & de Jong, 1991; 
Rutledge, Hollenberg & Hancock, 1993). Many suggestions have been made as to why 
these discrepancies may exist but, to date, no satisfactory explanation exists. We are left 
with a paradox of paradoxical effects. Sometimes one finds them sometimes one does 
not. 
This chapter first outlines the main aims of the thesis, then briefly covers the main 
relevant literature, and finally outlines the empirical programme of research as reported 
in subsequent chapters. 
1. Aims 
This thesis aims to expand knowledge of intentional thought control in several directions. 
The primary aim is to provide an account of intentional thought suppression, relating the 
phenomenon to internal personality factors and psychopathology, and external factors 
such as the nature of the target and conditions in which suppression occurs. An 
additional aim was to examine the rebound effect from a broader perspective by relating 
conscious thought suppression to unconscious repression, one's perception of volitional 
control and memory for future intentions. 
(1) Factors affecting the rebound effect in the laboratory 
The rebound effect occurs when a person or group experiences a heightened frequency of 
thought after prior suppression. Therefore, this thesis aimed to examine the conditions 
under which the rebound effect is found in an attempt to clearly delineate the 
phenomenon's boundary conditions (see Chapter 3). It was also hypothesised that the 
rebound effect may be mediated by individual differences such as personality or ability 
that will affect when and where the rebound effect is found (Chapter 3). An innovation in 
research methdology was made by moving away from using self-report measures of 
assessing the rebound effect and to investigate the phenomenon more thoroughly using 
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implicit measures such as reaction time to recognise stimuli (Chapter 6). The advantage 
of implicit measures is that they are not susceptible to interference from the participant's 
own theories of mental control or their attempts to withhold the relevant information 
from the experimenter. 
(2) The Tendency to Suppress Thoughts and Measures of Individual Difference 
Another aim was to examine a wide variety of those personality and individual difference 
measures that have been theoretically related to the frequency of using thought- 
suppression in everyday life as measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(WBSI). This is a questionnaire developed by Wegner and Zanakos (1994) to assess 
people's tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life. The rationale for using this 
questionnaire was to try and understand whether there is a certain type of individual who 
uses these strategies more than others and what their characteristics are (Chapters 4,7 & 
8). This issue was investigated in normal young adults and a sample of older people. The 
work with the older adults represents one of the first investigations into the mental 
control strategies for this age group (Chapter 8). 
(3) Relation of Thought Suppression to Repression and Volition 
The thesis also examined the nature of repression (unconscious avoidance) and how it 
relates to the use of thought suppression in everyday life, as assessed by the WBSI 
(Chapter 9). The final aim was to broaden the field of mental control by investigating the 
effects of thought-suppression on perception of participants' own will (volition) when 
carrying out a range of simple tasks under different mental control instructions. Chapter 
10 reports the effect of trying to focus on the task vs. trying not to think about the task. 
Chapter II reports on memory for intentions one wants to enact. 
The thesis touches on a number of areas within psychology and therefore, the 
introduction to the literature is wide ranging. The review starts with a general 
introduction to research on mental control. The original thought suppression paradigm is 
described, followed by more recent advances using modified versions of this paradigm. 
Theoretical accounts of the rebound effect are then discussed. Later sections deal with 
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the possible role of several individual difference variables in rebound effects and the 
tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life, as well as measures specifically designed 
to measure repressive coping style. Finally, more global issues for thought suppression 
are addressed: the relation of suppression (conscious) to repression (unconscious); the 
relation between mental control and conscious will; and the role of goals and intentions. 
II. Experimental Studies of Mental Control and the Rebound Effect 
The current project focuses on the area of conscious mental control. As a topic of 
psychological investigation interest in the area of mental control has developed only 
recently. Indeed, as pointed out by Wegner and Pennebaker (1993) references to mental 
control do not appear in the literature on cognitive psychology prior to 1987. 
The simplest definition of mental control is that it is a process that occurs when people 
attempt to influence their own mental states. For example, suppressing unwanted 
thoughts, inhibiting an emotion, or concentrating on a sensation (Wegner, 1989). 
These strategies may be conscious and implemented through a force of will or 
unconscious and represent a pre-conscious aversion to negative information. The current 
thesis focuses mainly on changing one's thoughts through the use of conscious strategies. 
This can involve two distinct processes. One is the expulsion of thoughts one does not 
wish to have, known as thought-suppression; the other is consciously bringing to mind 
desired thoughts and maintaining these, known as thought-expression. For reasons of its 
direct relevance to everyday life, the research on mental control has focused almost 
exclusively on suppressive forms of mental control. Consequently, the present literature- 
review also focuses mainly on the suppressive side of control. However, one must bear in 
mind that mental control involves expressive forms as well. 
(1) Unwanted Thoughts and Thought Suppression 
How do people cope with their unwanted thoughts? Freud (1915/1917) was one of the 
first to recognise that the strategies people employ to cope with unwanted thoughts may 
be both conscious and unconscious. In an article written in 1915, Freud defines the term 
20 
repression. According to him "the essence of repression lies simply in the function of 
rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness" (p. 147). This function could be 
carried out both consciously and unconsciously and it seems Freud did not concentrate on 
differentiating between the two at that stage. However, it is well known he went on to 
focus more on the unconscious side of the divide. 
It is generally accepted that conscious suppression of thought is no longer called 
repression but thought-suppression. It is also generally agreed that conscious thought 
avoidance is not automatic but represents a controlled (conscious) process (Schiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977). In contrast, suppression that is carried out unconsciously is known as 
repression (Erdelyi, 1993; Wegner, 1989). The process of repression is presumed to be 
automatic and therefore might occur without consuming mental resources. Repression, 
being unconscious, is much more difficult to study in the laboratory. This has lead some 
to suggest there is no evidence for repression at all. Holmes (1990) states that "despite 
over sixty years of research involving numerous approaches by many thoughtful and 
clever investigators, at the present time, there is no controlled laboratory evidence 
supporting the concept of repression" (p. 96). Whilst not necessarily agreeing with 
Holme's conclusion, this thesis acknowledges that providing evidence of repression is 
indeed much more difficult than providing evidence of conscious thought-suppression. 
Consequently, the main focus of this project will be on the intentional employment of 
conscious strategies to change one's mental contents, in short, thought-suppression or 
expression. However, the thesis also investigates repression through methods developed 
by Weinberger, Schwartz and Davidson (1979) for identifying individuals with a 
repressive coping style. This style is characterised by using a number of strategies to 
avoid experiencing negative emotions (Myers, 2000). There is also evidence that 
repressors are unaware that they are being avoidant (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998). This 
provides support for the notion that repression is an unconscious process. The ideas of 
repression are revisited later in this review. For now it is enough to realise that mental 
control as a field encompasses both unconscious (automatic) processes and more 
deliberate conscious strategies (controlled processes). 
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Unwanted thoughts are remarkably common. Rachmann and De Silva (1978), for 
example, argue that most normal people have "obsessions" that closely parallel those 
"abnormal" obsessions seen in clinical populations. In a similar vein, Schackelford and 
Wegner (1985) asked 180 people to write down an unwanted thought. Almost the entire 
sample had one or more of these to write down. Table 1.1 below shows a list of 
commonly suppressed thoughts (Wegner 1989). Indeed, as much as 80 % of the general 
population report experiencing negative intrusive thoughts which are highly likely to be 
suppressed (Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). In line with this, Erdelyi and Goldberg (1979) 
informally surveyed college students and found that 99% reported having tried to exclude 
disturbing thoughts from consciousness to avoid discomfort. In addition, recent research 
suggests thought-suppression is a strategy that virtually everyone uses at times (Wegner 
& Zanakos, 1994) 
TABLE 1.1 - THOUGHTS PEOPLE MOST OFrEN S uppREss - FROM THE MOST OFTEN 
SUPPRESSED To LEAST SUPPRESSED 
position Thought 
I Relationship problems Oealousy, arguing, loneliness) 
2 College worries (failing, not getting enough done) 
3 General worries (future and life) 
4 Death of loved ones 
5 Fear of attack (rape, robbery) 
6 Lack of money 
7 Physical appearance 
8 Sexual impulses 
9 Health 
10 Food / eating 
11 Repeating songs 
Source Wegner (1989) 
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It appears that unwanted thoughts are ubiquitous and that mental control (especially 
thought suppression) is equally prevalent. Moreover, numerous correlational and 
experimental studies have consistently demonstrated an association between thought 
suppression and various measures of psychopathology (Purdon, 1999; Rassin et al., 2000; 
Wenzlaf & Wegner, 2000). This has lead some researchers to suggest that thought 
suppression may be involved in the actiology of such conditions as Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder, anxiety and depression (Purdon, 1999; Rassin et al., 2000; Wegner et al., 1987). 
There is also some evidence that thought suppression can depress the normal functioning 
of the immune system (Petrie et al., 1998). Most importantly, however, thought 
suppression may result in a rebound effect, i. e. when one becomes preoccupied with the 
very material one wishes to avoid. 
(2) Methods of Indexing The Rebound Effect 
Wegner et al. 's (1987) original study, which first demonstrated the rebound effect, led to 
many further investigations. Initially, these early experiments viewed successful 
suppression as totally emptying the conscious mind of all instances of the target thought. 
Thus, when asked to suppress a thought such as "white bear" for a five minute period it 
was thought that successful suppression meant no instances of the thought should be 
reported in this period (Wegner, 1989; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). However, these early 
experiments demonstrated conclusively that virtually all participants still reported some 
thoughts of the target (white bear) during the suppression period (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 
2000). Thus, the original ideas of suppression have been revised to take account of the 
fact that an idealised total suppression seems virtually impossible. Most researchers now 
view successful suppression as maintaining a low number of thoughts of the target in the 
suppression period. 
Most experimental investigations into thought-suppression have used a stanclardised think 
aloud procedure. Participants are encouraged to verbalise their thoughts during short 
successive periods of time. It is customary to leave the participants alone during these 
periods and record their thought verbalisations on a tape recorder. After a practice period, 
in which all participants attempt the task the experimenter provides instructions for the 
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participant to continue verbalising their thoughts but now to either express or suppress a 
certain concept such as "white bear" (the most commonly used target in thought- 
suppression studies). During this period (usually referred to as period 1), the participants 
are also asked to press a buzzer if they happen to think of or mention the to-be- 
suppressed or expressed concept. These buzzer presses are an index of how many times 
the participant has thought of the concept during the suppression or expression period. In 
the majority of the studies reviewed in this chapter the number of buzzer presses recorded 
for each participant is the dependent variable. 
The paradigm used in the original Wegner et al. (1987) study, denoted here the "original 
method" is as follows. An initial 3-minute practice thought verbalisation period was 
followed by two five-minute verbalisation periods. In the first of these 5-minute periods 
(period 1) participants were divided into two groups, an initial expression condition and 
an initial suppression condition. The target thought for expression or suppression was 
"white bear". In period 2 (the second thought verbalisation period) participants were 
asked to undertake the opposite form of mental control to the previous period. Thus, if 
they had been suppressing white bear in period I they were now asked to express white 
bear. If they had been expressing white bear in period I they were now asked to suppress 
white bear. Results showed that participants expressing white bear in period 2, after prior 
suppression demonstrated a significantly higher number of white bear thoughts in 
comparison to a group that expressed white bear thoughts in period I without prior 
suppression. Wegner et al. (1987) called this a rebound effect. Thus, according to 
"original method" the rebound effect is assessed by comparing the number of buzzer 
presses in the suppression group during period 2 and those of the expression group in 
period 1. This is schematically depicted in Figure 1.1 below. 
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FIGURE 1.1 - THE ORIGINAL 1987 METHOD, USED IN THOUGHT-SUPPRESSION EXPERIMENTS - SINGLE SIDED 
ARROWS INDICATE THE TEMPORAL FLOW OF THE EXPERIMENT. THE DOUBLE SIDED ARROW SHOWS 
WHICH TWO GROUPS ARE COMPARED ON THEIR MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN ORDER TO 
ASSESS THE REBOUND EFFEM 
Practice Verbalisation Period I Period 2 
Practice Verbalisation 
Verbalisation + suppression Verbalisation + expression 
Period 1 Period 2 
Verbalisation + expression Verbalisation + suppression 
Although this method of assessing the rebound effect was used in some of the subsequent 
studies, it has also been criticised. Therefore, several modifications of the original 
method became more widely used in the following years. For example, according to 
Clark et al. (1991) one problem that the original method has is that participants who 
express in period 2 after previous suppression have had more practice at thought 
verbalisation than participants who express in period 1, and this factor alone may be 
responsible for the rise in thoughts seen after prior suppression. This criticism lead to the 
introduction of another design which will be termed the "modified method" of assessing 
the rebound throughout this thesis. In this design following an initial period of expression 
or suppression in period 1, both groups engage in expression during period 2. Here, the 
rebound effect is indexed by comparing the number of buzzer presses between the two 
expression groups in period 2 (see Figure 1.2 for a schematic depiction of the modified 
method). 
25 
FIGURE 1.2- A LATER REFINEMENT TO THE ORIGINAL THOUGIfr-SUPPRESSION PARADIGM (DENOTED 
THROUGHOUT AS THE MODIFIED METHOD). SINGLE SIDED ARROWS INDICATE THE TEMPORAL FLOW OF 
THE EXPERIMENT. THE DOUBLE SIDED ARROW SHOWS WHICH TWO GROUPS ARE COMPARED ON THEIR 
MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE REBOUND EFFECT. 
Period I 
Practice Verbalisation Verbalisation + suppression 
Period I Period 2 
Practice Verbalisation Verbalisation + expression n Verbalisation + expression 
A third paradigm for indexing the rebound effect also exists and has now come to be the 
most widely used method in thought suppression experiments. This will be referred to as 
the "standard method" throughout this thesis. In this paradigm, expression conditions are 
replaced by a think anything instruction (see Figure 1.3 below). 
Period 2 
Verbalisation + expression 
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FIGURE 1-3- ANOTHER MODIFIACTION OFTHEORIGINALTHOUGHT SUPPRESSION PARADIGM REFERRED TO 
AS THE STANDARD METHOD IN THIS THESIS. SINGLE SIDED ARROWS INDICATE THE TEMPORAL FLOW OF 
THE EXPERIMENT. THE DOUBLE SIDED ARROW SHOWS WHICH TWO GROUPS ARE COMPARED ON THEIR 
MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE REBOUND EFFECT. 
Period 1 
Practice verbalisation Verbalisation 
suppression 
Period I 
Practice verbalisation Verbalisation + think 
anything 
Period 2 
Verbalisation + think 
anything 
Period 2 
Verbalisation + think 
anything 
All three paradigms outlined above (original, modified and standard methods) and their 
various derivatives have been used in thought suppression research with various success. 
With all these methods the rebound effect has been demonstrated in some studies but not 
in others (Clark et al., 1991,1993; Harvey & Bryant, 1998a, 1998b; Wegner et al., 1991; 
Wegner and Gold, 1995). Reasons for these discrepant findings will be discussed in 
subsequent sections. At this point, however, it is important to mention that all of these 
methods have one thing in common, namely conscious thought verbalisations (usually 
tape recoded) and a reliance on self reported measures of target thought frequency (i. e. 
number of buzzer presses). However, self-report measures are known to be unreliable in 
certain situations (but see Ericsson & Simon, 1980; 1984). In the case of thought 
suppression, one could suggest that some participants may avoid mentioning the to be 
suppressed thought not because they are successfully avoiding it but because they want to 
appear good at the task. As a direct result some researchers have suggested using implicit 
measures, such as reaction times to recognise previously expressed or suppressed stimuli, 
as the dependent variables (Wegner, 1992). 
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(3) Studies that have deviated from the traditional paradigms 
Studies that have employed paradigms that are different from the "original method" of 
assessing the rebound effect provide further evidence of the phenomenon of the post- 
suppression rebound and increase the generality of the findings. The majority of these 
studies have been conducted in the laboratory using a variety of implicit and/or 
behavioural measures of the rebound effect. There are very few studies that have 
examined the rebound effect with naturalistic methods. 
(1) Laboratory studies 
Wenzlaff and Bates (1999) had participants suppress/express positive thoughts or 
suppress/express negative thoughts during period 1. Then instead of having all groups 
express the formerly manipulated thoughts in period 2, they asked all participants to form 
sentences out of mixed up words with the first sentence that came to mind. These 
jumbled sentences could be formed into either a positive or a negative sentence. 
Rebound effects were observed in that: (a) the positive suppression group later produced 
more positive sentences than the positive expression group; and (b) the negative 
suppression group later produced more negative sentences than the negative expression 
group. 
Macrae et al. (1994) also used a non-standard paradigm. In their study, participants had 
to examine a photograph of a male skinhead and all participants were then told to write 
about a typical day in his life. Half of the participants were additionally told to avoid 
thinking about the target (the skinhead) in a stereotypical fashion (they were suppressing 
stereotypes); the other half received no such instructions. Following these manipulations, 
the participants were told they were going to be taken next door to meet the person they 
had been describing. However, on entering the room the participant was not confronted 
with the skinhead but with empty seats. On one seat was a denim jacket (allegedly 
belonging to the skinhead). Each participant was instructed to take a seat on one of the 
empty chairs. The results showed that stereotype suppressors showed a rebound effect by 
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choosing a seat at a significantly greater distance from the skinhead's seat than 
participants in the control group. 
Sulivan et al. (1997) had participants immerse their hands in ice water -a procedure they 
were told would be mildly uncomfortable. Prior to immersion, half of the participants 
were asked to suppress procedure-related thoughts and the other half were merely told to 
express their thoughts. The results showed that suppression was associated with 
heightened pain experience. 
Another study to examine the rebound effect by using a different paradigm was the study 
of Wegner and Erber (1992). In this study Wegner and Erber were trying to test their 
theory that the rebound effect occurs due to heightened activation that the constructs 
accrue as a result of being suppressed. Participants were instructed to either suppress or 
express thoughts of the target word, "house". Simultaneous to this task, participants 
completed a two colour Stroop Task. The words used in the Stroop Task included target 
words, non-target words and target related words. Half of the participants completed this 
task under high load condition (simultaneously rehearsing a9 digit number) and the 
others were in a low load condition (rehearsing aI digit number). The results showed that 
participants in the suppression condition were slower to indicate colours of all words in 
comparison to participants in the expression conditions. This may be due to the fact that 
suppressing thoughts requires greater cognitive resources than active expression. 
Reaction times to target-unrelated, target-related and target words were all similar in the 
low load condition, this was the case for participants in both the suppression and 
expression groups. However, in the high load conditions latencies were significantly 
longer for target words, compared to target-related or target-unrelated words, but only in 
the suppression group. This interaction between load (high vs. low) and group 
(suppression vs. expression) was explained with reference to Wegner's (1994) ironic 
process theory of mental control (see page 41). 
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(2) Naturalistic studies of thought suppression 
A study by Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) investigated the rebound effect in everyday life 
by using a diary method. In this study, participants identified a negative intrusive thought 
and were then told to record its occurrence over the next 4 days. One third of the 
participants were told simply to monitor its occurrence, one third were told to suppress 
the thought whenever it occurred and the final third were told to think about the thought 
whenever it occurred. Results indicated that participants in the suppression group 
experienced significantly more of the unwanted thoughts than the other 2 groups and 
additionally they rated these thoughts as more uncomfortable than the other two groups. 
(4) Factors Influencing the Rebound Effect 
Although the rebound effect has been demonstrated on many occasions using different 
methods of assessment the field, as a whole, is beset by controversy due to many studies 
using similar paradigms but failing to demonstrate the basic effect (Merckelbach et al., 
1991; Muris et al 1992,1993; Roemer and Borkovec, 1994). In addition, several 
researchers in the field have acknowledged informally that demonstrating the rebound 
effect is not an easy enterprise (Ellis, personal communication; Wegner, personal 
communication). In view of these mixed findings from the thought suppression literature 
the possible explanations for these discrepancies will now be examined. The reasons that 
several studies have failed to replicate the rebound effect may be due to the methods used 
to investigate the effect (e. g. the paradigm used) or methodological problems such as 
insufficient power (Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). Others have suggested that it may be 
the type of thought that is suppressed that leads to the different results (Kelly & Kahn, 
1994). It has also been proposed that individual differences in participants may be 
responsible for when and where the rebound effect is obtained (Rutledge et al., 1993). 
(1) Methods of Assessing The Rebound Effect 
One factor that has not been systematically examined and that can potentially result in 
conflicting findings is the variety of different methods used to assess the rebound effect. 
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As pointed out earlier in this chapter there are now three methods (original, modified and 
standard) of rebound effect assessment all of which are in current use. The standard 
method was developed mainly by clinically oriented researchers who wanted to 
investigate thought suppression by using negative thoughts or indeed participants' own 
intrusive thoughts. As a direct result it was felt that asking distressed participants or 
clinical participants to actively think about (express) their own intrusive thoughts or 
distressing thoughts might be unethical. Therefore, the standard method whereby 
participants are asked to either suppress the thoughts or merely think about anything 
(including the distressing thoughts if they wished) was believed to be a better and more 
ethical control. 
Despite the widespread uptake of the standard method over the original or modified 
methods it was decided not to use this method in the current thesis and instead to 
concentrate on contrasting the original and modified methods of assessing the rebound 
effect. There were several reasons for not using the standard method. Firstly, was the 
ambiguity of instructions asking participants to: "think about anything, you may think 
about a white bear but you do not have to". Previous research has shown that variability 
in participants' suppression and expression performance is very high. Thus, some 
participants in suppression conditions buzz as many as 20 times, whereas others may 
buzz only 2-3 times in a 5-minute period. In the expression group, the variance is even 
greater with some participants buzzing 50 times in the 5 minutes and others buzzing just 
3 times. The instructions used in the standard method can only serve to increase this 
variability as they introduce ambiguity and participants may be confused by the mention 
of the target wondering exactly what they have to do with this target. 
Crucially in this thesis another criticism of the standard method is the issue of the 
artificiality of these new instructions (think anything, you may think of a white bear but 
you do not have to). In many experiments that use the standard method participants first 
view a film or listen to a taped story and then half are asked to suppress their thoughts 
about the story and the other half are asked to think anything. Under these circumstances 
the instructions of the standard method make sense, but in studies where participants do 
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not first view a film or listen to a taped story and are just provided with a target for 
suppression the alternative group may find these instructions highly artificial. 
A final criticism concerns the fact that expression itself is a form of mental control and if 
investigators want to understand the mechanisms of mental control, then it is necessary to 
understand the mechanisms underlying expression of thought as well as suppression. For 
these reasons in all of the research reported in this thesis thought expression was used as 
the control condition. 
Therefore, the two methods of rebound effect assessment that will be contrasted in this 
thesis are the original and modified methods. The modified method depicted in Figure 1.2 
(page 26) is currently believed to provide a better method of assessment than the original 
method, because it assesses the rebound effect by making a comparison between two 
groups that have both had equal practice at thought verbalisation. However, there are also 
reasons to believe that there may be some problems with the modified method itself. For 
example, a recent study by Erskine and Kvavilashvili (2002) has shown that using the 
modified method may result in a rise in reported thought during the second expression 
period for the participants who express twice (express during period I and 2). This may 
well be due to the effects of either practice or priming. However, the fact that this rise can 
occur when using the modified method means that the first period of expression is 
affecting the second and may not provide a clean comparison for indexing the rebound. 
This possible rise in reported thought in the group that expresses their thoughts twice may 
diminish the chances of demonstrating a rebound effect. Therefore, there are reasons to 
suggest the original Wegner et al. (1987) method of assessing the rebound might avoid 
these complications. The current thesis will systematically investigate these two different 
methods of assessing the rebound within the same studies. 
(2) Role of Type of Thought Used in Suppression Experiments 
Another variable which has been manipulated in thought-suppression experiments with 
very mixed results is the type of thought to be suppressed. Recent studies have started to 
investigate the suppression of both positive and negative thoughts and additionally to 
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look at the effect of the personal relevance of the to be suppressed thought. Of great 
importance to the research on thought suppression is the almost uniform finding that 
emotional material is more difficult to suppress than neutral information (Wenzlaff & 
Wegner, 2000). This can exacerbate the difficulty of experimental investigations because 
if the thought is so difficult to suppress then the rebound effect may not occur. Some of 
the research which has failed to demonstrate rebound effects using emotional material 
may be due to the suppression group failing to suppress the thought from the outset, thus 
representing a failure of the experimental manipulation. 
(1) Research using personally relevant thoughts 
Kelly and Kahn (1994) failed to demonstrate a rebound effect when using peoples' own 
intrusive thoughts. However, they did demonstrate the rebound effect using the 
traditional target thought - white bear. This study makes a very important point, in that 
most of the experimental investigations of the rebound effect have used neutral words 
which have little personal relevance, like "white bear" or "vehicles". Another study by 
McNally and Ricciardi (1996) also looked at the effects of suppressing a personally 
relevant intrusive thought and compared this to suppression of a neutral and not 
personally relevant thought (white bear). The post-suppression rebound was observed for 
the personally relevant thoughts, but not for white bear thoughts. Thus, the results of this 
study directly contradict the results of Kelly and Kahn (1994). Rutledge (1998) and Smari 
et al (1995) both failed to find a post-suppression rebound for naturally occurring 
thoughts. However, Salkovskis & Campbell (1994) did find suppression related 
enhancements occurring with naturally occurring intrusive thoughts. 
Wegner and Gold (1995) have suggested that participants may expend greater energy in 
the suppression of naturally occurring thoughts and may never completely relinquish 
suppression as instructed to in period 2 due to the nature of such thoughts in many cases. 
Of critical importance is the demonstration by Trindler and Salkovskis (1994) that 
suppression of naturally occurring thoughts does lead to more intrusive thoughts in real 
world settings. 
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Wenzlaff and Wegner (2000) suggest that results from experiments using naturally 
occurring intrusive thoughts as targets for suppression, despite being mixed are 
suggestive of the idea that personally relevant thoughts may be less susceptible to 
suppression enhancement effects observed in the laboratory. 
(2) Research using negative or positive thoughts as targets for 
suppression 
Davies and Clark (1998) using the thought-suppression paradigm displayed in Figure 1.3 
on page 27, with two groups (one suppressing and one thinking anything including the 
target) found that a film with negative and distressing content produced a post- 
suppression rebound, whereas, a film about white bears did not. Roemer and Berkovec 
(1994) found that participants suppressing a depressing (i. e. negative) thought later 
expressed more depression-relevant thoughts than did individuals who suppressed neutral 
or anxious thoughts. However, Harvey and Bryant (1998b) showed 3 different films 
(neutral, positive and negative) and found a post-suppression rebound effect in all 
conditions irrespective of the valence of the film. 
In another study, Harvey and Bryant (1999) showed two films to two groups of 
participants (neutral and distressing) and had participants suppress or express thoughts of 
the film they had seen. Results indicated that a rebound effect occurred but that it was 
mediated by anxiety. In particular, a rebound effect was obtained in the low trait anxiety 
group where prior suppressers reported more film-related thoughts than non-suppressers 
in the final thought verbalisation task in period 2 where they were allowed to think about 
anything. However, this difference was not significant for high Trait Anxiety subjects. 
Interestingly, high anxiety non-suppressors stated they had been using suppression but 
low anxiety non-suppressors did not use suppression; this effect was found in both 
experimental periods. Therefore, it is possible that the spontaneous suppression (during 
period 1) exhibited by highly anxious participants who did not receive suppression 
instructions lead to the insignificant differences. 
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Wegner and Gold (1995) also observed that highly anxious participants spontaneously 
suppressed thoughts irrespective of experimental condition. Additionally, these high 
anxious participants were observed to naturally suppress unwanted thoughts and did not 
display a rebound effect. 
Possible reasons for these mixed findings, in addition to anxiety, centre on the effects of 
practice. Participants are likely to have much experience with suppressing naturally 
occurring negative thoughts and perhaps this experience may have allowed the person to 
develop better strategies or distracters for suppressing them. Wegner (1994) has also 
suggested that practice with suppressing certain thoughts may lead to the process 
becoming more automatic. Additionally, these experiments were all carried out in the 
laboratory despite using thoughts classed as intrusive in daily life. It is possible that 
different results would have been obtained if these same thoughts were suppressed in the 
same environment that they were deemed intrusive in the first place (see Trinder & 
Salkovskis, 1994). 
(3) Individual Differences in Thought-suppression and The Rebound Effect 
The research described above on the methods used to investigate the rebound effect and 
on the type of thought used in these experiment does not completely account for the 
discrepant findings. This has lead to the suggestion that there may be individual 
difference factors at work that affect when and where rebound effects will be found. 
Rutledge et al. (1993) and Rutledge et al. (1996) provide evidence that certain individual 
difference variables may affect whether a rebound effect is obtained or not in a particular 
study. For example, in their first study on thought suppression Rutledge et al. (1993) 
failed to replicate the Wegner et al. (1987) findings. However, they suggested this could 
have been due to such variables as ability. The participants in the studies of Wegner and 
his colleagues were all students at selective universities where the average American 
college testing score was above average, whereas the participants tested by Rutledge and 
her colleagues came from an open admissions university where the American college 
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testing scores were average. To test this hypothesis, the participants from the Rutledge et 
al. (1993; 1996) studies were re-examined and classed as rebounders or non-rebounders. 
Rutledge et al. used a within subjects design as shown below in Figure 1.4. Rebounders 
were defined as those participants who experienced an increase in the number of white 
bear thoughts (during expression) after suppression compared to expression prior to 
suppression. These groups were then compared on their American college testing scores. 
In line with predictions, the few participants who did experience the rebound effect had 
higher American college testing scores than the non-rebounders. 
FIGURE 1.4 -A WITHIN SUBJECTS DESIGN FOR ASSESSING THE REBOUND EFFECT. SINGLE SIDED ARROWS 
INDICATE THE TEMPORAL FLOW OF THE ExPERimENT. THE DOUBLE SIDED ARROW SHOWS WHICH TWO 
GROUPS ARE COMPARED ON THEIR MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN ORDER TO ASSESS THE 
REBOUND EFFECr. 
Baseline Expression Suppression Final Expression 
In another study, Rutledge et al. (1996) provided further evidence that individual 
differences may play a role in the contradictory findings about the rebound effect. Once 
again the repeated measures design was used as shown in Figure 1.4. Participants were 
first asked to express thoughts of a "white beat", then to suppress thoughts of the white 
bear and then finally to again express thoughts of the white bear. All thought 
verbalisation periods lasted 9 minutes. The results indicated that 36.4 % of the sample 
experienced a rebound effect (an increase in white bear thoughts following suppression). 
Thus, 63.6 % showed no evidence of increased thinking about white bears after 
suppression. A regression model was created predicting thought rebound. The significant 
predictors were American college testing score (higher scores predicted greater rebound 
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effects), gender interacted with thought intrusion (more thought intrusions during 
suppression predicted more rebound for males only), obsessionality (less obsessionality 
predicted more rebound), trait anxiety (less anxiety predicted more rebound), race (whites 
rebounded more than blacks). 
These findings suggest that certain variables may mediate or modify possible 
relationships between thought-suppression and a post-suppression rebound effect. 
However, there are several problems with the studies of Rutledge and her colleagues. For 
example, they took measures of crystallized and fluid intelligence (Horn 1975) in the 
second experiment, yet do not refer to these in the results section other than to say there 
was a significant correlation between thought rebound and crystallized intelligence. This 
is an important point because Rutledge et al. (1996) are keen to point out that higher 
American college testing scores predict greater thought rebound. However, one would 
think that intelligence may well mediate this effect. Another confusing aspect concerning 
the studies of Rutledge et al. (1993; 1996) is that they found negative correlations 
between the rebound effect and obsessionality and negative correlations between the 
rebound effect and anxiety. These findings are somewhat puzzling because there is now 
much evidence to suggest that there is a high and stable correlation between the extent to 
which one uses thought-suppression in daily life and trait anxiety (Muris et al. 1996; 
Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). 
Perhaps the most important problem with the research reported by Rutledge et al. is that 
they always used a within subjects design (see Figure 1.4). This is quite different from 
the methods used by virtually all other researchers. One could question the effect of 
having all participants express their thoughts at the outset, then suppress and then express 
again. In a personal communication Daniel Wegner has expressed doubts about the 
suitability of the within participants design to measure the rebound, as there is no 
comparison group and one does not know the possible effects of the initial expression 
period. In addition in the studies of Rutledge and her colleagues each verbalisation 
session was for 9 minutes which seems a very long time, especially in view of the fact 
that simply by introducing the repeated measures design they are also introducing another 
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verbalisation period. Thus, by the time participants engage in the final verbalisation 
session they have been verbalising for 27 minutes. In the original Wegner et al. (1987) 
studies verbalisation was for 5 minutes with two verbalisation periods. The effects of 27 
minutes of verbalisation might well make one less likely to find rebound effects as a 
result of habituation or exhaustion simply as a result of the large amount of time spent on 
thought verbalisation. Taken together, these problems indicate that much more research is 
needed before one can make firm conclusions regarding the effects of individual 
differences on the rebound effect. 
The only other study to examine the effects of individual differences on thought 
suppression was Brewin and Beaton (2002). They looked at the relationship between 
thought-suppression, intelligence and working memory capacity. Brewin and Beaton 
(2002) had participants perform a thought-suppression task and also tests of working 
memory capacity, fluid and crystallised intelligence. They found that more effective 
thought-suppression was related to both higher working memory capacity and higher 
fluid intelligence, but was not related to crystallised intelligence. This suggests therefore 
that higher fluid IQ may make one a more effective suppressor. The current thesis also 
directly investigates this question (Chapter 4). 
Finally, one additional but important reason for believing that individual differences may 
play a role in rebound effects was highlighted by Rassin et al. (2000). They refer to a 
study conducted by Merckelbach et al. (1991) where a positive relationship was found 
between the number of target thoughts during active suppression and the number of 
thoughts during the post-suppression period. Therefore, the participants who were less 
successful at thought suppression and reported a high frequency of thoughts during 
suppression also reported more thoughts in the post-suppression period. This suggests 
there may be individual difference factors at work which may make people a poor or 
good suppressor and in addition may affect their propensity to experience rebound 
effects. This will be directly examined in the current thesis, where we will examine a 
range of individual difference variables and relate this to participants "ability" at 
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suppression or expression and their propensity to experience the rebound effect in the 
laboratory (Chapters 3 and 4). 
(5) Summary of Experimental Studies of Mental Control and Rebound Effect 
This section has reviewed the possible reasons for the controversy in the thought 
suppression literature over the rebound effect. Of the studies that failed to find a rebound 
effect, many introduced procedures that may have led to the rebound effect not occurring. 
One possible source of confusion in the literature is the wide variety of paradigms used to 
index the rebound effect. However, it must be borne in mind that even when rebound 
effects are found they tend to be weak to medium, thereby necessitating large samples 
(Ambramowitz et al., 2001). The situation is further complicated by individual 
differences that may make people more or less susceptible to the rebound effect. It seems 
people of higher ability, as measured by their university entrance exams and intelligence 
tests, may be more likely to demonstrate the rebound effect (Rutledge et al., 1996). The 
type of thought that is to be suppressed is also influential in the outcome of these studies. 
One point of agreement in the literature is that negative or positive thoughts are 
consistently rated as harder to suppress than neutral thoughts (Petrie et al., 1998). The 
same is true of personally relevant thoughts, which are again harder to suppress than 
neutral thoughts. Some of the studies failed to demonstrate a rebound effect precisely 
because the suppression group could not successfully suppress the thought at all (Davies 
& Clark, 1998). 
111. Theoretical Accounts of The Rebound Effect 
Several theoretical explanations have been put forward by various researchers to explain 
the rebound effect. These explanations will now be examined together with some new 
theoretical ideas about the nature and mechanism of the rebound effect proposed in this 
thesis. 
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(1) Distracter Association Theory 
The earliest suggestion of a mechanism underlying the rebound effect was the distracter 
association theory (Wegner et al., 1987). This theory is based on the observation that 
when people want to suppress a thought they try to distract themselves by thinking about 
many other things. This is well documented in virtually all thought-suppression 
experiments and can be easily verified by listening to the taped thought verbalisations. 
According to the distracter association theory it could be the use of many varied 
distracters that is responsible for the rebound effect. For example, most of the self- 
generated distracters used by the participants were from the immediate environment, yet 
most of these did not hold the participant's attention for long, and attention soon drifted 
back to the to-be-suppressed thought. At this point another distracter was found and the 
cycle repeated. The result of this cycle is that associations are created between the 
distracters and the unwanted thought. Thus, when suppression efforts are stopped, all of 
the distracters can potentially serve as reminders of the suppressed target, producing the 
rebound effect. 
This account has support from experiments which have shown that use of a single 
(experimenter generated) distracter reduces the rebound effect (Wegner et al. 1987). For 
example, Wegner et al. (1987) ran an experiment where participants were asked to 
suppress thoughts of a "white bear" by focusing on a red Volkswagen. In this experiment 
no rebound effect was found. Additionally, if the environment is changed during the post- 
suppression expression period (period 2), the rebound effect is either greatly diminished 
or does not occur at all (Muris et al., 1993; Wegner et al., 1991). However, the rebound 
effect is not always totally eliminated by using these manipulations (Macrae et al., 1994). 
Furthermore, the distracter association theory may account for the findings that 
suppressing personally relevant intrusive thoughts in a laboratory does not always lead to 
a rebound effect. This could be due to the environment being different from the 
environment in which the same thoughts are traditionally suppressed (i. e., the home 
environment). 
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However, the distracter-association account has problems accounting for the finding that 
under high cognitive load participants who actively suppress the target thought end up 
having more thoughts of the target than a group of participants intentionally expressing 
the target. This effect has been termed the immediate enhancement effect and is distinct 
from the rebound effect (Wegner & Erber 1992; Wenzlaff & Wegner 2000). 
(2) The Ironic Process Theory 
The Ironic Process Theory was introduced by Wegner and colleagues (1992; 1994). 
Broadly, this theory suggests that suppressing thoughts requires the involvement of two 
distinct mechanisms. One is an intentional operating process that seeks distracters and 
thoughts designed to maintain the desired state, i. e. not thinking about the suppressed 
thought. This process is effortful and designed to maintain a distracter in consciousness 
(this process has also been termed the controlled distracter search). The other mechanism 
is an ironic monitoring process that continually searches for instances of the to-be- 
suppressed thought in consciousness which will signal a failure of suppression. This 
ironic monitoring process is thought to be an automatic process and therefore not 
consumptive of cognitive resources (this process is sometimes referred to as the 
automatic target search). In the course of thought suppression these two processes are 
proposed to operate to-ether as a feedback mechanism aimed at controlling thought. 0 
In addition, Wegner and his colleagues (1992; 1994; 1997) have suggested that the 
controlled distracter search, being a controlled process is more susceptible to interference 
than the automatic ironic monitoring process. For example, if a person attempting mental 
control is under high load or in a dual task situation the resultant lack of cognitive 
resources will have a detrimental effect on the controlled distracter search leaving the 
ironic monitor relatively untouched. The effect would be that the very thought one was 
attempting to avoid would spring to mind with greatly increased frequency. This is 
exactly what has been found where participants have been put under high load during 
active suppression (Wegner & Erber, 1992). Thus, this theory can account for the 
immediate enhancement effect. 
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This theory is currently the most comprehensive explanation of the rebound effect. 
In support of this position, thought-suppression has been shown to enhance the 
accessibility of suppressed targets both during active suppression (Wegner and Erber, 
1992) and subsequent to active suppression (Macrae, et al 1994). However, this account 
is not without some limitations. One of these is that the mechanism by which the ironic 
monitor raises the activation level of suppressed thoughts relative to expressed thoughts 
is not made explicit. This issue will be raised in more depth in Chapter 6 where the 
activation levels of previously suppressed and expressed thoughts will be examined in an 
experiment. 
(3) The Goal Interruption Theory 
Another theory which may in part explain why the rebound effect occurs is that of Goal 
Interruption. Martin and Tesser (1996) propose a model of ruminative thought in which 
rumination (repetitive thought on one topic similar to preoccupation) occurs as a direct 
result of failure to accomplish one's goals. According to this position, the rebound effect 
may reflect rumination as a result of having failed to attain the recent goal of successfully 
suppressing a thought (Martin & Tesser, 1996). Indeed, suppression is rarely, if ever, 
totally successful and it is natural for people to ruminate about their unsuccessful (or 
interrupted) goals. 
Support for this notion comes from a study by Martin et al. (1993). They had participants 
either express or suppress thoughts of a white bear prior to undertaking a word 
recognition task designed to assess the activation level of the target (white bear). 
However, before presenting the word recognition task, half of the suppression 
participants received feedback suggesting they were very good at suppressing thoughts. 
This success feedback was designed to eliminate the sense of goal tension. In contrast, 
the other suppression participants received no feedback. After these manipulations, all 
participants were presented with the word recognition task. This word recognition task 
included words related to the target (polar bear, iceberg), words relating to the 
experimental setting which were distracter words (experiment, psychologist) and 
unrelated control words (electricity). The rebound effect was assessed via reaction times 
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to each of these stimuli, under the assumption that if the rebound effect was in operation 
reaction times to recognising target related words would be reliably faster than the times 
to recognise unrelated or distracter words. The success feedback eliminated the rebound 
effect that was still evident in the no feedback condition (i. e. faster reaction times to the 
target related words than to the distracter or control words). This study suggests that the 
success feedback eliminated the rebound effect because it took away the participants need 
to ruminate about the failure of the previous task of suppressing a thought. 
Although this suggests another way of looking at the rebound effect it has not been 
systematically evaluated other than by the study by Martin et al. (1993). Therefore, prior 
to evaluating the theory, more research designed to verify or refute the premises of this 
theory is needed. 
(4) Intentional explanation of the rebound effect. 
In this thesis a new and different account of the rebound effect is proposed. This account 
is based on the concept of intention and the so-called Intention Superiority Effect (see 
below). Wegner (1996) admits that thought suppression is preceded by an intention not to 
think about certain constructs. However, it is known that formulating an intention leads to 
the intention being stored at a heightened activation level (heightened readiness for use) 
(Kuhl 1994). Goschke and Kuhl (1993) demonstrated, by using implicit tests, that 
intention-related information is recognised reliably faster than unrelated information. In 
their experiments participants had to learn two scripts describing simple actions (e. g. 
setting the table, clearing a desk). After learning both action scripts participants were 
informed that one of these scripts would have to be performed later in the experiment, the 
other would not have to be performed. Before performance of the action script all 
participants completed a recognition test where it was found that words from the to be 
performed script were recognised significantly faster than words from the alternative not 
to be performed script. It is important to note that this effect is shown in implicit tests that 
are not subject to conscious interference. The reaction times used in this paradigm make 
it highly unlikely that participants consciously altered their strategies when faced with 
intention related information. Thus, it seems these effects are likely to be automatic. This 
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automatic advantage for intentional information in one's declarative memory has been 
labelled the Intention Superiority Effect and has been replicated and extended by other 
researchers (e. g. Marsh, Hicks & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks & Bryan, 1999). Marsh et al. 
(1998) examined the activation levels of various intentions and whether they changed 
depending on the intentions status as fulfilled or unfulfilled. They found that information 
relating to uncompleted intentions was recognised faster (had higher activational status) 
than control material with no associated intention. In addition, they found that the 
recognition latencies of completed intentions were slower than that of control material 
(no associated intention). Marsh et al. (1998) go on to suggest this could represent active 
inhibition of completed intentions. 
However, of greater relevance to the current thesis is that Goschke and Kuhl (1994) and 
Kuhl (1994) have consistently argued that the Intention Superiority Effect is affected by 
personality factors. This contention was largely ignored by the later researchers who 
replicated the effect (Marsh, Hicks & Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks & Bryan, 1999). Kuhl 
(1994) showed that intention superiority effects are mediated by a particular personality 
dimension which they call state vs. action orientation. State orientation is characterised 
by a persisting activation of intentions and a conscious rumination on them irrespective 
of whether they have to be carried out promptly or not. State orientation is also 
characterised by a tendency to have involuntary intrusion about future goals or previous 
failed goals. Thus, state orientated individuals will continue to ruminate even on 
completed intentions (Kuhl, 1994; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). 
According to Kuhl (1994), state orientated individuals do not show a deactivation of 
intentions after successful completion. In contrast, action oriented participants do 
deactivate intentions after formulation and are therefore not so prone to intention related 
intrusive thoughts. Indeed, Goschke and Kuhl (1994) provide evidence that the Intention 
Superiority Effect is stronger for state orientated participants than for action oriented 
participants. They suggest that in "state orientated subjects the explicit, episodic 
representation of a postponed intention persisted in an active state even if external cues 
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were available and active maintenance of the intention was not necessary. " (Goschke & 
Kuhl, 1993, p. 74). 
At present state and action oriented individuals are identified through a dual response 
format questionnaire designed by Kuhl (1994). This questionnaire is comprised of three 
sub-scales each assessing a slightly different aspect of the global dimension of state vs. 
action orientation. The first sub-scale "action orientation subsequent to failure vs. 
preoccupation" (AOF) assesses a person's reaction to failure and contrasts a ruminative 
or preoccupied style of information processing (indicative of State orientation) with a 
style characterised by lack of rumination and easy adaptation to the experience of failure 
(Action orientation). The second sub-scale "perspective and decision-related action 
orientation vs. hesitation" (AOD) assesses a person's ability to initiate intended actions 
and contrasts a hesitant style (indicative of state orientation) with a style characterised by 
an appropriate initiation of intentions at the desired moment (indicative of action 
orientation). The third and final sub-scale "performance-related action orientation vs. 
volatility" (AOP) assesses the ability to stay within self-initiated desirable activities 
without shifting attention prematurely to alternative activities. The premature shift away 
from desirable activities would represent state orientation whereas continuing with the 
desirable activity would represent action orientation. 
The intention superiority account offers an alternative explanation for the rebound effect. 
The rebound effect is based on the fact that when the decision to suppress is made the 
person formulates an intention to suppress a thought, which then leads to all the 
suppressed content having heightened levels of activation as a result of its intentional 
status. Although Marsh et al. (1998; 1999) have shown that completed intentions are 
deactivated and inhibited, it is likely that suppressed thoughts can never be properly 
deactivated as one is never fully successful at thought-suppression (i. e. one has 
formulated an intention which is impossible to fulfil or complete), unless one adopts a 
relatively lenient criterion of what counts as successful thought suppression (e. g. three 
thoughts an hour). Most importantly, this theory can be tested directly. In particular, if the 
intentional theory of thought suppression is plausible one would expect to find a much 
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weaker rebound effect (or none at all) in action orientated participants and a much 
stronger rebound effect in state orientated participants. This prediction was tested in 
Study I described in Chapter 3. 
(5) Summary of Theoretical Accounts of Mental Control and the Rebound Effect 
The previous section reviewed various theoretical models of the mechanisms underlying 
the rebound effect. Currently the Ironic Process Theory (Wegner 1992; 1994) is the most 
widely accepted explanation of the rebound effect. However, despite its acceptance the 
ironic process theory proposes that an unconscious search operates continually in the 
background looking for failures of thought suppression. The mechanisms that underlie 
this continuous automatic search process are ill-defined and subject to different 
interpretations (e. g., Macrae et al., 1994; Wegner, 1994). The current thesis puts forward 
an alternative intentional explanation of the rebound effect that does not hypothesise an 
unconscious search process but explains the rebound as a function of the activation of 
intentional representations. This seems to provide a more parsimonious explanation of 
the processes involved in the rebound effect. 
IV. The tendency to Use Thought Suppression In Everyday Life and Personality 
Research on thought suppression has evolved into two separate areas of investigation. 
One is represented by the experimental research reviewed in depth above. Another is 
based on correlations of questionnaire data collected via various instruments. These two 
methods of investigating mental control (experimental manipulation and correlation 
methods) have to an extent remained separate with few studies using both methods within 
the same study. The current thesis will employ both methods in an effort to increase the 
generality of findings, but also in an effort to increase convergent validity by examining 
the effects of thought suppression from multiple angles. 
One questionniare, designed by Wegner and Zanakos (1994), is known as the White Bear 
Suppression inventory (WBSI). It was designed to assess the frequency with which a 
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person uses thought suppression in everyday life. This measure is often used to examine 
correlations between the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life and other 
individual difference measures and psychopathological indices. 
Another instrument used is the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ - Wells & Davies 
1994). The Thought Control Questionnaire was developed to assess the tendency to 
control thoughts in everyday life by varied means (Wells & Davies, 1994). The Thought 
Control Questionnaire assesses peoples' preferred methods of thought control (for 
example, avoidance by distraction, social methods, worrying, self punishment and 
reappraisal of the thoughts). However, despite the usefulness of this scale it has remained 
little used in thought suppression research relative to the WBSI. Only a few clinically 
oriented studies have reported using it to assess relations between thought suppression 
tendencies and psychopathology (Myers, 1998; Purdon, 1999). To date only one study 
has examined the relations between the WBSI and the Thought Control Questionnaire 
(Muris et al. 1996). They found a weak positive correlation between the total TCQ score 
and the WBSI (r (172) =. 22 p <. 01). 
(1) Psychometric Properties of the White Bear Suppression Inventory 
In the original development of the WBS1, Wegner and Zanakos (1994) set out to examine 
not only the factor structure of the WBSI, but also its stability over a three month period. 
The correlation between WBSI scores at test and retest after 3 months was . 69. Wegner 
and Zanakos (1994) therefore argue that the WBSI measures a tendency that can be 
regarded as a stable personality trait. 
Muris et al. (1996) also examined the psychometric properties of the WBSI. Using a 
sample of 172 participants, they found it to be a reliable instrument, Chronbach's alpha 
was 0.89 and a 12 week test retest correlation was 0.80. In addition, this study was in 
agreement with the original Wegner and Zanakos study which reported a one factor 
solution. A more recent investigation of the psychometric properties of this scale 
(Blumberg, 2000) used a much larger sample than the Muris et al. (1996) study (N 
935). Here, three factors were found and labelled unwanted intrusive thoughts, thought- 
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suppression and self-distraction. In addition, it was found that the second and third 
factors were more likely to be endorsed by women. In other words, women were more 
likely to report these avoidant strategies. 
The most recent investigation of the psychometric properties of the WBSI was conducted 
by H6ping and Jong-Meyer (2002). These researchers factor analysed the scale in a 
sample of 276 non-clinical participants. Using orthogonal rotation a two-factor solution 
was arrived at. The factors were labelled as "Unwanted intrusive thoughts" and 
"thought-suppression". The authors noted that the correlations with psychopathological 
measures were due almost exclusively to the factor of unwanted intrusive thoughts and 
not thought-suppression. They suggest it is doubtful that the full scale primarily assesses 
a disposition to suppress unwanted thoughts. 
It would seem therefore, that there is sufficient doubt to question whether the VVBSI only 
measures the tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life. The two studies that found 
more than one dimension underlying the scale (Blumberg, 2000; H6ping and Jong- 
Meyer, 2002) both suggest that one further dimension it assesses is "unwanted intrusive 
thoughts". In addition, the items they list as falling under this factor are similar. When 
examining the scale itself one often feels that some of the items do seem to assess 
something more like unwanted intrusion than the tendency to suppress thoughts. For 
example item 3 of the scale is "I have thoughts I can not stop", and item 9 is "there are 
thoughts that keep jumping into my head". Both of these items seem intuitively to be 
related to intrusive thought and not necessarily to the use of thought suppression. Perhaps 
it is not surprising that both Blumberg (2000) and Hoping and Jong-Meyer (2002) found 
these items to load on the unwanted intrusions factor. 
Studies usina this measure and relating it to performance during a suppression task in the 0 
laboratory have demonstrated that participants with high WBSI scores (i. e. a high 
tendency to use thought-suppression in everyday life) demonstrate more intrusions during 
active suppression, but also during expression after previous suppression (Muris, 
Merckelbach & Horselenberg, 1996; Van den Hout et al., 1996). This interesting and 
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somewhat counterintuitive finding seems to provide additional evidence in support of the 
idea that the WBSI is measuring something akin to proneness to experiencing thought 
intrusions in addition to thought suppression. 
(2) The Relationship of The WBSI with other individual difference measures and 
psychopathological indices 
The original paper by Wegner and Zanakos (1994) found that the WBSI to correlated 
positively and strongly with several measures of psychopathology. This paper had the 
advantage of using very large samples, often with 600 participants. Thus, the correlation 
between the WBSI and Beck Depression Inventory and the Maudsley Obsessive 
Compulsive Inventory (MOCI) was . 45 and . 40, respectively in a sample of 609 students. 
The correlation with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory was . 53 in a sample of 199. 
Finally, the correlation with the Anxiety Sensitivity Inventory was . 49 in a sample of 133. 
These correlations between the propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life and 
various indices of psychopathology have been replicated by other researchers. For 
example, Muris et al. (1996) found the following correlations between the WBSI and 
various measures of psychopathology in a sample of 172 university undergraduates: Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (. 57), Eysenck Personality Inventory Neuroticism scale (. 46), Student 
Worry Scale (. 38), Beck Depression Inventory (. 54), Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive 
Inventory (. 35) and the Unwanted Intrusions Questionnaire (. 40). 
Thus, if one accepts that the WBSI is measuring the tendency to suppress thoughts in 
everyday life then there is clear evidence that this is linked to increased psychopathology. 
These findings have been replicated by other researchers (Muris & Merckelbach, 1997; 
Van den Hout et al., 1996). However due to the correlational nature of these studies direct 
statements about possible causality can not be made. It could be that greater use of 
thought suppression may lead to greater psychopathology or it could be that greater 
psychopathology leads to heightened use of thought suppression. In addition, there 
always exists a possibility that some other (currently unknown) variable causes both the 
elevated psychopathology and thought suppression. 
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(3) WBSI and Dissociation 
Further research has investigated possible links between thought-suppression and the 
phenomenon of dissociation. Dissociation has been defined as a "breakdown in the 
usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, perception of self or the 
environment" (p. 755 American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Dissociation is 
conceptualised as a non-conscious process in that the person is unaware that they use this 
strategy. Research by Van den Hout et al. (1996) found that scores on the WBSI and the 
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) correlated significantly and positively r =. 52. A 
later study by Muris and Merckelbach (1997) also found a positive correlation between 
WBSI scores and DES scores (r =35). The most recent study by Spinhoven and van der 
Does (1999) examined the WBSI in a clinical sample. The WBSI was found to correlate 
positively with all dimensions of psychopathology measured by the Symptom Checklist- 
90 and was not found to differ between patients with affective disorder, anxiety disorder 
or no psychiatric diagnosis. However, the WBSI scores were found to be unrelated to 
measures of dissociation when controlling for level of psychopathology. Thus, it appears 
that although both thought-suppression and dissociation are associated with 
psychopathology, they are relatively independent. 
(4) The WBS1 and Thought Action Fusion 
Thought Action Fusion (TAF) refers to a cognitive bias whereby a person has an inflated 
sense of responsibility for their thoughts. In everyday terms people with high scores on 
TAF scales believe that thinking of an act is as bad as actually carrying out that act. For 
example, they would view thinking of murdering a colleague to be almost as bad as 
actually murdering the colleague. Conceptually, this has been linked to greater thought- 
intrusion, just as thought-suppression has (Shafran et al., 1996). 
Rassin and his colleagues have conducted several studies looking into possible relations 
between thought-suppression and TAF (Rassin, 200 1; Rassin et al., 1999,2000,200 1). 
In the first study, Rassin et al. (1999) tried deliberately to manipulate people's sense of 
responsibility for their thoughts. In a decisive experiment, Rassin et al. (1999) made 
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participants believe that their thoughts could be recorded by an EEG machine. 
Specifically, participants were told that every time they thought of the word "apple" the 
machine would pick this up and give a small electric shock to a participant in an adjacent 
room. Control participants were not informed about shocks being administered but were 
still under the assumption that their thoughts could be known from the EEG machine. 
Rassin et al. (1999) found that experimentally induced thought action fusion resulted in 
more thought-intrusion, and greater discomfort. Thus, they concluded that TAF may 
contribute to the transformation of normal intrusions into obsessive intrusions. 
As a direct result of this study, Rassin et al. (2000) went on to investigate in more depth 
the relations between thought-control and TAR In particular they investigated the 
possible relations between scores on TAF and thought-suppression as measured by the 
WBSI. They rationale was that TAF and thought-suppression may well interact or work 
synergistically to create extreme intrusions. They administered questionnaire measures of 
TAF, and the WBSI and the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory to 173 
undergraduates. A structural equation modelling approach was used to examine which of 
the hypothesised models best fitted the data. The results indicated that TAF was indeed a 
precursor to thought-suppression and thought-suppression was a precursor to greater 
levels of obsessionality. A model with a direct path from WBSI scores to obsession 
scores did not fit the data well. This suggests that the role of thought-suppression is a 
mediational one coming between TAF and obsessions in the causal chain. 
Unfortunately, these encoura ing findings were not replicated in the later studies of 9 V., 
Rassin and his colleagues (Rassin 2001; Rassin et al., 2001). It is possible that results 
were not replicated due to using clinical samples in these studies. Another possible reason 
is that there is now evidence that TAF scores are not stable over time and therefore do not 
display trait like qualities. Thus, in the Rassin et al. (2000) study TAF scores of students 
significantly dropped after 3 months. In contrast there is evidence that scores on the 
WBSI do not vary much over time (Wegner and Zanakos, 1994). 
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(5) Summary of Questionnaire Measures of Thought Control 
The WBSI has been shown to be a reliable instrument for measuring a person's tendency 
to use thought suppression in everyday life. In addition, the research discussed above has 
consistently demonstrated large associations between the tendency to use thought 
suppression and various indices of psychopathology, most notably, anxiety, depression 
and obsessive compulsive disorder. The current thesis examined in detail the relationship 
between a range of psychopathology indices and both the WBSI and the TCQ. These 
were examined in two samples, one of young adults and one of older adults. The work 
focusing on older adults is important as to date all of the studies investigating the 
relations between use of thought suppression and psychopathology have used young 
samples. Thus, almost nothing is known about the prevalence or the use of thought 
suppression and its effectiveness in old age. The current thesis examined the tendency to 
suppress thoughts and the mental control strategies used by older adults (over 65 years of 
age) by administering the WBSI and TCQ to a sample of healthy older adults and will 
attempt to assess the amount they use thought suppression in everyday life compared to a 
sample of undergraduate students (Chapter 8). 
V. Thought-suppression, Rumination and Repression 
Two variables that have both been linked to various psychopathologies but also to 
thought suppression are rumination and repression. The relevant research on these 
phenomena and their possible relation to thought suppression will now be examined. 
(1) Rumination and Thought Suppression 
Rumination has been defined as a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a 
certain theme and recur frequently for an extended period of time, often in the absence of 
immediate environmental demands requiring the thought (Martin & Tesser 1989; 1996). 
Content wise, ruminative thoughts may be neutral, positive or negative. Examples of 
rumination include day-dreaming, reliving successes and anticipating pleasures as well as 
disasters. As such, rumination could be conceptualised as the antithesis of thought- 
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suppression. However, there are various theoretical positions which suggest these two 
processes may well have great impact on each other. 
Broadly speaking there are two main positions as regards rumination and its possible 
relation to thought suppression. The first was advanced by Martin and Tesser (1989; 
1996). They suggest that rumination or repetitive thought is related to unattained goals 
and that unexpected progress towards goals (either approaching one's goal too fast or not 
fast enough) will instigate rumination. Once instigated, rumination can interfere with 
other processing and can be aversive (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 1994). As a result, people 
may attempt to suppress the ruminative intrusions in an effort to restore mental balance. 
However, Martin and Tesser (1996) go further in suggesting that rumination may be the 
mechanism underlying paradoxical effects often found with thought suppression. Thus, a 
person attempting thought suppression has a goal not to think about a certain topic, but as 
this is a difficult, if not impossible task they do think about the to-be-avoided thought 
even during active suppression. As they are having problems approaching the goal of not 
thinking about X they begin to ruminate on why they can not avoid these thoughts, 
resulting in a paradoxical increase in thinking of the very thought they were trying to 
avoid. 
The second position regarding the relation of rumination to thought suppression has been 
advanced by Erber and Wegner (1996). Whilst accepting that blocked goals may in some 
cases lead to rumination they suggest that the main cause of rumination is thought 
suppression itself. Erber and Wegner (1996) state that people try to suppress thoughts that 
are unwanted. The act of suppression then paradoxically increases the accessibility of the 
suppressed thought via the ironic process theory (see page 41) leading to the return of the 
previously suppressed thought and rumination on it. Once again Erber and Wegner 
(1996) also postulate a cyclical process where thought suppression leads to rumination 
which may again instigate more suppression and so on. 
Both Martin and Tesser (1996) and Erber and Wegner (1996) accept that thought 
suppression can lead to rumination, but they explain this process through the operation of 
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different mechanisms. For Martin and Tesser (1996) it is the failure of thought 
suppression (i. e. the goal not being realised) that "causes" thought rebound or rumination. 
For Erber and Wegner (1996) it is the operation of the ironic monitoring process that 
leads to thought rebound and rumination not because the goal of successful suppression 
had not been realised. 
Despite the importance of the concept of rumination to thought suppression and the 
theoretical views of Martin and Tesser (1996) and Erber and Wegner (1996) there 
remains virtually no research looking into the possible relation between rumination and 
thought suppression. 
The current thesis will investigate the possible relations between rumination and the use 
of thought suppression in everyday life. In addition this thesis will also examine whether 
the rebound effect itself is affected by participants tendency to ruminate a lot in everyday 
life as assessed by the Rumination Inventory (McIntosh and Martin, 1992). 
(2) Repression and Thought Suppression 
Repression represents a particular style of interacting with the world whereby negative 
information is automatically avoided by the repressive person. One way to view the 
concept of repression is as a form of unconscious avoidance, or an unconscious (and 
automatised) thought suppression. Repression is now mainly treated as a trait-like 
variable (a relatively stable individual difference between people). Weinberger et al. 
(1979) were the first to formulate a reliable questionnaire method of identifying 
repressors or people with a repressive coping style. The Weinberger et al. (1979) method 
identifies repressors on the basis of participants' scores on questionnaires measuring 
anxiety and defensiveness. The table below clarifies the four-fold classification system 
they developed for this purpose. 
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TABLE 12 - THE CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM OF WEINBERGER Er AL. 1979 FOR REPRESSIVE 
COPING STYLE 
Defensiveness (Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability) 
Low High 
Trait Anxiety 
Low Low anxious Repressors 
(Spielberger 
High Non defensive high anxious Defensive high anxious Inventory) 
Table 1.2 shows that repressors are people who show low anxiety (usually defined as 
below the normative median on an anxiety inventory such as the Taylor Manifest Anxiety 
Inventory (1983) or the Trait Anxiety Inventory by Speilberger et al., 1983) whilst at the 
same time scoring high on measures of defensiveness (usually defined as participants 
scoring above the upper quartile of the normative values for the Marlowe Crowne scale 
of Social Desirability, 1964). Most studies using the Weinberger et al. (1979) method of 
identifying repressors have shown about 10 to 20 % of their samples to be repressors 
(Myers, 2000). However, these percentages have been mainly established in samples of 
young participants (usually undergraduate students). 
Many studies have now shown that when placed in stressful situations people with a 
repressive coping style report no anxiety yet show high levels of physiological reactivity 
as assessed by heart rate and blood pressure (Asendorpf & Scherer, 1983). What makes 
this finding interesting is that non-repressive individuals with low self-reported anxiety 
do not show this physiological reactivity to anxiety provoking stimuli. In other words, in r) 
people with a repressive coping style there is a discrepancy between self-reported anxiety 
and physiological indices of anxiety. 
Derakshan and Eysenck (1998,1999) provide evidence that repressors are truly unaware 
of their own repressiveness (avoidance). They asked repressors and non-repressors to 
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complete anxiety inventories and measures of defensiveness. They then asked 
participants to complete the same questionnaires whilst being connected via electrodes to 
a machine which resembled a lie detector. In addition, participants were informed that 
this machine was able to tell if they were telling the truth. This procedure is known as the 
"bogus pipeline". The scores of repressors did not change over the two time periods 
suggesting that repressors are self deceivers. 
There are theoretical reasons to believe that thought suppression and repression may be 
related. It is well known that over time routine behaviours become automatised to the 
extent that they can be performed whilst consuming minimal cognitive resources. A 
prime example of this would be driving. When one first attempts to drive it is almost an 
impossible task but, after a few months of practice, it becomes a skill one can perform 
whilst simultaneously having a complicated and detailed conversation with a passenger. 
In relation to thought suppression, Singer and Sincoff (1990) have raised an interesting 
question as to whether repeated efforts at conscious suppression may lead to a gradual 
autornatisation of the process. They suggest that "repression may develop after a series of 
conscious suppressions, and the two processes may not be that different after all" (p. 
477). To date, only one study has attempted to look at the effects of repeated practice on 
a suppression task. This study (Jordan & Wegner, 2003), had participants practise 
thought-suppression over four experimental sessions, one week apart. Somewhat 
surprisingly, despite using the same target over the first three weeks and then switching 
to a new target in week 4, participants displayed no improvement in suppression 
performance relative to a control group. The main message from the above preliminary 
study is that in this case practise at thought-suppression did not lead to the participants 
being any more successful over repeated suppression trials with the same target. With the 
above example, one could question whether four practice sessions are enough. It seems 
likely that in a naturalistic setting, a person may suppress the same construct hundreds, if 
not thousands, of times. This could then possibly become automatised. 
In one of the only studies to directly examine the effects of repressive coping style on 
conscious mental control abilities, Champion (1998) found that repressors were much 
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more successful at thought-suppression than non-repressors. However, this evidence must 
be viewed with caution, as it is known that repressors score very highly on scales of 
social desirability. Therefore, the low number of thoughts they report during suppression 
may merely reflect that they do not wish to report truthfully the accurate number of 
conscious intrusions. Of course, it may also show they are genuinely better at thought- 
suppression, but future research needs to untangle this question. 
In conclusion, it seems that being a 'repressor' is an individual difference variable with 
10 to 20 % of young undergraduate samples being classified as repressors. Repressors are 
claimed to display an automatic tendency to avoid negative or threatening information 
(Dawkins & Fumham, 1989; Myers & McKenna, 1996). They also report, and indeed the 
evidence suggests, that they have little awareness that this is the case. More importantly 
for this thesis is that whatever methods repressors are using, they appear to be successful 
at avoiding, or claiming to avoid their unwanted thoughts, something where more 
conscious suppression is not successful. It seems to truly avoid thoughts one does not 
like, one needs'to eliminate the thoughts themselves, but in addition one also needs to 
drive out the very idea that anything has been dispelled. 
The following new classification system may help to clarify some of the issues that have 
been discussed in this section. The system classifies mental control operations according 
to two dimensions. The first dimension refers to a distinction between conscious and 
unconscious mental processes. The second is the distinction between the suppressive 
(avoidant) and expressive forms of mental control. This leads to the four fold 
classification of mental control operations presented in table 1.3 below. 
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TABLE 1.3 -A NEw 2 (UNCONSCIOUS VS. CONSCIOUS) X2 (AVOIDANT VS. EXPRESSIVE) 
CIASSIFICATION SYSTEM OF MENTAL OPERATIONS 
Unconscious Conscious 
Avoidant Repression Thought Suppression 
Expressive / focusing Automatic noticing of 
threatening information 
Focusing, thought 
expression 
The current thesis will examine the rates of repressors and non-repressors in a sample of 
young adults, but also in a sample of older adults (over 60 years). The rates of repression 
(proportion of older and younger participants who are repressors) in the two samples are 
directly compared in Chapter 9. 
VI. Goals, Intentions and Conscious Will 
The final two sections of the literature review examine mental control from the broader 
perspective of intentional behaviour and volition. The necessity for this is based on the 
basic assumption of the thesis that a decision to suppress a thought is an intention. If this 
is so then one needs to examine the relation of thought suppression to intentional action, 
memory, and the perception of one's own intentionality in goal-directed behaviour. 
(1) Goals and Intensions 
It is now widely accepted that human behaviour is goal directed (Latham & Locke, 
1991). According to Latham and Locke purposeful action in humans is volitional and 
consists of processes of discovering and choosing what is beneficial to one's welfare and 
then setting goals to achieve it. Goal setting is one of the major methods of self- 
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regulation as by defining a goal the person is saying what they are (or are not) willing to 
do. 
It is also important to distinguish goals from desires and intentions. Desires are 
tendencies to want various things. The important feature of desires is that when someone 
has a desire it does not yet mean they have decided to do anything about it (Malle & 
Knobe, 2001). In direct contrast, when a person formulates an intention they are actively 
planning to carry out a specific action. The concept of goals is more ambiguous and, in 
the literature the constructs of goals and intentions are sometimes used interchangeably. 
However, the difference between goals and intentions is that goals can be vague for 
example, the goal to be liked. In this instance, there can be many associated actions that 
would fulfil this goal, but the goal itself has no associated action as opposed to the 
intention to pay one's electricity bill. This has led Malle and Knobe (2001) to suggest that 
unlike goals "intentions always have as their content an action performed by the person 
who holds that intention" (p. 47). 
Carver and Scheier (2000) propose that goals are stored hierarchically, (i. e. they differ in 
their level of abstraction). For example, a person might have the goal of being a likable 
person, but she could also have the goal of smiling at her friend and offering them a drink 
when she sees them. The first goal relates to being a certain type of person, but the 
second goal relates to a type of action. From the foregoing analysis of the differentiation 
of goals from desires and intentions, one may well choose to label the second specified 
goal an intention. Carver and Scheier (1998; 1999; 2000) choose to label this as a goal. 
Like Latham and Locke (1991), Carver and Scheier (2000) also adopt the view that 
human behaviour is goal directed and purposeful. The distinct part of their theory is that 
they specify theoretically how goals impact on behaviour. They propose that goals 
function as reference values for feedback loops. The notion of feedback loops was 
introduced by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) and suggests that a self regulatory 
system needs an input function, a reference value, a mechanism of comparison and an 
output. Importantly, Carver and Scheier have also been instrumental in suggesting that 
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feedback mechanisms of control can work on two principles. These are discrepancy 
reducing loops and discrepancy enlarging loops. These operate to different extents 
depending on the exact goal being pursued. Thus, negative feedback loops work to 
reduce discrepancies between the input function and the reference value. In this 
formulation behaviour consists of trying to approach desired goals. If the output function 
detects discrepancies between actual output and the reference value, behaviour is altered 
to try and reduce these discrepancies thereby leading one towards one's goals. With 
positive feedback loops the function is more one of avoidance. Thus, these loops seek to 
avoid unwanted goals. Here the feedback loop compares present conditions with goals 
one does not want and attempts to distance oneself from the unwanted conditions thus 
increasing the discrepancy. 
This analysis of goals also suggests an interesting function of affect. Carver and Scheier 
(1998; 1999; 2000) suggest that affect arises in part from the comparison process 
operating in the feedback loops, where for example, the rate of progress is not right and 
adjustment is necessary. Moreover, Carver and Scheier (2000) state that "although the 
organism tries to minimise pain, it does not, in general, try to maximise pleasure. " (p. 
55). Conceptually, this is similar to Martin and Tesser's (1996) analysis of rumination 
where they clearly suggest that rumination (which often produces negative affect) occurs Im 
when the rate of progress towards one's goals is either too fast or too slow. Martin and 0 
Tesser (1996) also suggest that goal blockage (not being able to attain one's goal) leads 
to the greatest levels of both rumination and negative affect. 
Carver and Scheier (2000) argue that the process of minimising pain is relatively 
straightforward and consists of noticing negative feelings (arising due to not approaching 
goals fast enough) and altering behaviour, for example, by putting in more effort. 
However, they are left with a difficulty when it comes to maximising pleasure, as both 
Carver and Scheier (2000) and Martin and Tesser (1996) have suggested people also 
experience enhanced affect when they are approaching their goals too fast! Yet the 
system we have described seeks to reduce discrepancies, therefore this enhanced positive 
affect leads to behavioural changes which seek to reduce this discrepancy. This thesis 
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proposes a new model of why rebound effects may occur after intentional thought 
suppression (see page 43). Central to this model is the notion that avoidant goals may be 
more highly active in the cognitive system or more primary. The above analysis lends 
some support to this contention. 
Thus, intentions and goals may serve to help people control their behaviour. One question 
of interest concerns the impact goals and intentions and thinking about them or not 
thinking about them can have on one's sense of willing various actions. The next section 
will explore how mental control and intentions may, under certain conditions, alter one's 
perception of intentionality for simple actions carried out under different mental control 
(suppression vs. expression) instructions. 
(2) Mental Control and Conscious Will 
Although consciously enacted actions and behaviours appear to be preceded by goals and 
intentions, a recent literature review and meta analysis of the intention behaviour 
relationship concluded that intentions explain only about 28% of the variance in human 
behaviour (Sheeran, 2002). Thus, people do not always carry out the intentions they say 
they will. Moreover, sometimes people even carry out actions that are direct opposites of 
their initial intentions. Indeed, there are numerous everyday examples of people 
seemingly acting against their own consciously formulated intentions. For example, in a 
Dostoyevskian sense his protagonists often find themselves in situations where they feel 
compelled to act in a way they believe is contrary to their best interests. In many of his 
classical passages one finds his protagonists formulating a conscious intention not to 
perform the compelling action or not to think about it, yet only moments later one finds 
his protagonist engaging in the very same activity. When the protagonist realises they 
have acted in a counter intentional way they are aggrieved and feel that they have not 
completed this action themselves, there is a sense of the action having been externally 
impelled and beyond personal control. 
Where does this leave one with regards to one's own sense of conscious will? Research 
on the topic of conscious will is again a relatively new area, despite William James being 
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instrumental in bringing this field to our attention more than 100 years ago. This section 
will attempt to delineate the processes by which thought is vital in giving us the sense 
that we have willed our actions and that when such thoughts are lacking or inconsistent 
with the action that arises we experience little sense of having willed the ensuing actions. 
The theory of apparent mental causation recently proposed by Wegner (2000, see also 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) suggests that the experience we have of causing actions 
arises whenever we draw a causal inference linking our thought to our action. When 
thought seems to initiate action, we experience will. Principles guiding such inferences 
can be drawn from principles of attribution and inference that govern cause perception 
more generally (Gilbert, 1995; Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972; Michotte, 1963). However, 
the sense of having caused the action in this framework is dissociated from the actual 
causes of the action. According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness 
just prior to an action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by salient 
alternative causes of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to 
ourselves for the action. In contrast, when thoughts do not arise with such priority, 
consistency, and exclusivity, we experience the ensuing actions as less willed or 
voluntary. 
In essence, this theory suggests that voluntariness is experienced primarily when thought 
about action is the primary candidate for having caused the action that is observed. The 
application of these principles of inference suggests that experiences of voluntariness or 
involuntariness are guided by perceptions of mental causation, not by actual mental 
causation. In addition, this theory suggests that one's sense of will can be altered by 
environmental circumstances such that sometimes one can be lead to feel their actions are 
"happening" to them rather than that they are "doing it". For example, experiences of 
involuntariness regularly occur in hypnosis (Kihlstrom, 1985; Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 
1990). In addition there are also circumstances where people come to experience 
enhanced conscious will for events over which they have no demonstrable control 
(Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
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The current thesis is predicated on the view that thought suppression may be an ideal 
vehicle for further testing NVegners theory (i. e. that the sense of will can be manipulated 
by changing the contents of thought prior to acting). Suppressing or expressing intentions 0 
may be particularly interesting as it may be directly related to one's sense of will and 
causation. 
For example, if a person is attempting mental control via thought suppression and is 
suppressing the urge to undertake an action, but nevertheless does perform the action they 
should not experience a sense of having willed the action. This is because they would not 
experience a sense of having thought about the action just prior to its enactment 
(priority). Additionally, they would certainly not experience consistency, they are trying 
not to think about doing something but do it anyway. In contrast, if someone is 
attempting expressive mental control and thinking a lot of an upcoming action for 
example, thinking of an action they are really looking forward to and then do it, they 
should experience a greater sense of having willed the action due to the priority of 
thought, its consistency and its exclusivity. These hypotheses will be directly tested in 
Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
Another interesting question regarding mental control and intentions concerns the 
function of conscious mental control in helping us to enact our intentions and reach more 
of our goals. Will suppressing or maintaining intentions in mind help us to enact them 
with more success? The next section will explore these issues further. 
(3) Mental control and remembering future intentions 
Most prior investigations have focused on possible negative consequences of thought 
suppression and the rebound effect. Thus, thought suppression has been shown to induce 
not only a preoccupation with previously suppressed material, but also to have negative 
effects at a behavioural and even purely physiological level. For example, thought 
suppression can result in increased likelihood of a stereotypic behaviour (Macrae et al., 
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1994), increased perception of pain (Sullivan, Rouse, Bishop, & Johnson, 1997), or 
decreased immunological functioning (Petrie, Booth, & Pennebaker, 1998). 
However, there are several reasons why one could challenge this widespread assumption 
of the effects of thought suppression (and the rebound) always being negative. For 
example, if thought suppression enhances accessibility (i. e., the activation levels) of the 
suppressed thought and leads to subsequent unwanted (and recurring) intrusions of this 
thought then it is possible that this situation may have a favourable outcome for some 
mental processes in certain situations. One of the most likely candidates that could 
benefit from this hyperaccessibility is memory processing. Thus, one could suggest that 
perhaps suppression can improve memory for a previously suppressed target item (see 
Wegner, Quillian, & Houston, 1996; Wenzlaff, & Wegner, 2000). This contention has 
been shown to work for stereotypic information by Macrae et al. (1997) who 
demonstrated that previously suppressed stereotypic information was subsequently 
recalled with greater accuracy than other non-suppressed information. 
Of particular interest and relevance to the thesis would be to extend the study of the 
effects of thought suppression on memory to the area of prospective memory. The latter 
refers to remembering to perform an intended action at a particular moment in the future 
(for example, remembering to make a phone call, take a medication or post a letter), and 
is usually distinguished from retrospective memory or remembering past information (see 
Brandimonte, Einstein & McDaniel, 1996; Meacham & Leiman, 1982). 
In everyday life prospective memory failures appear to be more common, and are 
perceived by people as more frustrating than retrospective memory failures (See e. g. 
Smith, Delia Sala, Logie, & Maylor, 2000; Terry, 1988). In addition, prospective memory 
skills are vital for maintaining independent and successful functioning in everyday life, 
especially in those populations that may be more susceptible to failures, for example, 
older adults, people with traumatic brain injury or those with Alzheimer's disease. It is 
therefore important to study practical ways in which prospective memory can be 
improved. 
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Apart from these practical considerations there are valid theoretical reasons for combining 
research in the areas of thought suppression and prospective memory. For example, 
successful prospective memory involves encoding an intention which may refer to an 
activity one can only carry out in 2 hours time. During this retention interval the intention 
has been shown to be held at a heightened level of activation, the so called Intention- 
Superiority Effect as pointed out earlier (Goshke & Kuhl, 1993; Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 
1998; Marsh, Hicks, & Bryan, 1999). This heightened activation increases the likelihood 
that these intentions will become conscious during the retention interval and perhaps most 
importantly they increase the likelihood of one recognising an opportunity to carry out the 
intention. Thus, when the intention can be successfully completed (i. e. in the presence of 
the right cues) the intention suddenly "pops" back into one's mind (see Freud, 1901/1960). 
Similarly, in thought suppression research, suppression of a thought has also been shown to 
enhance the activation level of the suppressed thought and has been linked to the 
spontaneous "popping" back into mind of the previously suppressed thought (Muris, & 
Merckelbach, 1991, cited in Rassin et al., 2000; Trinder, & Salkovskis, 1994). It is 
therefore not difficult to see how theoretically the enhanced accessibility and intrusion of a 
suppressed thought might represent a simple method of enhancing prospective memory, by 
suppressing an intention during the retention interval. 
Suppression may enhance prospective memory through two related routes. Firstly, as 
mentioned above, suppression has been shown to enhance the activation level of the 
formerly suppressed concept. This increased activation of the suppressed construct will 
make it more likely to intrude on consciousness, and these intrusions can be construed as 
rehearsal opportunities for a prospective memory task. In addition, the heightened 
activation will also increase the likelihood with which suppressed constructs will be 
noticed if they occur in the surrounding environment as prospective memory target events 
(d-. Higgins, 1989). 
In order to test the effectiveness of this simple technique on prospective remembering 
Erskine and Kvavilashvili (2000) combined the two most common paradigms within the 
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thought suppression and prospective memory research. Thus, participants were given 
standard prospective memory instructions to remember to press the space bar every time 
they saw the word "white bear" in the context of a later sentence verification task. Next, 
in order to provide a delay between the encoding of these instructions and their 
execution, the first stage of the classical thought suppression paradigm was employed. 
Specifically half of the participants were given instructions to suppress a certain thought 
during a five minute period of verbalisation (i. e. thinking aloud). The other half of the 
participants was required to express this thought (i. e. actively rehearse) during a five 
minute period. Within each of these groups, half of the participants were manipulating 
(suppressing or expressing) the prospective memory target "white bear" and half were 
manipulating an irrelevant target "brown sugar". After this period all participants were 
introduced to the sentence verification task with no mention of the prospective memory 
component. There were 4 prospective memory targets (white bears) embedded in the 
sentence verification task. The dependent variable was a number of times participants 
remembered to press the space bar when seeing the prospective memory target of any 
animal word. 
The results of this experiment showed that prior suppression of prospective memory 
target did not result in enhanced prospective memory performance in comparison to a 
group that was suppressing the unrelated target. However, somewhat counter-intuitively 
even conscious thinking about the prospective memory target in expression condition did 
not result in enhanced performance relative to a condition in which participants were 
expressing thoughts about completely unrelated target. This failure of even overt 
rehearsal to enhance prospective memory suggests that the results may not reflect a 
fAilure of thought suppression, but may reflect the fact that perhaps suppression or 
expression of the prospective memory target only is simply not sufficient to result in 
enhanced prospective memory. For example, Guynn et al. (1998) reported similar results 
in their study which specifically focused on the effects of rehearsal (i. e. active 
expression) on prospective memory performance. In their study they demonstrated that 
target only reminders during the retention interval did not serve to enhance prospective 
memory performance. However, they did show that thinking about the whole intention, 
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i. e. the prospective memory target as well as the associated action did enhance 
prospective memory performance. Guynn et al. (1998) therefore suggest that one needs 
to activate the link between the prospective memory target and the associated action in 
order to benefit from potential effects of rehearsal on prospective memory performance. 
If Guynn et al. 's (1998) suggestions are valid then one needs to examine whether 
suppressing a whole intention (i. e. a prospective memory target and associated action) 
during the retention interval could subsequently enhance prospective memory 
performance. Accordingly, Chapter 11 describes an experiment where people formulated 
an intention (to remember to press the space bar whenever they saw an animal word in a 
computerised word association task) and then either suppressed or expressed this 
intention or an irrelevant intention (to eat later on) during the retention interval. If 
maintaining the intention in consciousness is helpful then the group expressing the 
relevant intention should show better prospective memory performance than the group 
expressing or suppressing an irrelevant intention. In addition, if thought suppression 
raises the constructs activation levels to beyond that of conscious thought expression then 
the group suppressing the relevant intention should demonstrate the best memory 
performance. 
VII. Summary of Review 
As this review has shown thought suppression is intrinsically related to the concept of 
intention and volitional behaviour. This has been largely ignored in previous research as 
usually the focus has been on suppressing or expressing a discreet simple target thought 
(e. g. white bear). In this thesis, thought suppression research is expanded by examining 
the effects of suppressing or expressing one's intentions and how this may affect one's 
perception of their own conscious will and prospective memory (remembering one's 
future intentions). 
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VII. Empirical Studies 
The aim of the experiments that will now be reported was to delineate how mental 
control processes operate and how individual differences between people act to alter 
these processes. The experiments looked at mechanisms underlying the rebound effect, 
individual differences in both conscious and unconscious mental control strategies, how 
the perception of causality for one's own actions is affected by the suppression / 
expression of one's intentions, and finally, how mental control impacts on the ability to 
enact intentions. In addition, methods of indexing the rebound effect (the original method 
versus the modified method) were directly contrasted in order to assess their relative 
merits. 
The first three studies mark a direct effort to try and design a series of studies to answer 
some of the unresolved questions outlined above, whilst taking into account the 
methodological inadequacies of previous research. The first study (Chapter 3) attempted 
to replicate the original rebound effect after a time delay using two neutral words as the 
target thoughts. In addition, several individual difference variables were collected in 
order to see if any of them mediated the rebound effect. Of particular interest were State 
vs. Action orientation and fluid intelligence. It was hypothesised that perhaps only people 
with high IQ would display the rebound effect as suggested by Rutledge et al. (1996) or 
that only State-oriented individuals would display the effect as predicted by our 
intentional model of the rebound effect (see page 43). 
The second study (Chapter 4) used the same data obtained from participants in Study I 
but addressed a different set of research questions. In particular, this study examined the 
relationship if any, between a wide variety of individual difference variables and one's 
performance on both a suppression and expression task as measured by the number of 
buzzer presses made by participants in period I in Study 1. If a person is a good 
suppressor they should report a low number of buzzer presses during suppression relative 
to other participants who are also suppressing. In other words, the study sought to 
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determine which individual differences account for whether a person is a good or poor 
suppressor or expresser. It also sought to determine the relationship between expressive 
and suppressive forms of mental control. 
Study 3 (Chapter 5) attempted to replicate the findings from Studies I and 2 by re-testing 
the same sample of participants after a one week delay. All participants who completed 
Study I were asked to return to the laboratory one week later to take part in Study 3. In 
Study 3 those participants who had previously suppressed their thoughts in Study I had to 
now express a different thought and participants who had previously expressed a thought 
were now asked to suppress a different thought. Apart from attempting to replicate 
findings from Study I (and Study 2) this methodology allowed us to examine the 
relationship between suppressive and expressive forms of mental control within the same 
participants across week I and week 2 of testing. 
Study 4 (Chapter 6) attempted to move away from the problems associated with self- 
report data by examining the rebound effect with implicit measures (reaction time). The 
activation level of previously expressed or suppressed thoughts was examined via 
reaction time to recognise the target as a word or non-word in a Lexical Decision Task. 
This Study examined the construct accessibility in the crucial period after suppression or 
expression has been discontinued, i. e. the period in which the rebound effect is assumed 
to occur. Previous work in this area (Wegner & Erber 1992) examined construct 
activation during active suppression and not during the post-suppression period. 
Study 5 (Chapter 7) examined a sample of 97 young adults on a wide variety of 
individual difference and ability measures and attempted to relate these to their self 
reported use of thought suppression in everyday life as assessed by the White Bear 0 
Suppression Inventory and the Thought Control Questionnaire. Since these two 
questionnaires are both assumed to measure thought suppression in everyday life the 
relationship between the scores on these questionnaires was also examined. 
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Study 6 (Chapter 8) was a replication of study 5 using a sample of 64 older community 
dwelling adults aged over 65. This study also provided a unique opportunity to examine 
the psychological well-being in older adults by comparing the young and the old adult 
samples on their mean scores on a wide variety of individual difference variables, 
including such measures of psychopathology as anxiety, depression and neuroticism. 
Study 7 (Chapter 9) examined the same data collected in Studies 5 and 6 but divided the 
two samples into repressors and non-repressors on the basis of a method developed by 
Weinberger et al. (1979). The prevalence of repression in both samples was then directly 
compared. In addition, the relationship of repression and the tendency to suppress 
thoughts in everyday life as measured by the WBSI was also examined. 
Study 8 (Chapter 10) was designed to extend the thought suppression research by 
examining the effect of suppressing / expressing one's intentions on one's perceptions of 
their own will in carrying out simple intended activities. The main idea behind this study 
was that actions carried out whilst suppressing thoughts about the action should, as a 
result, feel less willed and more as if they just occurred. In contrast, actions carried out 
whilst thinking of the action itself should feel more willed and intentional. 
Study 9 (Chapter 11) was designed to examine whether prospective memory performance 
could be improved by suppressing or expressing relevant intention durin the retention rý 9 
interval relative to the suppression or expression of a completely unrelated intention. 
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TABLE 1.4 - CluvrER TITLES AND THE MAPPING BETWEEN EACH CHAPTER AND THE 
RESPECTIVE STUDY. 
Chapter Study Title N 
I Introduction Current research on thought suppression and mental control: A 
review 
2 Method Overview of the experimental method used in studies 1,2 &3 
3 Study I The rebound effect: Methods of assessment and individual 94 
differences 
4 Study 2 The role of individual differences in suppression and expression 94 
performance in the laboratory 
5 Study 3 Replication of Study I and assessing the rebound via a within 84 
subject design 
6 Study 4 Assessing the rebound effect with an implicit method: Reaction 97 
times to previously suppressed and expressed targets in a lexical 
decision task 
7 Study 5 Individual differences and the use of thought suppression in 9T- 
everyday life in a sample of young adults 
8 Study 6 Individual differences and the use of thought suppression in 65 
everyday life in a sample of old adults 
9 Study 7 Psychological well-being and repressive coping style in young and 97+ 
old adults 65 
10 Study 8 The role of thought suppression / expression in the perception of 24 
intentionality of completed actions 
II Study 9 Ile role of thought suppression / expression in remembering one's 88 
future intentions 
12 Discussion General discussion 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Overview of the experimental method used in studies 1,2 &3 
All the data for Studies 1,2,3,4 and 5 outlined in the previous chapter were collected in 
one large-scale study that consisted of two I-hour long sessions conducted on the same 
participants one week apart. In order to avoid any confusion with respect to the method 
and design used in this initial large-scale study this Chapter will provide a brief outline of 
the methods used in week I and week 2 of the study. This should provide a general 
framework that should facilitate the understanding of the method sections of each 
subsequent chapter. 
I. Week 1 
Participants were tested individually. After being introduced to the aims of the study and 
the tasks they would have to complete participants had some initial practice with a couple 
of the tasks they had to carry out later (i. e., lexical decision task and the think aloud task). 
This was followed by the thought verbalisation (think aloud) procedure used in thought 
suppression experiments. During period one half of the participants were asked to think 
aloud while trying to suppress any thoughts about the target word, and the other half was 
asked to try to deliberately express (think about) the target word. Half of the participants 
within each group were asked to suppress/express thoughts about a "chair" and the other 
half to suppress/express "ocean". In addition, all participants had to press a buzzer every 
time they happened to think or mention aloud the target word. In Period 2 all participants 
had to deliberately express (think about) their period I target word irrespective of the 
condition (suppression vs. expression) they were in during Period I of the experiment. 
However, the crucial difference between the present experiment and any other paradigm 
in thought suppression research was a 15-minute delay introduced between Period I and 
Period 2 of the thought suppression paradigm. During this delay participants completed a 
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Lexical Decision Task in this task participants had to rate whether the words that they 
were presented with were real words or non-words. 
At the end of the experiment participants filled in several questionnaires in the order 
presented below: 
1. The Speilberger Trait and State anxiety inventory (Speilberger et al., 1983). This 
questionnaire has two subscales measuring Trait and State anxiety respectively. Trait 
anxiety is conceptualised as a relatively stable individual difference in anxiety proneness, 
whereas state anxiety refers more to individual differences in reactions to currently 
experienced stimuli (See Appendix A for a copy of this questionnaire). 
2. The White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) - (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). This 15 
item questionnaire measures the propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life, 
and contains statements like "I have thoughts I cannot stop" or "I always try to put 
problems out of mind". Ratings are made on a five point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree (See appendix B for a copy of this questionnaire). 
3. The Marlowe Crowne Scale - (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This questionnaire was 
designed to measure social desirability, or the tendency to avoid disapproval and seek 
approval. However, Crowne and Marlowe (1964) have suggested that this scale is more 
likely to measure affect inhibition, defensiveness and the protection of one's self esteem. 
Many others have also suggested that the Marlowe Crowne scale indeed seems to assess 
the need to avoid social disapproval and protect one's self esteem (Evans 1979). 
Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that the Marlowe Crowne scale, in conjunction with 
the Speilberger Trait Anxiety Inventory is used to assess a Repressive coping style 
(Weinberger et al 1979) (See appendix C for a copy of this questionnaire). 
4. The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ)- (Wells & Davies, 1994). This 
questionnaire has 5 subscales designed to assess peoples' tendency to use a variety of 
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thought suppression strategies in everyday life such as self punishment, re-appraisal, 
distraction, worrying, and social methods. A total TCQ score can be computed by 
summing the scores on the individual subscales. Higher scores indicate a greater variety 
of mental control strategies being used (See appendix D for a copy of this questionnaire). 
5. The Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised version (EPQ-R) - (Eysenck, 
Eysenck, & Barett, 1985). This scale has four sub scales each containing 12 items, 
measuring the personality dimensions of introversion / extraversion, neuroticism, 
psychoticism and also includes a lie scale (See appendix E for a copy of this 
questionnaire). 
6. The Beck Depression Inventory - (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) This scale 
measures a person's level of depression. The person reads a series of statements and is 
asked to circle any they feel apply to them (e. g. "I feel discouraged about the future" or, 
"I don't feel disappointed in myself") (See appendix F for a copy of this questionnaire). 
7. The Need For Cognition Scale - (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) The need for cognition 
scale assesses the extent to which people report liking to engage in thinking. It contains 
items like "I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending considerable 
mental effort". Answers are made on a9 point scale ranging from very strongly disagree 
to very strongly agree (See appendix G for a copy of this questionnaire). 
8. The State / Action Orientation Questionnaire - (Kuhl, 1993). Assesses the global 
personality attributes of state orientation and action orientation. It comprises three 
separate subscales (a) Action orientation subsequent to failure vs. preoccupation (AOF), 
(b) Prospective and decision-related action orientation vs. hesitation (AOD), (c) Action 
orientation during (successful) performance of activities (intrinsic orientation) vs. 
volatility (APO). Each of these subscales contains 12 items which describe particular life 
situations. For each item there are two answers, one of which represents state orientation 
and one which is indicative of action orientation. An example of an item from the AOF 
subscale is: When I have lost something that is very valuable to me and I can't find it 
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anywhere: (A) I have a hard time concentrating on something else, (B) I put it out of my 
mind after a little while. The three subscales assess different aspects of state / action 
orientation and therefore an overall score is not created (See appendix H for a copy of 
this questionnaire). 
11. Week 2 
After exactly one week participants returned for their second one hour experimental 
session. Once again all participants were tested individually. After being reminded of the 
aims of the study, it was explained to participants that the tasks and procedures for week 
2 would be very similar to the first week, albeit with different stimuli. Thus, participants 
had some initial practice with a couple of tasks they had to carry out later (i. e., lexical 
decision task and the think aloud task). 
As in week 1, this was followed by the usual procedure used in thought suppression 
experiments. Half of the participants were asked to think aloud while trying to suppress 
any thoughts about the target word, and the other half was asked to try to deliberately 
express (think about) the target word. Additionally in order to systematically evaluate the 
relationship between suppressive and expressive forms of mental control within the same 
participants, those participants who had been asked to suppress thoughts in period I of 
week I were now asked to express their thoughts. Those who had been asked to express 
thoughts in period I of week 1 were now asked to suppress their thoughts. In week 2 the 
targets chosen for suppression or expression were changed to Eagle and Carpet. 
Thus, half of the participants within each group were asked to suppress/express a thought 
about "Eagle" and the other half about "Carpet". In addition, all participants had to press 
a buzzer every time they happened to think or mention aloud the target word. 
In Period 2 all participants had to deliberately express (think about) the target word 
irrespective of the condition (suppression vs. expression) they were in during Period I of 
the experiment. However, as on week 1, participants had to undertake a Lexical Decision 
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Task between the two verbalisation periods. In this task participants had to rate words 
half of which were real words and half of which were non-words. 
After this part of the experiment had been completed all participants were asked to 
complete the short form (Scale 2 form A) of the Cattell and Cattell Culture Fair 
Intelligence Test (1960). 
Finally all participants filled in several questionnaires in the order presented below: 
I. The Linking Questionnaire - (McIntosh & Martin, 1992) assesses the extent to which 
an individual views goal attainment as central to their overall happiness. It uses a forced 
choice format and asks participants questions about the way in which specific 
occurrences would affect their happiness. For example one question was "Do you get 
more happiness out of pursuing your goals or as a result of reaching them? " the two 
possible responses to this item were: 
a. I get more happiness out of striving for my goals; reaching them is just icing on the 
cake. 
b. My happiness comes primarily from reaching my goal. 
Here response (a) would represent a non-linking perspective. Option (b) would represent 
a linking perspective where one views the outcome of being happy on being contingent 
on attaining ones goals (See appendix I for a copy of this questionnaire). 
2. The Thought Action Fusion Questionnaire - (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) 
measures a participant's tendency to over evaluate the significance and consequences of 
intrusive thought. This scale has three subscales which all assess slightly different 
cognitive biases. For the purposes of this thesis only the first subscale will be used, this is 
known as TAF moral and includes items like "Thinking of making an extremely critical 
remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable to me as actually saying if'. This sub-scale 
measures the extent to which as person views thinking about an act to be as bad as 
actually engaging in that act (See appendix J for a copy of this questionnaire). 
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3. Rumination Inventory (McIntosh & Martin, 1992). This inventory was designed to 
measure a person's tendency to ruminate in everyday life. Higher scores would indicate a 
greater tendency towards rumination. It is a unidimensional scale with no subscales. It 
contains items such as " When I have a problem, I tend to think about it a lot of the time". 
Answers are made on a 7-point scale ranging from "does not describe me well" to 
"describes me well" (See appendix K for a copy of this questionnaire). 
4. Fordyce Unhappiness Rating (Fordyce, 1988). This scale asks participants to rate the 
percentage of time in everyday life that they feel happy, sad and neutral with the 
constraint that the percentages must add up to 100% (See appendix L for a copy of this 
questionnaire). 
5. The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire SPQ (Raine, 1991). This 74 item scale was 
designed to assess schizotypal personality as defined by DSM III-R. It comprises 9 
subscales assessing various schizotypal traits, such as; ideas of reference, excessive social 
anxiety, unusual perceptual experiences, odd beliefs or magical thinking, odd or eccentric 
behaviour, absence of close friends, odd speech, constricted affect and suspiciousness. 
An overall SPQ score is computed by summing the subscale values. The scale contains 
items like "I tend to avoid eye contact when conversing with others" responses are either 
yes or no (See appendix M for a copy of this questionnaire). 
Figure 2.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the whole experimental design over 
both weeks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The rebound effect: Methods of assessment and individual differences 
Many studies have demonstrated the rebound effect (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; 
Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wegner et al., 1987). However, others using similar 
methods have failed to replicate it (LoSchiavo & Yurak, 1995; Merckelbach, Muris, Van 
den Hout & de Jong, 1991). Possible explanations for the failure to replicate the rebound 
effect in these studies have centred on issues of methodology, types of thoughts used and 
individual differences. 
Study I aimed to resolve some of these controversies by introducing several new 
modifications into the classic "white bear " paradigm. One innovation is the 
introduction of a time delay between two periods of verbalisation. The second innovation 
is to examine systematically the effects of individual differences in personality and ability 
on people's experience of the rebound effects. Fluid intelligence, state vs. action 
orientation, the tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life (as measured by the 
WBSI), rumination and Trait Anxiety were all evaluated in this study. Type of target was 
also investigated using two neutral targets, one with, and one without, environmental 
cues. Finally the current study was also designed so that the two methods of indexing the 
rebound effect, the original method (Wegner et al., 1987) and the modified method could 
be compared and contrasted within the same study. 
(1) Time Delay 
Virtually all previous investigations of the rebound effect have examined the rebound 
phenomenon immediately after a period of suppression. Participants suppress a thought 
and then, in a subsequent expression period (which immediately follows the suppression 
period), they demonstrate a higher frequency of thought when compared to a group that 
expresses the same thought in period 2 after expression. The current study aimed to 
replicate the original rebound effect with a delay period of 15 minutes between the initial 
period of suppression/expression and later expression. If the rebound effect can be shown 
to occur after a delay this would increase both the phenomenon's robustness and its 
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relevance to everyday thought suppression which is known to occur over prolonged 
periods of time. 
However, there are reasons to suggest the rebound effect may not occur after such a 
delay. According to Wegner (1994) the mechanism underlying the rebound effect is one 
of enhanced activation of the previously suppressed thought. Yet, Higgins (1989) has 
repeatedly demonstrated that over time the activation accrued by constructs (mainly as a 
function of earlier priming) decays. For example, the effects of primes that are seen with 
short delays often disappear at longer intervals (Bargh & Charterand, 2000). Moreover, 
there is currently only one study (Hodson & Dovidio, 2001) that has investigated the 
rebound effect and included a delay between suppression / expression (period 1) and final 
expression (period 2). The findings demonstrated that suppressed stereotypic information 
was remembered better than non-stereotypic control words with no delay (a rebound 
effect), but there was no rebound effect after a 10-minute delay. It should be pointed out, 
however, that in this study the rebound effect was not measured by a final expression 
period but by performance on a memory recall task. Therefore, the question about the 
time delay between initial thought suppression and the subsequent rebound remains open. 
(2) Individual Differences 
The current study also aimed to examine the effects of individual differences in 
personality and ability on one's propensity to experience the rebound effect. In line with 
this aim, several personality and ability measures were collected in order to see if any of 
these variables mediated the rebound effect. All of the individual difference variables 
examined were chosen on the basis of their theoretical relation to mental control and were 
taken from the thought suppression literature. The main variables of interest were: Fluid 
intelligence, state vs. action orientation, scores on the WBSI, Trait Anxiety and 
Rumination. 
One of the factors that has been reported to have an impact on whether the rebound effect 
is found is fluid intelligence (Rutledge et al., 1993,1996; Brewin & Beaton, 2002). 
Rutledge et al. (1993) suggest that participants of higher ability (assessed in this case by 
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college entrance exam scores) may be more likely to display the rebound effect In 
addition, Rutledge et al. (1996) found significant positive correlations between thought 
rebound and a measure of crystallized intelligence (Horn, 1975). The current study will 
attempt to replicate the traditional rebound effect whilst taking measures of fluid 
intelligence and observing how these relate to a person's propensity to experience the 
rebound effect. 
Another variable of high theoretical interest was the construct of state vs. action 
orientation proposed by Kuhl and Beckman (1994). This variable has not previously been 
examined in the thought suppression research. However, there are good theoretical 
reasons to believe it may have a large impact on when and where the rebound effects are 
seen. Thus, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) have shown that intentions have a privileged status 
in memory. When an intention is formulated this information is stored at a heightened 
activation level. In addition, Kuhl (1994) has shown that this Intention Superiority Effect 
is stronger in certain individuals, with a particular personality style known as state 
orientation (measured via a self report questionnaire). According to the alternative 
explanation of the rebound effect proposed in this thesis (see page 43 of Chapter 1), the 
rebound effects may occur because a decision to suppress results in the formulation of an 
intention not to think about something and this fact alone may result in increased 
accessibility of the to be avoided thought. 
Kuhl and Beckman (1994) discuss the theory behind their twofold classification system 
(state vs. action orientation) and link it very closely with volition by arguing that state- 
orientated individuals show reduced volitional abilities to plan, initiate and complete 
intended activities. What is interesting from the present perspective is the reason behind 
this reduced volitional capacity. State-orientated people are reported to have intrusive and 
perseverating thoughts which fill one's cognitive capacity, these thoughts may 
perseverate even when a goal has been fulfilled (Kuhl, 1994). In addition, state 
orientated individuals show a tendency to over-control their thoughts. Therefore, it may 
be that it is the state orientated individuals who employ intentional thought suppression 
on mass. In contrast, action orientated people are not prone to intrusive and perseverating 
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thoughts as they deactivate intentions after they are formulated. Thus, after formulating 
an intention state oriented people will continue to keep the intention active in working 
memory and think about it often, whereas action oriented people will deactivate the 
intention and only begin to think about it when the time for its completion is close. 
Therefore, Kuhl's Action Control Scale was used to measure state vs. action orientation 
as a means of assessing its impact on the rebound effect. It must be noted, however, that 
there are three separate subscales which assess different aspects of state vs. action 
orientation. It was decided that the best subscale to use was the preoccupation subscale as 
this most closely approximated the construct of interest in the present studies, thought 
suppression and subsequent intrusion. Kuhl and Beckman (1994) refer to this subscale as 
AOF (action orientation subsequent to failure vs. preoccupation). Using this sub scale it 
was possible to test the idea that it is indeed the state orientated participants who are most 
likely to demonstrate rebound effects after intentional thought suppression. 
A further variable that may be related to the rebound effect is the tendency to use thought 
suppression in everyday life as measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). As pointed out in the literature review (Chapter 1) research 
using this questionnaire has been conducted largely independently from laboratory 
research on thought suppression. There is to date only one study that has examined the 
relationship between participants' performance in laboratory tasks of thought suppression 
and expression and their scores on the WBSI (Muris, Mercklebach and Horselenberg, 
1996). The results of this study showed that participants with high scores on the WBSI 
reported significantly more target thoughts (i. e. intrusions) in the laboratory task of 
thought suppression during period I than participants who scored low on the WBSI. 
However, the problem with this study is that it did not find a rebound effect after 
intentional thought suppression and therefore could not assess the impact of WBSI scores 
on the rebound effect. It is possible the failure to find a rebound in this study occurred 
because they used participants' own intrusive thoughts and not neutral thoughts. In 
addition, the comparison group for thought suppression was a "think anything" group, not 
an expression group (see Figure 1.3, chapter 1, page 27 depicting this paradigm). The 
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current study will evaluate the effects of WBSI scores on the rebound effect using neutral 
thoughts and an expression group as a control. At present this seems to be the method 
most likely to result in the rebound effect. Two predictions can be made. Firstly, one 
might expect that high scorers on the WBSI would have more practice with thought 
suppression and may well have developed better strategies for successfully suppressing 
thoughts. As a result they may not display a rebound effect. However, if one regards high 
WBSI scorers as people who are particularly prone to intrusive thoughts and use thought 
suppression as a means of dealing with these intrusions then an alternative prediction 
would be that high WBSI scorers would demonstrate a greater rebound effect. 
Another variable of interest in relation to its effects on the rebound effect is trait anxiety. 
Anxiety has been linked with thought suppression numerous times in the literature and 
therefore warrants more indepth investigation (Harvey & Bryant, 1999; Purdon, 1999; 
Rassin et al., 2000; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). The study of Harvey and Bryant (1999) 
deserves further mention as they systematically investigated the impact of anxiety on the 
rebound effect. Specifically, after having watched either a neutral or a distressing film, 
half of the participants were asked to suppress thoughts of the film whereas the other half 
were asked to monitor their thoughts for film related intrusions without suppression 
(period 1). During a later thought verbalisation period (period 2) participants were then 
asked to think about anything whilst monitoring their thoughts for film related intrusions. 
Results indicated that there was an anxiety by suppression interaction, such that high 
anxiety participants demonstrated no rebound effect but low anxiety participants 
demonstrated a clear rebound. 
A final variable of interest was rumination. The current study employed a rumination 
inventory developed by McIntosh and Martin (1992) to measure one's tendency to 
ruminate in everyday life. Rumination has been theoretically linked to thought 
suppression several times (Martin & Tesser, 1996, Erber & Wegner, 1996), but any 
relations between thought suppression and rumination or any impact of rumination on the 
rebound effect awaits empirical verification. Because the use of thought suppression 
being heavily linked to the tendency to ruminate in the thought suppression literature, the 
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specific prediction made here is that people with a tendency to ruminate will be more 
likely to experience the rebound effect. 
(3) Type of Thought 
The effects of the type of thought on thought suppression was examined by having two 
discrete thoughts to suppress (although as stated earlier both were neutral thoughts and 
not personally relevant). One would refer to an object present in the experimental room 
and another to an object that is not in the room. In addition to increasing the generality of 
findings this manipulation also allowed for an examination of the impact of subtle 
environmental cues in thought suppression. This is an important question as in everyday 
life one may often try to suppress a thought which has many visual cues in the 
environment prompting its return. For example trying to suppress thoughts of death when 
in a graveyard may be harder than suppressing thoughts of death when in the 
supermarket. To our knowledge no previous study has investigated this important 
question. 
(4) Methods of Indexing the Rebound Effect 
Finally, the current study also systematically examined two different methods of 
assessing the rebound effect to see whether this might explain some of the controversy 
reported in the literature. The first method, which is referred to as the "original method" 
throughout the thesis, was used by Wegner and his colleagues (Wegner et al., 1987). This 
method assesses the rebound effect by comparing an expression group after prior 
suppression (in period 2) to a group which expresses in period 1. The second method, 
which is referred to in this thesis as the "modified method", compares two expression 
groups (in period 2), one after prior suppression and one after prior expression. (See 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 on pages 25 and 26 of the introduction for a diagrammatic 
representation of these two assessment methods). The rationale for comparing these two 
methods of assessing the rebound effect concerns the finding in previous research 
(Erskine and Kvavilashvili, 2002) that having a comparison group that expresses thoughts 
in period I and then again expresses thoughts in period 2 can result in an increase in 
expressed thoughts during the second expression period. This increase in thoughts from 
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period I to period 2 most probably represents the effects of practice or possibly priming. 
Crucially if period 2 expression group means are being affected by the prior expression 
during period 1 then practice and expression are confounded. The overall net effect of 
this rise is to make it harder to demonstrate a rebound effect. Therefore the current study 
sought to investigate the two methods of assessing the rebound effect within the same 
study. 
In summary, this study examines whether the rebound effect is still found with a delay 
between the two thought verbalisation periods; whether personality and ability influence 
the probability of experiencing the rebound effect and which method of assessing the 
rebound effect is most likely to produce the effect. 
In order to investigate these issues participants took part in an hour long experimental 
session in which they were asked to either suppress or express a certain target thought 
during period 1. To evaluate the effect of the type of target on the rebound effect half of 
the participants received a target word for suppression or expression depicting an object 
that was in the room (chair) and the other half received a target depicting an object that 
was not present in the room (ocean). After period I verbalisation participants completed a 
lexical decision task to provide the 15-minute delay between verbalisation periods. After 
the lexical decision task participants then completed the period 2 verbalisation where all 
participants were asked to express the thought they had manipulated (suppressed or 
expressed) in period 1. Finally, questionnaire measures of personality and ability were 
completed by all participants. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
94 University of Hertfordshire undergraduates (74 Females and 20 Males) volunteered to 
take part in return for course credit. The age range was from 18 to 60 years. The mean 
age was 23 years. 
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(2) Design 
The experimental design was a2 group (suppression vs. expression) x2 target thought 
(chair vs. ocean) between subjects design. 
(3) Materials and Apparatus 
Every time participants thought about or mentioned the target word they had to press a 
buzzer. The buzzer was a small box 6 cm x 6cm x 4cm which had been stuck to the 
underside of the experimental table so it was not visible to participants, it made an 
audible noise when pressed. A standard tape recorder was used to record participant's 
thought verbalisations. The filler task (15 minute task between period I and period 2 
verbalisations) consisted of a computerised Lexical Decision Task written using 
Superlab. 
The two target words for suppression and expression were taken from Postman and 
Keppel (1970) (the English sample). Targets were chosen to all have 5 or 6 letters and to 
be totally semantically unrelated to each other. They were also chosen to be of similar 
frequency of use in the English language, based on the norms provided by Toglia and 
Battig (1978). 
(4) Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. On their arrival at the laboratory participants 
were informed that they had to come back for a second experimental session exactly one 
week after the first session. Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to 
investigate how certain personality variables may be related to their ability to control 
their thoughts. It was explained that thought control involves both thought suppression 
(the active suppression of thoughts one does not want to have) and thought expression 
(the focusing and maintaining in consciousness of desired contents). It was also explained 
that in addition to suppressing and expressing thoughts in several think aloud periods and 
filling in various questionnaires they would be asked to do a computerised task 
measuring their linguistic ability to read and process words (i. e., the Lexical Decision 
Task). 
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After signing a consent form the experimenter introduced the Lexical Decision Task. 
Participants were informed that their task was to decide as quickly and as accurately as 
possible whether the letter string appearing on screen is a word or a non-word. If the 
stimulus was a word they were asked to press the A key, if it was a non-word to press 
they B key (using the specially adapted keyboards). If it was clear that participants 
understood the instructions they were asked to complete a short practice task. This 
practice task consisted of 5 nonwords and 5 words which were not to appear in the later 
task. 
After the practice task participants were informed that the task they had just practiced 
would come again later in the course of the experiment. Meanwhile, however, they had to 
complete a couple of tasks involving thinking aloud. Participants were informed that for 
the next three minutes they would be left alone in the experimental room and their task 
was to verbalise aloud into the tape recorder all the thoughts that came to mind. They 
could think about anything and were not required to explain or justify the thoughts at all. 
If the participant understood the instructions the tape recorder was started and the 
experimenter left the room. 
After exactly 3 minutes the experimenter returned and asked each participant how they 
had found the task. If there were no reported problems the experimenter provided the 
following set of instructions. Half of the participants received suppression instructions 
and half expression instructions. 
Suppression Instructions 
"I would like you to continue verbalising your thoughts, but I would like you to try not to 
think about a chair (or ocean). Thus, your task is to verbalise all of your thoughts whilst 
trying to suppress any thoughts of a chair (or ocean). Every time you say, or have "chair" 
(or ocean) come to mind though, please, ring this buzzer. " 
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Expression Instructions 
"I would like you to continue verbalising your thoughts, but I would like you to try and 
think about a chair (or ocean). Thus, your task is to verbalise all of your thoughts whilst 
trying to concentrate on thoughts of a chair (or ocean). Every time you say, or have 
"chair" (or ocean) come to mind though, please, ring this buzzer. " 
The experimenter then started the tape recorder and left the room. After 5 minutes the 
experimenter returned and asked the participant to perform the lexical decision task 
which lasted for 15 minutes. 
After the lexical decision task, it was explained to participants that there would be one 
more 5 minute verbalisation period. All participants were asked to express whichever 
construct they had manipulated (suppressed or expressed) during the previous 5 minute 
verbalisation period. Verbatim instruction were as follows: 
"Now, once again I will leave the room and your task is to think aloud again for 5 
minutes. This time, I would like you to try and think about a chair (ocean). Thus, your 
task is to verbalise all of your thoughts whilst trying to concentrate on thoughts of a chair 
(ocean). Every time you say, or have "chair" (ocean) come to mind though, please, ring 
this buzzer. " 
After this final 5 minute thought verbalisation period the experimenter returned to the 
room and asked the participant to fill out the first set of questionnaires. Participants then 
completed questionnaires 1-9 (see Chapter 2 for a full description of these 
questionnaires in week 1). After these questionnaires had been completed participants 
were reminded to come back for a second experimental session one week later, and a 
time was set up. Additionally they were informed that a full debrief would be provided at 
the end of the second session. 
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111. Results 
While thinking aloud participants had to press a buzzer every time they thought about or 
mentioned the to be suppressed or expressed construct. The taped thought verbalisations 
were coded for the number of buzzer presses. However, participants sometimes 
mentioned the target thought without buzzing, these were also counted as thoughts and 
added to the total number of buzzer presses. 
Initial screening of the data revealed that the number of buzzes made by participants 
during expression or suppression were not normally distributed. Square root 
transformations were performed on the number of buzzes during periods I and 2 in an 
effort to normalise the data. After transformation, boxplots revealed only two remaining 
outliers. One of these was in the suppression condition and buzzed 31 times. The other 
was in the expression condition and buzzed 202 times. These participants were removed 
from the analyses. For the sake of clarity results are reported on untransformed means, 
but all inferential analyses were conducted using the transformed values. All analyses 
were conducted at 95% confidence level. 
In this section the number of buzzer presses is examined first in period 1, in order to 
ascertain whether participants in suppression and expression conditions correctly 
followed the instructions. This is followed by the analysis of buzzer presses in period 2, 
in order to assess the occurrence of the rebound effect. The rebound effect is first 
examined using the modified method and then using the original method. Within each of 
these methods the role of individual difference variables is evaluated one at a time. 
(1) Buzzer presses in period I 
The mean (square root transformed) buzzer presses in period 1 were entered into a2 
group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 target thought (chair vs. ocean) between subjects 
ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main effect of group F (1,88) = 43.39, p =. 0001, eta- 
squared = . 33. Participants in the expression group had a reliably higher number of 
buzzer presses (M = 19.06), than those in the suppression group (M = 7.35), as shown in 
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Figure 3.1. The main effect of target thought was marginally significant, F(1,88) 
3.83, p=. 05, eta-squared = . 04. Participants manipulating chair had a higher number of 
thouOhts (M=15.28) than participants manipulating ocean (M=l 1.13). The interaction C t- 
was not significant F (1,88) = 1.88, p= . 17. L_ 
FIGuRF 3.1 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES AS A FUNCTION OF INSTRUCTION GROUP IN PERIOD 
(EXPRESSION VS. SUPPRESSION) AND THE TARGET THOUGHT (CHAIR VS. OCEAN) 
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These results indicate that participants did follow the experimental instructions, those 
asked to express had a significantly higher number of thoughts than those asked to Lý C 
suppress. In addition, the rates of buzzing found in the current study are similar to rates C, 
reported in the thought suppression literature (Wegner et al., 1987). L- zn 
(2) The Rebound Effect 
The next set of analyses were performed on buzzer presses in period 2 when all 
participants were expressing the construct they had previously been manipulating L, en, 
(suppressing or expressing). The rebound effect was assessed by using first the modified r_1 -- eý 
method and then the original method of assessing the rebound effect. In the modified Zý 
method the rebound effect is assessed by comparing the number of buzzer presses in In 
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period 2, when all participants are expressing thoughts, as a function of whether they 
suppressed or expressed in period I (between group design). 2-1 
(3) The modified method of assessing the rebound effect 
The mean (square root transformed) buzzer presses in period 2 were entered into a2 
cr ght (chair vs. ocean) between group (period I suppression vs. expression) by 2 target thouL- 
subjects ANOVA. Although the means are in the expected direction for the rebound t-- 
effect, results revealed no significant effect of group F (1,86) = 2.189, p=. 14 (see figure 
3.2). There was, however, a main effect of target thought F(1,86) = 8.41, p= . 005, eta- C, In 
squared = . 09, with more buzzes for Chair (M = 29.95) than 
for Ocean (M = 19.8 1). There 
was no sionificant interaction F< 1. Thus, using the modified method of assessing the Lý C5 
rebound did not result in a rebound effect in the present experiment where there was 15- 
minute delay between the two thought verbalisation periods. 
FIGURF 3.2 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN PERIOD 2 AS A FUNC7TION OF PREVIOUS GROUP 
(EXPRESSION VS. SUPPRESSION) AND TARGET THOUGHT (CHAIR VS. OCEAN) 
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The next aim was to look at the effects of various personality and ability measures on the 
rebound effect using the same modified method of assessment. 
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Cha. r Oceaý 
(1) The role of fluid intelligence on the rebound effect 
The effect of fluid intelligence on the rebound was examined by dichotormsing the 
sample into high and low IQ participants (via a median split, median = 106) and then 
conducting the 2(-roup) by 2(target thought) ANOVAs for both samples on the number L, Cý L_ L, 
of buzzer presses in period 2. For low IQ participants there was no main effect of group F 
(1,35) = 3.02 p =. 082, indicatino, that a rebound effect was not present. There was, 
however, a main effect of target thought F (1,35)=5.8 p=. 02, eta-squared = . 14,. The 
presence of the object in the room seemed to help the low IQ group to express their 
thoughts about the object (mean buzzes for chair was 25.37, and for ocean 14.10). The 
interaction was not significant F<1. In contrast, when the same 2 (group) x2 (target I- Zn 
thought) ANOVA was conducted on a group of participants with high IQ none of the C Z!, 
main effects or interaction proved significant. (F was only greater than I for the main 
effect of target construct, but remained i nsign ifi cant). Thus, dichotomising the sample C L, 
into participants with high or low IQ did not reveal a rebound effect in any of these sub 
groups. 
Fi(; URE 3-3 - THEMEAN NUMBER OF BETWEEN BUZZER PRESSING (PERIOD 
2) IN HIGH AND LOW FLUID IQ 
PARTICIPANTS AS A FUNCTION OF GROUP (EXPRESSION VS. SUPPRESSION) AND TARGET THOUGHT 
(CHAIR VS. OCEAN). 
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(2) The role of state vs. action orientation on the rebound effect 
Next, the sample was dichotormsed according to state vs. action orientation (median split 
usinc, the AOF subscale) and the 2 group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 target thought 
(chair vs. ocean) ANOVA was first conducted for the state oriented group. This analysis 
revealed a significant main effect of group F (1,43) = 4.77 p=. 03, eta-squared 10. The L, Z__ 
mean number of buzzes in the former suppression group was significantly higher (27.59) Cý Zn I 
than in the former expression group (19.57). There was also a main effect of target 
thought F(1,43)=5.3 l, p=. 03, eta-squared 11. The target that was in the room (i. e. chair) 
was mentioned much more frequently (M 27.54) than the target "ocean" that was not in 
the room (M = 19.10). The interaction was not significant (F < 1). Thus, state orientated 
participants demonstrated a clear rebound, something, that was not significant when the 
whole sample was examined (see Figure 3.4). In contrast, when the same analysis was 
conducted in a group of action oriented participants no rebound effect was obtained 
(F<1). The former suppression group did not buzz more frequently than the former 
expression group (means were 24.62 and 25.2 respectively). However, as in the state 
oriented group, there was a main effect of target thought F(1,37)=4.17, p = . 048, eta- Zn tn' ýn 
squared =. 10, (mean buzzes for chair was 31.20 and for ocean 18.90). There was no 
interaction F<I. Figure 3.4 below shows the exact means for this comparison. 
Fi(; URE 3.4 - THE MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES (PERIOD 2) AS A FUNCTION OF PERSONALITY (STATE 
% S. ACTION ORIENTATION), GROUP (SUPPRESSION VS. EXPRESSION) AND TARGET THOUGHT (CHAIR VS. 
OCEAN). 
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(3) The role of WBSI scores, anxiety and rumination on the rebound effect 
The next series of analyses examined the effects of participants' WBSI scores, anxiety 
scores and rumination scores on the rebound effect. For each of these variables the 
sample was first dichotomised in to high and low scorers. After dichotomisation, the 
mean number of buzzer presses were entered into a2 group (suppression vs. expression) 
by 2 target thought (chair vs. ocean) ANOVA separately for participants with high and 
low scores on each of the measures of interest. The results showed that participants' 
scores on the WBSI, anxiety inventory and rumination inventory had no impact on the 
propensity to experience the rebound effect (modified version). 
In summary, when using the modified method of assessment no rebound effect was 
obtained in the whole sample. However, when the sample was dichotomised into state 
and action oriented groups a clear rebound effect occurred in state oriented participants 
but not in action oriented participants. None of the other personality or ability variables 
produced a similar effect. 
(4) Original method of assessing the rebound effect. 
The mean number of buzzer presses in period I and 2 as a function of group and target 
are presented in Figure 3.5 below. A careful examination of the means in this figure 
shows that there may be some methodological problems in the modified procedure for 
assessing the rebound effect. Thus, the mean number of thoughts during expression group 
in period I was 23.17 for the target word chair and 14.96 for the target word ocean. In 
period 2 when these period I expression participants are again asked to express, they 
think about chair 27.67 times and ocean 17.64 times. Thus, in both of the groups that 
expressed twice (chair and ocean) there is a rise in the number of reported thoughts from 
period I to period 2. This was supported by a2 target (chair vs. ocean, between group) x 
2 period (period I vs. period 2, repeated measures) mixed ANOVA, on expression group 
(period 1) only. Results indicated a main effect of period F (1,44) = 5.1 p=. 03, eta- 
squared =. 10, a main effect of targets F (1,44) = 5.31 P =. 026, eta-squared 11, and no 
interaction F=1.00. 
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Fi(; t'RE 3.5 -THE MEAN NUMBER OF BL: ZZER PRESSES IN PERIOD 
I AND PERIOD 2 AS A FuNCTION OF TARGET 
THOUGHT (CHAIR VS. OCEAN). 
This rise in reported thought in the groups who express twice suggests that the original Z-- C, tý t: l 
method of assessing the rebound (Wegner et al., 1987) may well represent a "cleaner" 
method as it avoids the practice effect in the expression group that inevitably diminishes 
the chances of obtainincy the rebound effect with the modified method. Indeed, in the 
original method the rebound is assessed by comparing the buzzer presses in the 
expression group in period I with the buzzer presses of the suppression group in period 2. 
In this way neither group has had previous practice at expressing the construct. rn Vý 
In order to assess the rebound effect with the original method, the mean number of buzzer 
presses (square root transformed) were entered into a2 group (expression in period I vs. 
expression after suppression in period 2) by 2 target thought (chair vs. ocean) ANOVA. 
Results revealed a main effect of group F (1,87) = 7.01 p=. Ol, eta-squared = . 075. 
Participants expressing in period 2, after prior suppression had a reliably higher number 
of buzzer presses (M 26.81 ) than participants expressing in period I (M = 19.06). There 
was also a main effect of target thought F(1,87)=8.9 p< . 004, eta-squared = . 09. 
Participants manipulating the construct that was present in the experimental room 
reporting more thoughts (M = 27.35) than participants manipulating the construct not 4: 1 In 
95 
present in the experimental room (M = 18.53). There was no interaction (F < 1). Using 
this method of assessment the rebound effect is clearly present and strongly, whereas it 
was not present when using the modified method of assessment. c 
FIGURE 3.6 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN EXPRESSION GROUP IN PERIOD I AND OF SUPPRESSION 
GROUP IN PERIOD 2 AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET THOUGHT (CHAIR VS. OCEAN). 
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Next, using this original method of assessment the role of the same individual difference 
variables in the rebound effect were assessed, as they were in the case of the modified 
method. Out of all the variables only state vs. action orientation and anxiety produced 
significant results. Thus, when the sample was divided into action and state oriented 
groups a rebound effect was onl obtained in the state oriented group. As one can see y Cn 
from Figure 3.7 the prior suppression group expressed more target thought during period tý in t: ' Cý 
2 than the group expressing in period I (F (3,43) = 14.37 p= . 008, eta-squared = . 15). en en 
There was also the main effect of target thought F (3,43) = 8.45 p= . 038, eta-squared L, Zý 
10, and no interaction between the independent variables (F<I). In contrast, there was no 
rebound effect in the action oriented participants (F<I). However, a main effect of target 
thought was significant F (3,38) = 14, p= . 01, eta-squared = . 14. Participants thought z1- C, 
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about chair more frequently than ocean (means = 33.08 and 22.10 respectively). There 
was no interaction (F<I). Thus, it appears that unlike action-oriented participants, state- 
oriented individuals display a rebound effect whichever method is used to assess the 
rebound effect. 
FlGuRF 3.7 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN STATE AND ACTION ORIENTED PARTICIPANTS AS A 
Ft JNCTION OF GROUP (EXPRESSION IN PERIOD I VS. EXPRESSION IN PERIOD 2 AFTER PRIOR 
SUPPRESSION). 
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The next analysis was conducted on groups who had high or low anxiety scores. In the zn 
low anxiety group there was a main effect of group F (3,43) = 7.3 p= . 01, eta-squared C, Zý 
. 14. However, this effect was absent in the high anxiety group (F<I). Thus, Figure 3.8 Zý 
below shows how the rebound effect is present in low anxiety participants but not in high 
anxiety participants. Note that when using the modified method of assessment neither 
0 group displayed a rebound effect. 
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FIGURE 3.8 - MEAN NI'MBER OF BUZZER PRESSES COMPARING EXPRESSION IN PERIOD I WITH EXPRESSION 
AFFER PRIOR SUPPRESSION IN PERIOD 2 FOR HIGH AND LOW ANXIETY PARTICIPANTS. 
IV. Discussion 
One aim of this study was to demonstrate the rebound effect with a 15-minute delay 
between the two verbalisation periods. An additional aim was to collect individual 
difference data on personality and ability from each participant in an effort to examine 
which individual difference variables affect when and where the rebound effect is found. 
A further aim was to systematically examine and compare the outcomes of using two 
different methods of assessing the rebound effect. 
The results demonstrate that using the modified method the rebound effect was not found 
using two different targets (Chair and Ocean) with an intervening 15-minute delay. Z!, In 
However, the effect was strong when the original method of assessing rebound was used. rn 
This highlights the need for further investigation of the procedures used to assess the lin Cý el 
rebound itself. In addition, it suggests that the modified method of assessing the rebound zn 
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may be more conservative and this may be directly responsible for some of the failures to 
replicate the rebound effect reported in the literature. The present study therefore 
represents the first preliminary evidence that rebound effects can still occur after a delay 
of 15 minutes, even when the intervening tasks are quite demanding. This lends some 
robustness to the phenomenon. 
The study also examined the effect of fluid intelligence on the rebound effect. Previous 
work has shown that the rebound effect may be stronger in people with higher IQ 
(Rutledge et al., 1993,1996). The current study did not provide any support for this 
conclusion and found that rebound effects were no more likely in high than low IQ 
participants irrespective of the method of assessment of the rebound effect. 
Perhaps most significantly, the data reported here fully supports the alternative model of 
the rebound effect proposed in this thesis. Thus, when the sample is dichotomised 
according to the global personality attributes of state vs. action orientation the state 
oriented participants demonstrated a rebound effect irrespective of whether the original or 
modified methods of assessing the rebound were being used. In contrast action oriented 
participants did not show a rebound effect with either method of assessment. Studies have 
shown that state orientated individuals have a personal style which means they do not 
deactivate intentions easily (Kuhl, 1994; Goschke and Kuhl, 1993). It is interesting 
therefore that it is also state orientated individuals who demonstrate the rebound effect. It 
has been our theoretical contention that the rebound effect may occur precisely because 
one formulates an intention to suppress, thus heightening the activation levels of all the 
suppressed concepts. 
The results with respect to the WBSI are clear. Using both the modified method and 
original method of rebound effect assessment, both high and low WBSI scoring groups 
failed to show a rebound effect. These results suggest that WBSI scores do not directly 
influence one's propensity to display rebound effects. 
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The findings with regards to anxiety are less certain. Using the modified method of 
assessment both low and high anxiety groups fail to demonstrate rebound effects. 
However, when using the original method of assessment the low anxiety group 
demonstrated a clear rebound effect that was completely absent in the high anxiety group. 
Although this finding was not found using the modified method, this result has support in 
the thought suppression literature. Thus, Harvey and Bryant (1999) 'also found that 
rebound effects only occurred in their low anxiety participants and were absent in their 
high anxiety participants. One explanation for this finding is that high anxiety 
participants have a tendency to suppress, both Harvey and Bryant (1999) and Gold and 
Wegner (1995) have suggested this argument. However it is unclear why participants 
who are anxious would have an automatic tendency to suppress neutral thoughts such as 
ocean or chair. 
Another variable that was examined was rumination. However, when the sample was 
dichotomised according to the McIntosh and Martin (1992) rumination inventory neither 
high or low ruminators displayed a rebound effect with either assessment method. Thus, 
of all the individual difference variables examined in this study only the dimension of 
action vs. state orientation was consistently found to influence the rebound effect. 
The current study also examined the effect of the object being represented by the target 
thought being present in the experimental room. The findings were clear. The presence 
of the to be suppressed or expressed item in the room did lead to more reported thoughts 
of the item, than when the item was not present in the experimental environment. 
However, in terms of suppression it seems that the object being present in the 
experimental room may not make suppression any more difficult than if it were not 
present in the experimental room. Thus, the mean number of reported thoughts for 
suppressing an item in the immediate environment was almost identical to the mean 
number of reported thoughts for suppressing an item not in the immediate environment. 
This finding may suggest that the mere presence of an item in the immediate environment 
may subtly activate the construct. 
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The findings presented in this Chapter lead to some important conclusions. First it seems 
that the method one uses to assess the rebound effect can determine whether or not 
rebound effects are found. In this study power for the original and modified methods 
were identical by design. This may help explain some of the failures to replicate the 
effect reported in the literature. The results suggest that the modified method of assessing 
the rebound effect may not be the best method of assessing the effect. Indeed on the basis 
of these results is would seem that the original method is subject to less interference from 
practice effects and therefore may at present represent the best method of assessing the 
rebound effect. 
Using the original method it seems the rebound effect can occur even with a 15-minute 
intervening gap between the two verbalisation periods. In addition, the effect of AOF 
(state vs. action orientation) is robust and provides support for the alternative intentional 
model of rebound effects outlined in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The role of individual differences in suppression and expression performance in the 
laboratory 
One issue that has largely been overlooked in research on mental control and especially 
on thought suppression concerns whether performance on a suppression or expression 
task in the laboratory can be conceptualised as an ability. This is an important question 
given that in thought suppression experiments participants display large variability in the 
number of times they think about the target thought during expression and suppression 
tasks in period 1. For example in Study 1, reported in Chapter 3, one participant buzzed 
as many as 27 times and another only once in period 1 despite the fact that both were in 
the suppression group (overall M= 7.35). Similarly, one participant buzzed 56 times and 
another only 6 times in the same period 1, despite the fact that both were in the 
expression group (overall M= 19.15). 
Clearly, a person's frequency of buzzing during active suppression or expression in 
period I may be conceptualised as a measure of suppression or expression ability. A low 
frequency of buzzing during suppression would represent a high suppression ability 
relative to another participant who buzzes more during active suppression. Conversely, a 
high frequency of buzzing during active expression in period I would represent a high 
thought expression (concentration) ability relative to another participant who buzzes only 
a few times during active expression. 
Two main issues arise from the conceptual i sation of suppression or expression 
performance in the laboratory as an ability. The first issue concerns whether there is a 
unitary mechanism underlying mental control performance. In short, are those people 
who appear good on a suppression task also good at an expression task and visa versa? 
The second issue concerns which individual difference variables relate to suppression and 
expression ability. If suppression and expression are related abilities they should correlate 
with the same set of individual difference variables. If they are dissociated abilities they 
may be related to a different set of individual difference variables. The aim of the present 
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study was to address these two issues by examining the correlations between the number 
of buzzer presses in period I and 2 by participants in suppression and expression groups, 
and how various individual difference factors such as fluid intelligence, state vs action 
orientation, anxiety and several other variables are related to participants' suppression 
and expression performance in the laboratory. 
(1) Relationship between suppression and expression performance 
If suppression and expression performance represent unitary abilities one would expect a 
negative correlation between buzzing during active suppression and active expression. 
Thus, participants who are poor at suppression (i. e. high number of buzzer presses during 
suppression) should be poor at thought expression (i. e. low number of buzzer presses 
during expression). In contrast, if suppression and expression are dissociated one would 
expect either no correlation or a positive correlation between performance during 
suppression and expression. 
The previous findings of Merckelbach et al. (1991) suggest mental control performance 
may not be a unitary ability. They found positive correlations between the number of 
thoughts during the suppression phase (period 1) and the later expression period (period 
2). Thus, participants demonstrating many failures during suppression subsequently went 
on to display the highest levels of thought during the expressive phase. Merckelbach et al. 
(1991) and Rassin et al. (2000) state this suggests individual difference factors are at 
work. However, in addition it also suggests that suppression and expression performance 
may be dissociated, i. e. uncorrelated. 
(2) Relationship of suppression and expression performance to individual difference 
variables 
Research on fluid intelligence suggests that higher levels of intelligence are in some cases 
positively related to performance in tasks requiring focussed attention (Engle et al. 1992, 
1999b; Crawford, 1991). Furthermore conscious inhibition has also been found to be 
related to greater intelligence (Heaton, 1981). However, not all experiments have 
validated these relationships (Fogarty & Stankov, 1988; Dempster, 1991). In line with 
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this, Brewin and Beaton (2002) found that participants with higher working memory 
capacity and higher fluid intelligence buzzed reliably fewer times in period 1 in 
suppression condition than participants with low fluid intelligence. This suggests that 
people with high fluid intelligence may be better at suppressing their thoughts than those 
with low fluid intelligence. Brewin and Beaton (2002) also investigated the relationship 
between fluid intelligence and number of buzzer presses in expression condition but, 
somewhat surprisingly, did not find any significant correlation between the two. 
However, their experimental design meant that the expression scores used for calculating 
the correlation between fluid intelligence and expression were all collected from an 
expression period that followed a suppression period and was therefore possibly affected 
by a rebound effect. It is obvious that more research needs to be done to address the issue 
of relationship between fluid intelligence and suppression and expression performance. In 
the present study fluid intelligence was assessed by the short form (Scale 2 form A) of the 
Cattell and Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test (1960). Fluid intelligence was then 
correlated with the number of buzzer presses in period I separately for suppression and 
expression groups. 
Due to a lack of research in this area, it is uncertain how personality factors may be 
related to suppression (or expression) performance. As an initial attempt to fill in this gap 
the current study examines how various individual difference measures are related, if at 
all, to suppression and expression performance in period 1. One of the variables of 
interest was the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI) that assesses the tendency to 
use thought suppression in everyday life. The current study will examine whether people 
with high scores on the WBSI (who suppress a lot) are better at a suppression task in the 
laboratory as a result of practice. If thought suppression is an ability that improves with 
practice then people with high scores on the WBSI should demonstrate better suppression 
ability in the laboratory. However, there is some experimental evidence that suggests the 
relationship may not be so simple. For example, some preliminary findings indicate that 
participants with high WBSI scores not only experience more target thoughts during 
active suppression, but also during expression after previous suppression (Muris, 
Merckelbach & Horselenberg, 1996; Van den Hout et al., 1996). This indicates that 
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people with high scores on WBSI may actually be worse at suppression task and suggests 
that suppression performance may not be subject to practice effects. 
Another variable of interest in the current study was state vs. action orientation due to its 
direct relevance to the alternative theory of the mechanisms behind the rebound effect put 
forward in this thesis (the intentional explanation). In Chapter 3 it was demonstrated that 
state vs. action orientation had a strong impact on whether the rebound effect was found. 
Thus, action oriented participants displayed no rebound effect and state oriented 
participants showed a strong rebound effect. As to the impact of state vs. action 
orientation on suppression performance in the laboratory one would expect state oriented 
participants to demonstrate worse suppression performance as Kuhl and Beckmann 
(1994) have consistently argued that state oriented people are susceptible to intrusive 
thoughts, especially intrusions relevant to a current goal (and thought suppression can be 
conceptualised as a current goal). In contrast, it is expected that action oriented 
participants will be able to suppress their thoughts more successfully than state oriented 
individuals. It is more difficult to make specific predictions about the relationship 
between expression performance and state vs. action orientation. It is possible that there 
will be no reliable correlation between this scale and the number of buzzer presses in 
period I in expression condition. 
Another variable investigated in the current study was how ability at thought suppression 
or expression would relate to personality. As such, the Eysenck personality inventory 
(Eysenck et al., 1985) was also included mainly for exploratory purposes, no specific 
predictions were made as to the possible relationship of personality to suppression or 
expression performance. 
Several other individual difference measures were also collected during this study. As 
stated earlier very little research has examined the issue of factors affecting ones 
performance on a suppression or expression task, therefore the following list of variables 
were included in an exploratory capacity. Specific predictions as to whether or how these 
variables may relate to suppression or expression performance were avoided. 
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These other variables collected included: Thought Action Fusion, tendency to run-iinate, 
State and Trait Anxiety, Marlowe Crowne scale, Thought Control Questionnaire, Beck 
Depression Inventory, Need for Cognition scale, state vs. action orientation, Linking, 
Unhappiness, and Schizotypal Personality. 
(2) Summary 
Overall this study addresses the question of how much control people have over their 
thoughts. In particular it will examine whether suppression and expression performance 
are underpinned by similar cognitive mechanisms, and which personality variables are 
related to being a successful suppressor and expresser in the laboratory. In order to 
address these issues the data from Study I (described in Chapter 2 and 3) were used. In 
particular, the number of buzzer presses made by the participants in suppression and 
expression groups in period I was used as well as participants' scores on various 
individual difference measures collected during two sessions of Study 1. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
94 University of Hertfordshire undergraduates (74 Females and 20 Males) volunteered to 
take part in return for course credit. The age range was from 18 to 60 years. The mean 
age was 23 years. The same participants as in chapter 3. 
(2) Materials and Procedure 
Participants completed a standard thought verbalisation session where half of the 
participants were asked to suppress and half asked to express (period 1). In period 2 all 
participants were asked to express the previously manipulated construct (suppressed or 
expressed). Finally all participants completed a series of self-report personality and 
ability inventories. 
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111. Results 
Results are analysed in two sections. The first analysis examines the relationship between 
suppression and expression performance; the second explores the relationship between 
suppression/expression performance in period I and several individual difference 
variables. 
(1) Relationship between suppression and expression performance 
The first analysis performed examined the correlation between buzzing during period 1 
and buzzing during period 2. Two correlations were computed, one for the suppression 
group (period 1) and one for the expression group (period 1). For the group of 
participants suppressing in period 1 and then expressing in period 2 the correlation 
between the number of buzzer presses in the two periods was r (44) =. 51 p=. 001. This 
correlation is positive and highly significant suggesting that those participants who buzz 
frequently during a thought suppression task (task failure) subsequently buzz frequently 
during a thought expression task (task success), and vice versa. The correlation between 
buzzer presses in the group expressing during period 1 and then again expressing during 
period 2 is r (46) =. 85 p =. 0001. Thus, those participants asked to express in period I 
who buzz frequently, subsequently buzz frequently during period 2 expression as well. 
The difference between these two correlations is significant at the 95% confidence level, 
z score for difference in Fisher's z for probabilities = 3.35, p=0.0008. 
Out of all the individual difference variables only two are significantly correlated with 
suppression performance in Period I(see Table 4). These variables were extraversion r 
(45) = -. 29, p =. 05, and state vs. action orientation r (44) = -. 295 p =. 05. The correlations 
are both negative. The negative correlation with extraversion suggests that more extravert 
participants make fewer buzzer presses in the laboratory suppression task. 
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TABLE 4.1 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN PERIOD 
AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE MEASURES 
Buzz Buzz Trait Q EPQ- Rumi Week I Week I WBSI MarC TC EPQ-E EPQ- BDI AOF F-IQ TAF SPQ 
Period I Period 2 Anxiety 
PN nate 
Suppress Week I Group 
Period Ir1.00 . 510 . 001 -. 
018 -. 102 . 008 -. 252 -. 293 . 041 . 110 . 025 -. 295 . 108 -. 067 . 207 
Buzzes p . 0004 . 
997 . 907 . 505 . 958 . 
095 . 051 . 789 . 477 . 877 . 052 . 507 . 677 . 321 
N 44 44 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 44 41 44 40 41 25 
Period 2r . 510 1.00 -. 190 . 180 -. 110 -. 150 -. 170 -. 030 -. 
290 -. 210 -. 153 -. 010 . 270 -. 150 -. 470 
Buzzes p . 0004 . 217 . 
242 . 477 . 
331 . 270 . 
847 OS6 . 171 . 
346 . 949 . 
076 
. 
356 . 018 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 40 43 44 40 25 
Express Week I Group 
Period I r 1.00 . 850 . 084 -. 070 -. 170 . 120 -. 050 -. 300 . 110 . 110 . 050 . 130 . 
350 -. 270 . 030 
Buzzes p <0005 . 575 . 640 . 253 . 422 . 739 . 040 . 462 . 467 . 756 . 
389 . 031 . 088 . 880 
N 47 46 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 46 41 46 38 41 28 
Period 2 r . 850 1.00 -. 028 -. 245 -. 113 . 180 -. 061 -. 179 . 001 . 037 . 047 . 
160 . 362 -. 208 -. 120 
Buzzes p -c-0005 . 853 . 101 . 455 . 231 . 687 . 234 . 995 . 807 . 770 . 288 . 
028 . 198 . 551 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 41 46 37 40 27 
p: r.. 05. bold;. 10> p> 0.05 italic 
Key 
WBSI White Bear Suppression Inventory 
MarC Marlowe Crowne Scale 
TCQ = Thought Control Questionnaire 
EPQ -P= Eysenck Personality Questionnaire - Psychoticism 
EPQ -E= Eysenck Personality Questionnaire - Extraversion 
EPQ -N= Eysenck Personality Questionnaire - Neuroticism 
BDI = Beck Depression Inventory 
Ruminate = McIntosh & Martin Rumination Inventory 
AOF = state vs. action orientation - preoccupation subscale 
F-IQ = Fluid Intelligence 
TAF - Moral = Thou-ht Action Fusion - Moral subscale 
SPQ = Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
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The negative correlation with state vs. action orientation suggests that as one's scores on 
the state vs. action scale rise (representing greater action orientation) one's buzzes during 
laboratory suppression fall. In contrast, low scores on the state vs. action scale 
(representing greater state orientation) relate to a high number of buzzes during 
laboratory suppression. Thus, the more action oriented participants appear to suppress 
better. 
Similarly, out of all the individual difference variables only two variables significantly 
correlated with expression performance in Period I (see Table 4.2). These were 
extraversion r (47) = -. 30 p= . 04, and Fluid intelligence r (3 8) = . 35 p= . 03. The negative 
correlation with extraversion is suggesting that as one's scores on an extraversion scale 
rise the number of buzzer presses during a laboratory thought expression task falls. In 
other words, introverts are more successful at expression task (buzz more) than 
extroverts. The positive correlation between buzzer pressing during thought expression 
and fluid intelligence suggests more intelligent people buzz more during expression. 
Finally, two regression models were computed predicting successful suppression and 
expression performance from all of their significant correlates. The first model attempted 
to predict the number of buzzer presses in period 1 (suppression group) from extraversion 
and state vs. action orientation. A regression model containing these predictors was 
significant, F(2,43)=4.1, p=. 023, and explained 16.8% of variance in the dependant 
variable. Thus, both extraversion and state vs. action orientation significantly predict 
suppression performance. When a stepwise regression procedure was used the same 
model was accepted. A model with only state vs action orientation resulted in an R2 of 
. 087. 
The second model attempted to predict the number of buzzer presses in period I from 
extraversion and fluid intelligence. However this model did not prove reliable, due to 
extraversion not significantly predicting expression buzzing, over and above the effect of 
fluid intelligence. A model with just fluid intelligence predicting expression buzzing was 
significant F (1,37) = 5.10 p= . 03 and explained 12% of the variance in the dependent 
variable, a stepwise regression procedure resulted in the same model. 
IV. Discussion 
Two major findings emerged from this study. The first finding is that thought intrusion 
during suppression (as assessed by buzzer pressing) was positively correlated with later 
thought expression. The second finding was that suppression performance is best 
predicted by extraversion and state vs. action orientation whereas expression performance 
is best predicted by fluid intelligence. 
The first finding has support in the thought suppression literature. Thus, Merckelbach et 
al. (1991) found that there was a positive correlation between buzzer pressing during 
suppression and expression. This finding suggests that those participants who were 
successful suppressors and only buzzed a few times during active suppression went on to 
be poor expressers and only buzz a few times during expression. Taken together the 
results of this study and Merckelbach et al. (1991) suggest that suppressive and 
expressive forms of mental control may not be based on similar mechanisms. This result 
implies that being good at one form of mental control (suppression or expression) 
suggests one will be poor at the alternative form. 
This study also found that buzzing in the initial expression group during two periods of 
thought expression were highly positively correlated. This suggests an individual 
difference factor may be at work that makes some individuals better expressors than 
others and some less good at expression than others. 
The second finding further supports the first in that suppression and expression 
performance were found to be predicted by a different set of individual difference 
variables. Thought suppression performance was predicted by extroversion and state vs. 
action orientation. In contrast, expression performance was predicted by only fluid 
intelligence. Thus, successful suppression performance (i. e. low number of buzzer 
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presses) is related to being an extrovert and action oriented, and unsuccessful suppression 
performance (i. e. high number of buzzer presses) is related to being an introvert and state 
oriented. The finding relating unsuccessful thought suppression performance to state 
orientation is particularly important as it suggests we have found an individual difference 
variable that not only affects the rebound effect (see Chapter 3) but also affects one's 
performance during the suppression task. This pattern was expected on the basis of Kuhl 
and Beckmann's (1994) theory of state vs. action orientation where state orientation is 
related to intrusive thoughts and lack of control over one's thoughts, whereas action 
orientation is related to less thoughts intrusion and a greater degree of control. Therefore 
state vs. action orientation is a variable that deserves much greater emphasis in future 
thought suppression studies. 
In contrast, the correlation between expression performance and fluid intelligence is 
positive suggesting that as fluid intelligence increases one's performance on thought 
expression also improves (higher number of buzzer presses). High fluid intelligence is 
therefore clearly helpful to thought expression. Thus, it seems intelligence is assessing 
something akin to ease of construct activation and intelligence is unrelated to suppression 
performance. This finding is in direct contrast with the findings of Brewin and Beaton 
(2002) who showed that higher fluid intelligence was related to better suppression ability. 
However, there are some reasons this discrepancy may have occurred. Brewin and 
Beaton's frequency of intrusion during active thought suppression is very high, thus they 
report that in a 5-minute suppression period the average number of white bear mentions 
was 15.43. This is very high as the acknowledged average number of intrusions in 
thought suppression experiments using neutral thoughts is about I intrusion per minute 
(Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). This would put the average figure at 
5 intrusions for a 5-minute suppression period. It is therefore not clear why Brewin and 
Beaton have 15 intrusions in their suppression condition. It is possible that this represents 
an immediate enhancement effect, but whatever the reason it is clear that this figure is 
somewhat inflated, indeed in the expression condition the mean number of reported 
thoughts is 18.5, only slightly higher. 
III 
Somewhat surprisingly, the results also showed that there was no correlation between 
participant's scores on the WBSI and the number of buzzer presses in the suppression 
condition in period 1. Thus, it appears a person who suppresses thoughts every day of 
their life is no better at a new suppression task in the laboratory than a person who has 
suppressed thoughts only a few times in their life. This suggests that thought suppression 
is not an ability that gets better with practice. Overall the same results were obtained with 
the TCQ which represents another questionnaire method of assessing the tendency to use 
thought suppression, once again the TCQ did not correlate with the number of buzzer 
presses during suppression or expression. 
One criticism of the methods used in this study concerns the reliability of the measures of 
suppression and expression performance. In the thought suppression literature there has 
been broad discussion over the reliability and validity of using self reported thought 
measures. However despite discussion no study has yet set out to determine the reliability 
of suppression or expression performance as currently conceptualised in this chapter. 
Indeed, this study was designed to be exploratory and represents a new research direction 
in thought suppression experiments. This issue of the reliability of measures of 
suppression and expression performance will be more fully discussed in chapter 12. 
In summary, very few personality variables appear related to successful suppression or 
expression performance in the laboratory and those that have been identified explain only 
about 10% (on the basis of adjusted R) of the variance in suppression or expression 
performance. However, with 45 participants power to detect a 'medium' effect of r 
0.30 is only just over half, and any small effect would be unlikely to be detected. 
It would seem thoughts are relatively uncontrollable. Thus, no personality variable 
predicts success at both suppression and expression. Action orientation goes with 
effective suppression; while fluid intelligence goes with effective expression. 
Extraversion predicts success at suppression, but failure at expression. In addition, the 
evidence that thought suppression performance may not improve with practice is also 
suggestive of the fact that thoughts may be relatively uncontrollable (Logan, 1983). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Replication of Study I and assessing the rebound via a within subject design 
In Chapter 3a study was reported that investigated the rebound effect and the possible 
role of individual difference variables. This study was conducted during the week I 
session of a larger scale study. The design and procedures of this large-scale study were 
described briefly in Chapter 2, where it was noted that all participants were tested again 
after one week. The experimental session in week 2 was an exact replication of week 1 
session except that at the end of the experiment in week 2 participants completed the 
Culture Fair Intelligence Test (Cattell & Cattell, 1960) and a different set of 
questionnaires (for details see Chapter 2). In addition, as illustrated at the end of Chapter 
2 in Figure 2.1, those participants who were in the suppression group in week 1 had to 
express a thought in week 2 and vice versa. The target thought was also different in week 
2. Those who suppressed or expressed the target word 'chair' in week I had to 
manipulate the target word 'eagle' in week 2 and those who suppressed or expressed the 
target word 'ocean' had to manipulate 'carpet' in week 2. 
Conducting this study in week 2 had three objectives. First was to try and replicate the 
pattern of findings obtained in week I (Chapter 3). A second novel objective was to try 
and assess the rebound effect within subjects across the two weeks. The final aim was to 
further examine the relationship between the suppressive and expressive forms of mental 
control in a situation where suppression and expression performance are assessed on two 
separate occasions, one week apart, instead of following each other closely in time as was 
the case in week I (Chapter 4). 
(1) Replication of results obtained in week 1 
The first objective of this study was to assess the rebound effect via the conventional 
between subject comparisons, in order to see if the pattern of results obtained in week I 
(see Chapter 3) could be replicated in week 2. If the findings replicate across the two 
sessions this would speak in favour of robustness of the rebound effect. However, there 
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are reasons to believe that demonstrating a rebound effect on a second experimental 
testing session may not provide significant results. This is mainly due to the possible 
effects of practice from the first session of testing. Thus, results from week 1 suppression 
(see Chapter 3) showed that there was a significant rise in reported thought in the group 
that expressed their thoughts in both period I and period 2. If this practice effect also 
continues across weeks it might make it harder to demonstrate the rebound effect in week 
2 after participants have already taken part in a thought suppression experiment in week 
1. 
In order to minimise possible practice effects the current study was designed to have a 
one week gap between experimental sessions. The targets used for suppression and 
expression were also changed from week I to week 2 testing. Thus, on week I 
participants were manipulating (suppressing or expressing) "chair" or "ocean". On week 
2 participants were asked to manipulate "eagle" or "carpet". All target words were 
matched for their frequency of use in the English language (see method section). In 
addition, as in week 1, two of the targets chosen for week 2 were either representing an 
object in the experimental environment (carpet) or an object not in the experimental room 
(eagle). It was not anticipated that the target being present or absent in the room would 
have a direct effect on suppression or expression performance. Therefore, for 
counterbalancing purposes, participants who manipulated a target in week I which was 
present in the experimental environment manipulated a target not present in the 
experimental room on week 2 and visa versa. Finally participants who had been 
suppressing in week I period 1 were asked to express during week 2 period I and visa 
versa. 
(2) Assessing a rebound effect using a within subjects design 
An additional reason for conducting a similar study in week 2 on the same participants 
was to assess the rebound effect within subjects instead of using the between group 
comparisons that has been customary in thought suppression research. Indeed, most 
methods of assessing the rebound effect (i. e., original, modified and standard) described 
in the introduction (Chapter 1) have been comparing the number of target thoughts 
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between two different groups of participants. In view of large individual differences 
displayed by participants in both suppression and expression conditions one may question 
whether using between subjects comparisons is the best possible way of assessing the 
rebound effect. Perhaps using within subjects comparisons could provide a more robust 
way of assessing the rebound and be able to produce stronger effects. 
Rutledge et al. (1993; 1993) have previously investigated the rebound effect using a 
within participants design (see figure 1.4 page 36 in Chapter 1). However, the design 
used by Rutledge and colleagues was conducted within one testing session, by asking 
participants first to express a thought, then suppress it, and finally to express it again in 
three consecutive 9-minute long thought verbalisation periods. The rebound effect was 
assessed by comparing the number of target thoughts in the first expression period with 
the second expression period (after suppression). However, there are two problems with 
using a within subjects design in one experimental session. First is that the number of 
buzzer presses may decrease over the long thought verbalisation sessions irrespective of 
type of instructions due to fatigue. The second and more likely problem emerged from 
the results in Chapter 3 where it was shown that the group expressing twice, in both 
period I and period 2 demonstrated a significant increase in target thought, most probably 
representing an effect of practice with the task in the former expression period. 
The current study used within participants comparisons across two weeks of testing. 
Testing participants twice in a thought suppression experiment by assigning them to 
different experimental groups (expression vs. suppression) in week I and week 2 will 
allow for an assessment the rebound effect within participants whilst seeking to minimise 
the effects of fatigue or previous practice. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show how the rebound can be assessed within participants across the 
two weeks using both modified and original methods of assessment. Figure 5.1 represents 
this for participants who were in suppression group in week I (initial suppression group) 
and Figure 5.2 for participants who were in expression group in week I (initial 
expression group). These two figures illustrate that the rebound effect can be assessed 
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within subjects with the modified method if one compares the number of buzzer presses 
in period 2 (when all participants are expressing the target thought) across the two weeks 
(week 1 and week 2). Using these comparisons the rebound effect should be present in 
both initial expression and initial suppression groups if the number of buzzer presses is 
higher in period 2 after initial suppression than after initial expression irrespective of 
week of testing. 
As to the original method, Figure 5.1 shows that for the initial suppression group the 
rebound can be assessed by comparing the number of buzzer presses in period 2 in week 
1 (expression after suppression) with those of period I in week 2 (expression without 
prior suppression). The rebound effect would be present if the number of buzzer presses 
in period 2 (in week 1) is higher than in period 1 (in week 2). Alternatively, for the initial 
expression group the original method involves comparing the number of buzzer presses 
in period I in week I (expression without prior suppression) with those of period 2 in 
week 2 (expression after suppression) (see Figure 5.2). In this condition the rebound 
effect would be present if the number of buzzes is higher in the period 2 (week 2) after 
initial expression than in the group expressing in period I of week 1. 
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IFIGuRE 5.1 - METHODS OF ASSESSING THE REBOUND EFFECT WITHIN SUBJECTS FOR THE INITIAL 
SUPPRESSION GROUP OF WEEK 1. THE MODIFIED METHOD ASSESSES THE REBOUND EFFECT BY 
COMPARING TWO EXPRESSION CONDITIONS IN PERIOD 2 ACROSS THE TWO WEEKS (SEE VERTICAL 
ARROW). THE ORIGINAL METHOD ASSESSES THE REBOUND EFFECT BY COMPARING TWO EXPRESSION 
CONDITIONS ONE IN PERIOD 2 AND ONE IN PERIOD I FOR WEEKS 1 AND 2, RESPECTIVELY (SEE 
DIAGONALARROW). 
Period I Period 2 
Week I Suppression Expression 
Original method Modified 
Method 
Week 2 Expression Expression 
FIGURE 5.2 - METHODS OF ASSESSING THE REBOUND EFFECT wrrHIN SUBJEcTS FOR THE INITIAL 
EXPRESSION GROUP OF WEEK 1. THE MODIFIED METHOD ASSESSES THE REBOUND EFFEcr BY 
COMPARING TWO EXPRESSION CONDITIONS IN PERIOD 2 ACROSS THE TWO WEEKS (SEE 
VERTICAL ARROW). THE ORIGINAL METHOD ASSESSES THE REBOUND EFFECT BY 
COMPARING TWO EXPRESSION CONDITIONS ONE IN PERIOD I AND ONE IN PERIOD 2 FOR 
WEEKS I AND 2, RESPECTIVELY (SEE DIAGONAL ARROW). 
Period 1 
Week II Expression 
Original method 
Week 21 Suppression 
Period 2 
Expression 
I 
odified MMethod 
Expression 
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(3) Relationship between suppression and expression performance 
The final aim of the study was to examine the relationship between suppression and 
expression performance across two sessions occurring one week apart. In Chapter 4 this 
relationship was examined between the buzzer presses in two 5-minute periods of thought 
verbalisations which followed each other fairly closely in time (there was only a 15- 
minute interval between them). A positive correlation was obtained between the number 
of buzzer presses in period I and period 2 in the initial suppression group. This 
correlation suggests a negative relationship between suppressive and expressive forms of 
control. 
However, it is possible that in the initial suppression group the number of buzzer presses 
in period 2 was influenced by the rebound effect (see Chapter 3). It is therefore desirable 
to assess this correlation on the basis of participants' performance that is not potentially 
confounded by this effect. One way of achieving this is to have participants suppress and 
express their thoughts in 5-minute verbalisation periods that have a substantial time 
delay, instead of following each other within a short space of time. Given that 
participants who were in suppression group in week I were in expression group in week 
2 and vice versa it was possible to examine the number of buzzer presses in period 1 
across the two weeks within the same participants. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
All 94 participants who completed the study in week I were asked to return for the 
second session in week 2. However, 10 participants did not return for the second 
experimental session in week 2 and therefore the analyses reported below are based on 
the data of 84 participants whose mean age was 23.27 years (SD=7.4). 
(2) Method and Procedure 
The method employed in the current study was identical to the method used in week I of 
the study described in Chapters 2 and 3. The detailed procedure and design is described 
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in Chapter 2 and is depicted in Figure 2.1 (page 78). As one can see in Figure 2.1, in 
week 2 of the study instead of suppressing or expressing Ocean or Chair the targets were 
now changed to Eagle or Carpet. All four targets were chosen to be of similar familiarity 
and frequency of use in everyday life using Toglia and Battig's word norms (1978). In 
addition, all were chosen to be of similar length, 5 or 6 letters. 
111. Results 
The results will be presented in three subsections representing the three objectives of the 
study. First, the rebound effect will be assessed using the conventional between subject 
method of comparison in an attempt to replicate the pattern of results obtained in week I 
described in Chapter 3. This will be followed by the analyses of data with a novel way of 
assessing the rebound effect by within subjects comparisons. Finally, the correlation 
between suppression and expression performance in week I and week 2 will be 
examined. 
(1) Replication of results obtained in week I 
Initial screening of the buzzer presses in week 2 revealed that the number of reported 
thoughts in periods I and 2 were not normally distributed. Therefore, square root 
transformations were performed on the number of buzzes during periods I and 2 in an 
effort to normalise these distributions. After transformation, boxplots revealed 2 
remaining outliers. These participants were removed from all analyses involving buzzer 
presses. For the sake of clarity results are reported on untransformed means, but all 
analyses were conducted using the transformed variables. 
In order to check whether participants correctly followed the instructions for suppression 
and expression in period 1, the mean number of square root transformed buzzer presses 
during period I was entered into a2 group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 target 
thought (carpet vs. eagle) between subjects ANOVA. This analysis revealed a main effect 
of group, F(l, 78) = 71.77, p<001, eta-squared =. 49. Participants expressing their 
thoughts in period I buzzed significantly more (M = 30.17) than participants suppressing 
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their thoughts (M = 7.9). It is therefore evident that participants compiled with the 
experimental instructions. However, unlike the results of week 1, the effect of target 
thought was not significant (F<I). Participants who manipulated target word Carpet, C, L- 
representing an object in the room, did not buzz more (M=20.37) than those who 
manipulated the word Ea-le (M=17.90). The interaction was also not significant, 
F(1,78)=1.33, p=. 25. 
FIGURE 5-3 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES AS A FUNCTION OF INSTRUCTION GROUP IN PERIOD 
(SUPPRESSION VS. EXPRESSION) AND TARGErTHOUGifr(CARPEF VS. EAGLE) IN WEEK 
The next analysis was performed on the number of buzzer presses in period 2 in order to 
assess the rebound effect using a modified method of assessment. The mean number of 
(square root transformed) buzzer presses in period 2 were entered into a2 group 
(suppression vs. expression) by 2 target thought (carpet vs. eagle) between subjects rn In 4n 
ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of group, F(1,76*6.94, P=. 01, eta-squared 
. 09, no main effect of taroet thought (F < 1) and no interaction (F < 1) (for means see tý In 
Figure 5.4 below). The main effect of group shows that in period 2 those participants who 
previously suppressed buzzed reliably fewer times (M = 20.52) than those who 
previously expressed (M = 29.69). Thus, in week 2 there is a clear effect of previous 
expression or suppression but it is in the opposite direction to a rebound effect. 
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FIGURE 5.4 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN PERIOD 2 AS A FUNCTION OF PREVIOUS GROUP 
(SUPPRESSION VS. EXPRESSION) AND TARGET THOUGHT (CARPET VS. EAGLE) 
Similar results were obtained when the original method of assessing the rebound was 
used (see Figure 5.5). For this method, the mean number of square root transformed 
buzzer presses were entered into a2 group (expression in period I vs. expression in 
period 2 after prior suppression) by 2 target thought (carpet vs. eagle) between subject 
ANOVA. Results revealed a main effect of group F (3,72) = 7.64, p=. 007, eta-squared 
. 09. Participants expressing in period I displayed reliably higher number of buzzer 
presses (M=30.19) than those who expressed in period 2 after prior suppression (M 
20.6). There was no effect of target thought and no interaction (Fs<]). Cý C 
FiGURE5.5- MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES ASA FUNCTION OF GROUP (EXPRESSION IN PERIOD I VS. 
EXPRESSION IN PERIOD 2 AFTER SUPPRESSION) AND TARGET THOUGHT (CARPET VS. EAGLE). 
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In summary, in week 2, the group expressing after prior suppression is clearly not 
demonstrating a rebound effect, whether the analysis is performed using the original 
method or the modified method. If anything, participants expressing without prior 
suppression or after prior expression have reliably higher number of target thoughts (See 
Figures 5.3 and Figure 5.2 respectively). 
A possible reason for this failure to replicate the rebound effect in week 2 becomes 
apparent when one examines the mean number of buzzer presses in the initial expression 
and suppression conditions across week 1 and week 2 (see Figure 5.6 for means). 
If one examines the left hand panel of Figure 5.6 showing the data of participants who 
were in suppression groups then one can see there is no difference in the amount of 
buzzer presses across the weeks in period I when participants suppressed and period 2 
when these participants expressed after prior suppression. In contrast, when one examines 
the right hand panel of Figure 5.4 showing the data of participants in expression groups a 
different picture emerges. Thus, in week 2 participants in the expression condition had a 
significantly higher number of buzzer presses than in week I both in period I (M = 30.17 
and M= 19.06) and in period 2 (M = 29.70 and M= 22.65). 
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FIGURE 5.6 - MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN WEEK I AND WEEK 2 FOR BOTH EXPERIMENTAL 
PERIODS (PERIOD I AND PERIOD 2) 
Thus, due to this large increase in buzzing in the expression conditions (possibly due to 41, en 
the former practice with expression) the rebound effect can not be obtained with either 
the modified or original method of assessment. Moreover, unlike the results from week I 
testing, the rebound effect was not obtained when participants' action vs. state orientation L- I 
was taken into account. 
(2) Assessing a rebound effect with a within subjects design 
The results of the analysis reported in the previous section are indicative that due to 
possible practice effects in expression performance across the weeks it is less likely that 
the rebound effect will be obtained when using the within subjects comparisons outlined 
in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. An additional complication was that there was a main effect of 
type of thought in that participants consistently buzzed more in the expression conditions 
when the construct was in the experimental environment compared to when the 
expression target was not in the immediate environment. 
As a result of these complications, when the analyses depicted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 zn 
were undertaken the results did not support a straightforward explanation. In some cases In 
a rebound effect was found, in others no rebound was found and in some a reverse 
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rebound effect was demonstrated. It seems therefore that these unexpected findings arose 
due to the large rise in expression group performance in week 2, and the significant effect 
of the presence of the to be expressed stimulus in the experimental environment. Thus, 
once again the effects of practice from week I on expression buzzing in week 2 and the 
type of target thought preclude firm conclusions from being made. 
(3) The relationship between suppression and expression performance across the 
weeks 
In order to examine the relationship between suppression and expression performance 
across the two weeks the correlations between participants buzzing in period I of week I 
and period I of week 2 were calculated. Due to the fact that whatever form of mental 
control participants were undertaking in period I of week I they then undertook the 
opposite form in period I of week 2 this meant that correlations between performance 
during suppression and expression periods could be calculated within the same 
participants. 
The correlation for participants suppressing in period I of week I and then expressing in 
period I of week 2 was positive, r (37) =. 342 p= . 038. The correlation 
for participants 
expressing in period I of week I and then suppressing in period I of week 2 was also 
positive, r (40) =. 483 p= . 002. 
IV. Discussion 
One of the main findings of the present study is that it failed to replicate the rebound 
effect obtained in Study I (Chapter 3). However, the results also showed quite clearly 
that this was primarily due to carry over effects in practice with an expression task across 
two weeks. Thus, participants who were expressing their thoughts in week 2 either 
without prior expression/suppression demonstrated a large rise in the number of reported 
thoughts during expression which may have lead to the failure to demonstrate any 
rebound effect using week 2 data. The results suggest that expression is highly sensitive 
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to the previous effects of practice both within the same experimental session and across 
two weeks. These findings provide additional support for an idea suggested in Chapter 3 
that using the modified method of assessing the rebound effect may be more problematic 
in comparison to the original (Wegner et al., 1987) method. 
Unfortunately the present study did not allow for an assessment of whether practice 
effects may exist in suppression performance. Although the level of thought in the 
suppression groups across both weeks was fairly constant, one must remember the 
experimental design meant that participants expressing in week 2 had previous practice 
with thought expression whereas participants suppressing in week 2 had no previous 
suppression practice. 
As a direct result of the carry over effects demonstrated in expression performance across 
the weeks, the within subjects comparisons of the rebound effect were not investigated 
further. 
This study demonstrated a positive correlation between buzzing during period I week I 
and period I week 2 for both suppression and expression groups. Therefore, the results 
together with those reported in Chapter 4 provide strong evidence of a dissociation 
between suppressive and expressive forms of mental control. Thus, in spite of the 
difficulties present in this replication study, it is clear that there is much evidence for the 
position that being a successful suppressor means one will be a poor expresser and being 
an unsuccessful suppressor means one will be a better expresser. This pattern of results 
may suggest that it is not necessarily mental control that is of most interest, but one's 
proneness to intrusion, which seems to vary intra-individually. 
In summary, the results from the data of week 2 testing do not replicate the rebound 
effect obtained in week I of testing (see Chapter 3). In future explorations of the rebound 
effect and the nature of individual differences in mental control, much greater emphasis 
needs to be made of the possible effects of practice on expression performance. Whilst 
negative, the results of the present study have important methodological implications for 
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thought suppression research. In particular the results strongly suggest that once 
participants have taken part in a thought suppression experiment they should not 
participate in other thought suppression experiments as even one week later their 
performance on the second experiment could be strongly effected by the prior study they 
took part in. 
At the conceptual level, these results imply that the rebound effect as currently 
demonstrated in the laboratory may not be as robust as previously suggested by some 
researchers (Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff and Wegner, 2000). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Assessing the rebound effect with an implicit method: Reaction times to previously 
suppressed and expressed targets in a lexical decision task 
The large-scale study described in Chapter 2 examined the rebound effect in week I (see 
Chapter 3) and week 2 (Chapter 5) as well as the role of individual differences in 
performance on laboratory suppression and expression tasks (Chapter 4). One criticism of 
all these studies is their reliance on self reported thought (i. e. the number buzzer presses) 
during suppression or expression as the dependent variable. This criticism is widely 
acknowledged in thought suppression research and has lead many to advocate a greater 
use of implicit measures (e. g. Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In view of this criticism one of 
the aims of the thesis was to try to assess the rebound effect with an implicit method. This 
involved measuring the reaction times to previously suppressed or expressed target words 
that were presented in a Lexical Decision Task immediately following the suppression or 
expression in period 1. The data reported in this chapter was collected in week 1 of the 
large-scale study described in Chapter 2. Thus, the Lexical Decision Task that was 
included to provide a short 15-minute delay between period I and period 2 of thought 
verbalisation was also a method of implicitly measuring the rebound effect. If the 
rebound effect occurs as a result of heightened activation of the previously suppressed 
thought then participants should respond faster to previously suppressed than expressed 
targets in the Lexical Decision Task (-cf. Erber & Wegner 1992). 
Apart from methodological considerations the current study also used implicit measures 
for important theoretical reasons. As pointed out in the introduction, Wegner's ironic 
process theory (Wegner et al., 1992; 1994) postulates two distinct mechanisms in thought 
suppression. An intentional operating process (sometimes called the controlled distracter 
search) seeks distracters and thoughts designed to maintain the desired state, i. e. not to 
think about the suppressed thought. In contrast, an ironic monitoring process (sometimes 
referred to as the automatic target search) continually searches for instances of the to-be- 
suppressed thought in consciousness which will signal a failure of suppression. While the 
intentional search for distracters is a consciously controlled process affected by the 
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amount of available attentional resources, the ironic monitoring process operates 
automatically without one's conscious awareness and does not consume cognitive 
resources. 
In the course of thought suppression these two processes are proposed to operate together 
as a feedback mechanism aimed at controlling thought. Wegner and colleagues (1992; 
1994) have pointed out that the operation of the automatic ironic monitor raises the 
activation levels of the to be avoided thought making it highly likely to intrude once the 
controlled distracter search is abandoned (i. e., a post-suppression rebound) or disrupted 
by the secondary task depleting one's attentional resources (i. e., the immediate 
enhancement effect). 
Despite the usefulness of this theory Wegner and his colleagues have not explicitly 
indicated exactly how the operation of the ironic monitor causes the raised activation 
levels. Wegner and Erber (1992) state that "the automatic target search should act in 
much the same way as an externally encountered prime to make the unwanted thought 
highly accessible" (p. 904). However, they do not develop this argument any further. 
In a further development of this model, Macrae et al. (1994) did suggest a mechanism by 
which the operation of the ironic monitor may raise the activation levels of the to-be 
avoided thought. Thus, Macrae et al. (1994) argue that when someone suppresses a 
thought, the operation of the ironic monitoring process will activate the unwanted thought 
continuously, albeit at low levels. In comparison, people who express the same thought 
will activate it periodically each time it comes to mind. Referring to Higgins (1989) 
synapse model of construct activation which suggests that the more frequently a construct 
is primed the more likely it is to have an effect on one's future judgments and behaviour 
(Higgins & Bargh, 1992; Higgins, 1989; Higgins & King, 198 1). Macrae et al. (1994) 
argue that the activation accrued in this way will be slow to dissipate, and much slower to 
decay than activation resulting from construct use. Thus, accessibility resulting from 
suppression may be greater than accessibility resulting from thought expression. 
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There are very few studies that have attempted to directly measure the activation levels of 
suppressed thoughts with such precise implicit measures as reaction times to target 
stimuli. An exception is Wegner and Erber (1992), who were first to demonstrate that 
thought suppression can raise a construct's activation level, even to a level beyond that of 
conscious thought expression. However, in the Wegner and Erber (1992) study the 
activation levels were measured in the course of the process of actively suppressing a 
target thought during active suppression. Thus, Wegner and Erber (1992) had participants 
generate associates to words presented on screen whilst suppressing or expressing a 
certain construct, in this case "house". Some of the words presented in the task were 
associated to the to-be-suppressed / expressed word, for example "home". Construct 
activation was assessed by the number of house related words a participant produced in 
response to the house related prompts for both suppression and expression groups. This 
however is problematic as the rebound effect occurs after active suppression has been 
discontinued. Therefore, the key point at which studies need to measure construct 
accessibility is not during active suppression but in the period after suppression and 
expression during the period when the rebound effect is supposed to be occurring. 
The study conducted by Macrae et al. (1994) is the only study so far that has examined 
construct accessibility (of formerly suppressed or expressed thoughts) in the critical post 
suppression period. They used a lexical decision task and reasoned that if thought 
suppression elevates thought activation to levels higher than even thought expression 
then these effects should result in faster recognition times for previously suppressed 
thoughts relative to previously expressed thoughts, and that both previously suppressed 
and expressed thoughts should be recognised faster than matched distracters. This was 
exactly the pattern of results they found. 
However, there are a number of problems with the study of Macrae et al. (1994) that 
prevent one from drawing firm conclusions. The main problem is that in this experiment 
participants were not explicitly asked to suppress or express their thoughts. Thus, 
participants were shown a photo of a male skinhead and asked to write a short passage 
about a typical day in his life. Half of the participants were asked to do this without 
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thinking about the target in a stereotypical manner (intended to automatically instigate 
stereotype suppression), the other half were given no instructions (it was assumed that 
they would use stereotypes in their descriptions). Thus, there is a degree of ambiguity as 
to whether participants were indeed deliberately suppressing or expressing. In addition, 
the thoughts they were using for suppression or expression were both personally relevant 
and negative in valence (stereotypes) which, as has already been shown (see Chapter 1), 
can often result in contradictory findings with respect to the rebound effect. As a result of 
these criticisms the key study examining the impact of thought suppression and 
expression on construct accessibility in the post suppression period still remains to be 
carried out. 
An important issue in designing the present key study relates to the choice of an 
appropriate implicit measure. For example, Wegner and his colleagues have mostly used 
the Stroop task (Wegner & Erber, 1992). However, there are reasons to believe that better 
methods of assessing construct activation exist. Indeed, in the Stroop task the construct 
activation is measured indirectly. Thus, if a word printed in green ink captures attention 
by virtue of it being highly accessible there will be a slowing on this trial relative to non- 
accessible words also printed in green ink. In other words, the word's activation level 
interferes with colour naming. However, Marsh and Hicks (1998) have suggested that a 
direct measure of thought activation such as the time taken to say whether a string of 
letters is a word or not (Lexical Decision Task) would be a more reliable method of 
assessing construct activation (See also Marsh & Landau, 1995). In the Lexical Decision 
Task one would expect no interference but would expect highly active and accessible 
words merely to be verified as words more quickly relative to less accessible words. 
The current study therefore aims to examine activation levels of previously suppressed or 
expressed thoughts in the post suppression period using a more reliable index of construct 
activation by having all participants complete a lexical decision task immediately after a 
suppression or expression task. The lexical decision task that was used in the current 
study contained 6 repetitions of a target word (previously suppressed or expressed 
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construct), 6 repetitions of a matched distracter word (matched to the target for frequency 
of use and familiarity), 24 unrepeated filler words and 48 non-words. 
Mental load was another variable that was manipulated in this study. Wegner and 
colleagues have repeatedly shown that load during active suppression can lead to 
immediate enhancement effects. This is claimed to be due to a differential effect of load 
on the two processes thought to be in operation when a thought is being suppressed. 
Thus, load makes the controlled distracter search almost impossible as this is a resource 
demanding process, however, it has little effect on the ironic monitor which is thought to 
be automatic. In contrast, there should be no effect of load in the post suppression period. 
This is due to the fact that the dual processes operating during active suppression will 
have been terminated. In other words, any residual activation that the previously 
suppressed thought has accrued should not vary as a function of load because 
accessibility effects seen in implicit paradigms are thought to be heavily automatised and 
insensitive to the disruptive effects of load (Bargh 1989; 1994; 1996). 
One final reason for conducting the current study is that it also allows for another 
important test of the new intentional model of rebound effects, advanced in this thesis 
(Chapter 1). In Study I (chapter 3) it was demonstrated that more state orientated 
participants displayed rebound effects but more action oriented participants did not. This 
was to be expected on the basis of the model advanced in this thesis, and suggests that the 
rebound effect may represent an intention superiority effect. With regards to the present 
study, if the intentional explanation of the rebound effect is valid, one would expect state 
oriented participants to display faster reaction times to targets than distracter words in the 
lexical decision task. However, action oriented participants should not show faster 
reaction times to targets than distracters. 
Therefore, the current study will also allow for a contrast between the model of Macrae 
and our own intentional model of rebound effects. Thus, on the basis of the Macrae et al. 
(1994) model we expect to find a positive correlation between buzzer pressing during 
expression and reaction times to targets in the lexical decision task. However, in the 
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suppression group we expect no correlation between buzzing during suppression and later 
reaction time to targets in the lexical decision task as here priming is not a function of the 
number of times the person has directly mentioned the target, but is a function of the 
ironic activation accrued from the ironic monitor. 
In contrast our own intentional model of rebound effects predicts that any enhancement 
effects of previous suppression on construct accessibility in the post suppression period 
will be stronger in state oriented individuals when compared to action oriented 
participants. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
This study represents data collected during the Lexical Decision Task phase of study I 
(See Chapter 3). Therefore the same 94 participants were used. However, 6 of these were 
removed as their scores on the reaction time measures were very extreme and remained 
so after transformation. A further 5 participants were lost due to missing data points. 
(2) Materials 
A total of 84 words and non-words were selected for a 15-minute Lexical Decision. Four 
different types of stimuli were used in this task, these were, six previously suppressed or 
expressed target words, six matched distracter words, 24 unrepeated filler words, and 48 
non-words. Due to the design of this study (see Chapter 2) on week I half of the 
participants were manipulating (suppressing or expressing) the target word "chair" and 
the other half of the participants were asked to manipulate "ocean". Therefore, the target 
word that participants did not see became the distracter word in the Lexical decision task. 
For example, the half of the participants manipulating "chair" did not encounter the 
alternative target "ocean" in the suppression or expression phase of this experiment, it 
was therefore used as the matched distracter in the Lexical Decision Task and visa versa. 
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All of the words used in the Lexical Decision Task (targets, distracters and filler words) 
were chosen to be of roughly equal word length, of similar frequency of use in the 
English language from Toglia and Battigs word norms (1978). In addition, all targets, 
distracters and filler words were chosen to be unrelated semantically to each other. This 
was done by examining lists of associates for each word chosen using the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database, and discounting any word which was associated to any other 
word contained in the final Lexical Decision Task. 
The order of words for this task was fixed with the constraint that a target or distracter 
word could not appear in the first 10 words displayed. Another constraint was that two 
targets, two distracters or a distracter and a target could not follow each other without any 
intervening items. Two versions of the lexical decision task were employed to control for 
any effects of word presentation order. 
(3) Procedure 
The overall procedure of the large-scale study into which the Lexical Decision Task was 
included is described in Chapter 2. Here, only the details concerning the Lexical Decision 
Task will be described. Thus, after receiving general instructions about the aims of the 
study and tasks involved participants were introduced to a Lexical Decision Task. 
Participants were informed that in the Lexical Decision Task the computer would display 
a string of letters on screen and their task was to press a key identifying which of the 
stimuli on screen were words and which were non-words as quickly and accurately as 
possible. Half of the participants had to press the "A" key if the stimulus was a word and 
the "L" key if it was a non-word. For the other half of the participants the keys were 
reversed to fully counterbalance for handedness. 
After these instructions all participants had the opportunity to undertake a practice 
version of the Lexical Decision Task. This practice task was similar in nature to the 
actual Lexical Decision Task that was presented later, but the words and non-words used 
in the practice task were not to appear in the main task. In addition, the words used in the 
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practice task were chosen to be semantically unrelated to any of the words used in the 
subsequent task. The practice task commenced with an audible beep of one second 
duration alerting the participant that the Lexical Decision Task was about to start. After 
the beep a fixation cross "X" appeared in the centre of the screen for 1500 milliseconds 
(ms) showing participants the location where the first word or non-word was to be 
displayed. The fixation cross then disappeared and was replaced by the first word or non- 
word stimulus. This letter string remained on screen until the participant made their 
response by pressing either the "1: ' key or the "A" key. The word disappeared 
immediately after the response was made and was replaced by a 500 ms inter-stimulus 
interval. During this inter-stimulus interval the screen was blank. After exactly 500 ms 
the next word or non-word was displayed and again remained on screen until the 
participant made their response. This sequence was repeated for all 10 of the practice 
items (5 words, 5-non-words). 
After the practice Lexical Decision Task participants were informed that during the actual 
later Lexical Decision Task they would have to perform this task with an additional 
secondary task, which was to remember a number during the task and to repeat it back to 
the experimenter at the end of all the trials. All participants were informed that they 
would have 30 seconds to memorise this number before the start of the later Lexical 
Decision Task. The importance of this second memory task was stressed by making it 
clear that if the participant could not recall this number after the task their data would be 
unusable. 
At this stage, if the participant had no problems with the practice Lexical Decision Task 
they undertook the first 3-minute practice thought verbalisation session. After this half of 
the participants were asked to suppress a certain thought for 5 minutes (half of the 
suppression participants suppressed chair half suppressed ocean), the remaining half of 
the participants were asked to express a certain thought (half of the expression 
participants expressed chair half expressed ocean). 
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Immediately after this thought verbalisation period all participants were informed that the 
Lexical Decision Task would soon begin but first they had to memorise a number to be 
repeated back to the experimenter at the end of the Lexical Decision Task. For half of the 
participants this secondary task consisted of remembering a9 digit number (high load 
condition); for the remaining half of the participants this secondary task consisted of 
remembering aI digit number (low load condition). In all cases the numbers given to 
participants were completely random number strings which were generated individually 
for each participant. Therefore, prior to commencement of the Lexical Decision Task 
participants were given a typed copy of the number for 30 seconds and asked to 
memorise it. After the 30 seconds the number was taken away and the Lexical Decision 
Task started. At the end of the LDT all participants were tested for their memory of the 
digit(s) they learned as part of the cognitive load manipulation. 
(4) Design 
The experimental design was a2 group (suppression vs. expression) x2 type of target 
thought (chair vs. ocean) x2 load (high vs. low) x4 type of word (target, distracter, filler 
word, non-words) mixed ANOVA with the repeated measures on the last factor. 
If the predictions of this study are correct, the results should demonstrate a main effect of 
load and type of word. In addition, it was expected that previously manipulated 
(suppressed or expressed) targets would be reacted to faster than matched distracter 
words in the Lexical Decision Task. Furthermore it was expected that this effect would 
be stronger for previously suppressed constructs as suppression is thought to result in 
greater construct activation than thought expression. As a result the expectation was of a 
main effect of type of word (target vs. distracter vs. filler words vs. non-words) but also 
of a significant interaction between group (suppression vs. expression) and type of word. 
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111. Results 
The dependent variable was the reaction time to the stimuli presented in the Lexical 
Decision Task. Initial inspection of participants mean reaction times showed that the data 
was not normally distributed. In an effort to normalise the distribution all reaction times 
were transformed using the simple formula of I/RT. This method was chosen on the basis 
of recommendations by Ratcliff (1993), showing that this transformation resulted in the 
fewest outliers after transformation. After transformation boxplots revealed 6 outliers. 
These were removed from all further analyses. An additional 4 participants were lost due 
to missing data points. Therefore, the analyses presented below are based on the data of 
84 participants. 
The load manipulation used in the present study appears to have worked in that 
participants in both low and high load conditions successfully recalled all digits at the end 
of the Lexical Decision Task. Two participants in the high load condition did not recall 
all 9 digits correctly but were retained in all analyses because they only misremembered 
one of the 9 digits. 
In order to test for this crucial interaction effect, the mean transformed reaction times 
were entered into a2 group (suppression vs. expression) x2 type of target thought (chair 
vs. ocean) x2 load (high vs. low) x4 type of word (target vs. distracter vs. filler word vs. 
non-words) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. 
Out of all four possible main effects only two were significant. Thus, there was a main 
effect of load F(1,76) = 4.73, p= . 033, eta-squared = . 6, participants in the high load 
condition were significantly slower to react to all words (M = 670 ms) when compared 
with those in the low load condition (M = 618 ms). There was also a main effect of the 
type of words, F (3,240) = 129.14, p <000 1, eta-squared = . 63. Post hoc tests showed 
that, contrary to expectations, reaction times for distracter words (M = 574 ms) were 
reliably faster than target words (M = 600 ms), t (82) = -2.39, p=. 019. However, as one 
would expect, reaction time to targets was reliably faster than to filler words (M = 646 
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ms) t(82)=6.89. p =. 000 1. as wel I as to non-words (m = 760 ms) t(82)= I 3.292, p=. 000 1. 
See Figure 6.1 below. 
Out of all possible two and higher order interactions only a target (chair vs. ocean) by a 
type of word (target vs. distracter vs. filler vs. non-word) interaction was significiant, 
F(3,240)=3.95, p=. 009, eta-squared = . 5. Tests of simple effects showed that there was a 
significant difference between the group whose target was "chair" and a group whose L_ L_ C_ 
tar(yet was "ocean" in terms of their reaction times to taroret words, t (82)=2.2, p=. 03 1. but Z__ Lý 
not in terms of their reaction times to distracters, filler words or non-words. Thus, mean 
reaction times to target word -chair" was (M = 584ms) and to target word "ocean" was L_ Z-1 
(M = 619ms). The crucial interaction between group (suppression vs. expression) and 
t pe of word was not significant. None of the other interactions proved significant F<I in y 
all cases. 
Fi(; t -RE 6.1 - MEAN REA(-TIONTI. MF ASA Ft'N(-FION OF TYPE OF WORD(TARGFTVS. DISTRA(-I'ER VS. FILLER 
ý S. NON-WORD). 
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Having completed this overall analysis, the sample was then divided into two groups on ZI 
the basis a median split on participants scores on state vs. action orientation (AOF 
subscale). The above analysis was then re-run separately for state and action oriented 
participants. 
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U-1 OLLUI 
In state oriented participants this analysis resulted in exact replication of the findings 
from the overall sample. Thus, there was a main effect of type of word 
F(3,108)=74.23, p<001, eta-squared =. 67, such that distracters were responded to with 
the fastest reaction times (M=554ms), targets were responded to more slowly 
(M=598ms), filler words were responded to even more slowly (M=636ms) and non- 
words were responded to with the longest reaction times (M=750ms). Crucially, the 
difference between distracters and targets here was significant t=(43)-2.6, p=. 013, as in 
the analysis for the overall sample. There was also a main effect of load 
F(1,36)=5. I8, p=. 029, such that participant in the high load condition (M = 673 ms) 
responded more slowly than participants in the low load condition (M = 596 ms). 
In addition, an interaction between type of word and target thought was also significant 
F(3,108)=3.68, p=. 014, eta-squared =. 09. The target in the room (chair) was responded 
to faster (M=579ms) than the target outside the room (ocean M=621ms). None of the 
other interactions were significant (F<I) 
In contrast, the only significant effect that emerged when the similar analysis was 
conducted on the data of action oriented participants was a main effect of type of word 
F(1,93)=45.7, p<001, eta-squared =. 6. However, distracters were responded to with the 
fastest reaction times (M=589ms), targets were responded to more slowly (M=601ms), 
filler words were responded to still more slowly (M=646ms) and non-words had the 
longest reaction times of all words (M=760ms). However, the difference in reaction time 
to targets and distracters was not significantly different here t<I (for means see Figure 
6.2 below). 
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The final analysis examined the correlations between buzzing in period I and later 
reaction times to targets separately for suppressers and expressers. This analysis indicated C, 
that there was no correlation between the number of buzzer presses during suppression 
and reaction times to targets (r = -. 13 p=. 38). There was also no correlation between 
buzzing during expression and later reaction times to targets (r = . 245 p=. 13). Zn 
IV. Discussion 
The results of the current study in terms of the main effect of type of word are in line 
with previous findings on priming in Lexical Decision Tasks. Thus, overall reaction times Z!, 4r, 
to targets and distracters were reliably faster than to filler words and the mean reaction 
times to filter words were in turn reliably faster than reaction time to non-words. 
In addition, the current study was designed to demonstrate the heightened accessibility of 
formerly suppressed thoughts when compared to formerly expressed thoughts during the 
post suppression or expression period. In order to assess construct activation in the post 
suppression period participants completed a lexical decision task immediately after a 
period of thought suppression or expression. The lexical decision task contained the 
previously suppressed or expressed target word (repeated 6 times) a matched distracter 
word (also repeated 6 times), 24 unrepeated filler words and 48 non-words. 
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target distractor filler non-word 
The results showed that contrary to expectations, there was no effect of previous 
suppression or expression on reaction time to target words. Surprisingly, the results also 
indicated that the matched distracter words were responded to consistently faster than 
target words. Not only do these results conflict with the previous results of Macrae et al. 
(1994) but also with the theoretical premise that previously suppressed or expressed 
targets should have shown faster reaction times than previously un-manipulated and 
unseen words. 
However, the current results were not necessarily unexpected as the non-words were 
reacted to significantly slower than all other word classes a common finding in lexical 
decision research (Marsh et al., 1998). In addition, unrepeated filler words although 
yielding significantly faster reaction times than non-words were responded to 
significantly slower than the targets or distracters. Once again this pattern was expected. 
The results of the current study did not provide support for the model of Macrae et al. 
(1994) thus, although there was no correlation between the number of buzzer presses and 
reaction times to targets in suppression group (as predicted) there was also no positive 
correlation between these variables in the expression group (contrary to predictions). 
Most importantly, the current results do not seem to support the intentional model of the 
rebound effect as this model would have predicted significantly faster reaction times to 
targets than to distracters in state oriented people, but not in action oriented individuals. 
However, distracters were responded to fastest, a finding that no current model would 
have predicted. In view of this unexpected finding, alternative explanations will be 
discussed below. 
One possible explanation for the finding that distracters were responded to fastest of all 
other word types concerns the effects of conscious interference on encountering a 
previously manipulated target in a subsequent lexical decision task. For example, when 
participants who had been suppressing or expressing "chair" had to rate whether "chair" 
is a word in the lexical decision task it may have captured their attention as a result of its 
previous use and caused them to pause momentarily. In contrast, the previously unseen 
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distracter words which were repeated within the actual lexical decision task should not 
have had this effect. 
If this hypothesis is correct one way to examine this further is to examine the effects of 
load on reaction times to targets and distracters. In the high load condition participants 
are completing two concurrent demanding tasks, therefore one could suggest that they 
will have less residual mental capacity for such conscious interference to occur. In 
contrast, the low load group will have residual capacity and therefore possibly show 
greater interference on encountering the previously seen target. Unfortunately, the overall 
interaction between type of word and load was non-significant. However, if one analyses 
the difference between reaction times to targets and distracters separately for the high and 
low load conditions one does indeed find greater likelihood of conscious interference 
occurring in the low load condition. Thus, the difference between reaction times to 
targets and distracters were significant in the low load condition t (41) = -2.45 p= . 018, 
but insignificant in the high load condition t (41) -1.23 p= . 225. 
It appears that momentary conscious realisation that the target has been manipulated 
previously may well be causing the targets to be responded to slower than the matched 
distracter words. It is important to realise that even in the event that targets and distracters 
are responded to equally quickly it would still represent some degree of conscious 
interference. Thus, a simple priming explanation would suggest that previously 
manipulated targets (suppressed or expressed) should be responded to faster as a result of 
raised activation accrued from previous use, relative to previously unseen distracters. 
Therefore, if the mean reaction times to targets and distracters are not different then this 
would already indicate some kind of interference occurring in response to targets. 
This interpretation seems to be supported by the finding that faster reaction times to 
distracters than targets was only present in state oriented individuals and not in action 
oriented participants. Thus, state oriented participants demonstrate greater interference 
when compared to action oriented participants, as demonstrated by their significantly 
greater reaction times to distracters. However, it seems that in both state and action 
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oriented participants this most probably represents conscious interference on 
encountering a previously manipulated construct. Overall, these results therefore suggest 
that the lexical decision task may not always be a good measure of construct activation as 
it is currently conceived. 
Interestingly, after conducting a study on prospective memory, McDaniel et al. (2003) 
reported similar findings. In that study participants formulated an intention to press the 
"Q" key whenever they saw the prospective memory target in the context of a future 
imagery task. However in an intervening lexical decision task participants were told to 
ignore the prospective memory target. The lexical decision task contained three types of 
words, targets (which had an associated intention - to press the Q key), previously seen 
words (primed by making imagery ratings) and neutral words (not previously seen). 
Results showed that participants were significantly slower to verify the prospective 
memory targets than neutral words, but significantly faster to verify previously primed 
words than neutral words. This represents further evidence that previously encountering a 
target can, under some conditions, lead either to a speeding or slowing of reaction times. 
In cases where the target is surreptitiously activated, for example, by making imagery 
ratings it leads to speeded reaction time in a subsequent lexical decision task. However, 
in cases where the target is activated by overt thought suppression or expression or by 
having an associated intention linked to it, it leads to a slowing of reaction time in a 
subsequent lexical decision task. 
In summary, in spite of the negative findings this study has demonstrated important 
findings for future research using implicit methods of assessing construct activation. For 
example, these results strongly suggest that when assessing construct activation using 
Lexical Decision Tasks experimenters need to be mindful of the possible interference 
effects that can result from previous construct use (i. e conscious interference), this is 
especially important in view of the fact that many researchers assume that previous 
construct use will usually result in faster recognition times (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). 
Furthermore, this study also demonstrated that yet again state vs. action orientation seems 
to affect the activation levels of certain constructs, most notably distracter reaction times. 
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Finally, this study also demonstrated that the environment may have implicit effects on 
the activational status of constructs. Thus, the results indicated that items in the 
experimental environment (i. e. "chair") were consistently responded to with faster 
recognition latencies than items not present in the experimental environment (i. e. 
69 ocean"), this may represent an implicit priming of constructs simply as a function of 
their mere presence in the immediate surroundings. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN 
Individual differences and the use of thought suppression in everyday life in a 
sample of young adults 
It was pointed out in the general introduction (Chapter 1) that research on thought 
suppression has developed along two relatively separate lines. One of these lines 
concerns laboratory research investigating the rebound effect that has been discussed so 
far in this thesis. The other line of research concerns people's tendency to use thought 
suppression in everyday life (as measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory) and 
how this may relate to individual differences. 
Previous findings in the thought suppression literature have shown that the tendency to 
use thought suppression in everyday life (as assessed by the WBSI) is positively related 
to various measures of psychopathology such as anxiety, depression, neuroticism and 
obsessive compulsiveness (Muris et al. 1996; Rassin et al. 1999,2000,2001; Wegner and 
Zanakos, 1994). Despite these associations, most typically, in each of the previous studies 
a limited set of psychopathological variables has been used. Moreover, these measures of 
psychopathology have rarely been examined in conjunction with other individual 
difference variables such as personality, cognitive style and/or ability. It may be the case 
that if the effects of all these variables on WBSI scores are examined simultaneously in 
one study one could find that only one or two variables significantly and independently 
predict WSBI scores. Therefore, the aim of the current study was to examine how a broad 
range of psychopathology, personality, cognitive style and ability measures would 
correlate with the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life as assessed by the 
WBSI. 
A second aim was to examine the relation between the WBSI and the Thought Control 
Questionnaire (TCQ). The TCQ was developed by Wells and Davies (1994) and was 
designed to assess the strategies one uses to control one's thoughts. It comprises five 
separate subscales designed to measure thought control by various strategies such as 
distraction (When I experience an unpleasant/unwanted thought - "I call to mind positive 
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images instead"), social methods ("I ask my friends if they have similar thoughts"), 
worrying ("I dwell on other worries"), self punishment ("I slap or pinch myself to stop 
the thought) and reappraisal of the thoughts ("I analyse the thought rationally"). An 
overall score is created from the scores on each of the subscales, but it is unclear exactly 
what this overall score measures other than the variety of methods by which a person 
attempts to control their thoughts. Currently this scale has remained little used in thought 
suppression research relative to the WBSI. Only a few clinically orientated studies have 
reported using it to assess relations between thought control tendencies and 
psychopathology (Myers, 1998; Purdon, 1999). Most importantly there is only one study 
that has examined the relations between the WBSI and the TCQ (Muris et al. 1996). In 
this study, the total score on TCQ positively correlated with the WBSI. Somewhat 
surprisingly the correlation was weak (r (172) =. 22 p <. 01) indicating that these two 
questionnaires may be measuring somewhat different aspects of thought suppression. 
In order to address these two aims outlined above, several measures of psychopathology, 
personality, cognitive style and ability were obtained from 97 participants in week I and 
2 of the large scale study described in Chapter 2. The variables included in the current 
study and the rationale behind using them is discussed below. 
(1) Psychopathology and thought suppression 
The Speilberger Trait and State Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Speilberger et al. 1983), Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), Thought Action Fusion 
Questionnaire (TAF; Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman, 1996), and the Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire (Psychoticism and Neuroticism subscales, EPQ-R; Eysenck, 
Eysenck, & Barett, 1985) were all included due to their associations with the tendency to 
use thought suppression in everyday life, previously reported in thought suppression 
research. 
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Two additional previously unexplored measures that were included in the present study 
were The Fordyce Unhappiness Rating Scale (Fordyce, 1988) and the Schizotypal 
Personality Questionnaire (SPQ, Raine, 1991). 
The Fordyce Unhappiness Rating Scale is a simple questionnaire asking participants to 
rate the percentage of time they feel sad/unhappy in everyday life. This measure was 
included to examine whether the use of thought suppression in everyday life might relate 
positively to greater unhappiness. 
The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire is a 74 item questionnaire which assesses 
one's schizotypal tendencies personality and has 9 subscales assessing different aspects 
of schizotpal personality such as experiencing unusual perceptual phenomena, or having 
few close friends. An example of an item from the scale is "Have you often mistaken 
objects or shadows for people, or noises for voices? " answers are made by circling either 
a yes or no response. This measure was included to investigate possible relations between 
schizotipy and the tendency to use thought suppression. The rationale behind its inclusion 
was that one component of schizotypal personality is a greater tendency to experience 
mild hallucination like phenomena such as mistaking objects for people at night or mild 
delusions. These thoughts may be candidates for suppression in view of their negative 
nature. 
(2) Rumination and Thought Suppression 
Rumination has been theoretically linked with the use of thought suppression many times 
(Erber & Wegner, 1996; Martin & Tesser, 1996). Erber and Wegner (1996) suggest that 
thought suppression can directly lead to rumination as suppression often results in a 
rebound effect which can be conceptualised as a form of rumination. In contrast, Martin 
and Tesser (1996) prefer to conceptualise the relationship between rumination and 
thought suppression from the other causal direction, by suggesting that rumination often 
leads to thought suppression in an effort to avoid the discomfort associated with 
rumination. Thus, according to Martin and Tesser (1996) rumination may result in 
thought suppression, but the primary cause of rumination itself is not thought suppression 
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but a failure to attain personal goals or frustration in approaching personal goals. 
Although correlational, the current study will be the first to examine the relation between 
rumination and use of thought suppression in everyday life. 
Another variable closely linked to the tendency to ruminate is Linking. A questionnaire 
measure of this construct was also included (McIntosh, Harlow & Martin, 1995). Linking 
assesses the extent to which an individual views their happiness as being dependent on 
them attaining their goals. Greater scores on measures of linking (indicating that the 
person views goal attainment as central to happiness) have been shown to be related to 
greater rumination and thought intrusion (McIntosh & Martin, 1992). 
Although not related to rumination in the literature this study also included a 
questionnaire measure of the Need For Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). This 
measure assesses the amount a person likes to engage in thinking in general. This was 
included due to possible relations with both thought suppression and rumination. 
(3) Personality, ability and the tendency to suppress thoughts 
The present study also wanted to examine how the tendency to use thought suppression 
was related to personality and ability. In view of its relevance to our own intentional 
model of thought suppression (see page 43, Chapter 1) the first measure of personality 
used in the present study will be the State / Action Orientation Questionnaire (Kuhl, 
1993), which assesses the global personality attributes of state and action orientation. 
This questionnaire contains three separate subscales, each assessing a different 
component of state vs. action orientation. The three subscales are : (a) Action orientation 
subsequent to failure vs. preoccupation (AOF), (b) Prospective and decision-related 
action orientation vs. hesitation (AOD), (c) Action orientation during (successful) 
performance of activities (intrinsic orientation) vs. volatility (AOP). It is expected that 
state oriented participants will report using thought suppression much more than action 
oriented participants. 
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The Eysenck EPQ-R (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barett, 1985) was also used in the current 
study. This questionnaire assesses introversion/extraversion, psychotocism, neuroticism 
and includes a lie scale. The rationale behind this measures inclusion was to examine 
relations between personality (in particular introversion/extraversion) and the use of 
thought suppression in everyday life. Previously, only one study (Bourdon et al., 2001) 
has specifically investigated possible relations between extraversion and thought 
suppression, but this study examined the rebound effect and its occurrence in introverts 
and extroverts. In addition this study failed to demonstrate a thought rebound in either 
group. The current study will examine whether the tendency to use thought suppression 
in everyday life is related to introversion/extraversion. 
The Marlowe Crowne scale was also included as a measure of social desirability (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1964). This measure has been shown to assess the extent to which 
participants want to portray themselves in a favourable light when answering 
questionnaires. It is also a key measure in identifying what has been termed a repressive 
coping style. This will be investigated more fully in Chapter 9. 
Finally, in order to investigate whether the tendency to use thought suppression is related 
to Fluid intelligence, the Culture Fair Intelligence Test was also administered to 
participants (Cattell & Cattell, 1960). 
(4) Summary 
The current study will extend the analysis of the previously reported associations between 
thought suppression and psychopathology by measuring both previously reported and 
previously un-investigated variables. In addition, a further aim is to investigate how 
personality and ability impact on the use of thought suppression in everyday life. A final 
aim is to investigate relations between two currently available inventories measuring the 
tendency to use mental control in everyday life - the WBSI and the TCQ. 
148 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
97 University of Hertfordshire undergraduates (77 Females and 20 Males) volunteered to 
take part in return for course credit. The age range was from 18 to 60 years. The mean 
age was 23 years. 
(2) Procedure 
These 97 participants took part in a large scale study the design of which was described 
in Chapter 2. In this study participants took part in two I hour long experimental 
sessions. At the end of each experimental session participants completed a set of 
questionnaires and ability inventories. The questionnaires used were as follows: 
(1) Questionnaires used in previous thought suppression studies 
The following scales were used in an effort to replicate the previously found relationships 
between the tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life (as assessed by the WBSI and 
the TCQ) and various measures of psychopathology. 
I. The Speilberger Trait and State Anxiety Inventory STAI - (Speilberger et al., 1983) 
2. The Beck Depression Inventory BDI - (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) 
3. The Thought Action Fusion Questionnaire TAF - (Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman, 
1996) 
4. The Eysenck EPQ-R - (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barett, 1985) 
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(2) Questionnaires and ability measures not previously used in thought 
suppression research 
The following scales were used due to their theoretical relevance to thought suppression 
in everyday life. None of these scales have been used in previous studies. 
I. Culture Fair Intelligence Test - (Cattell & Cattell, 1960) 
2. Rumination Inventory (McIntosh & Martin, 1992) 
3. The State / Action Orientation Questionnaire - (Kuhl, 1993) 
4. The Linking Questionnaire - (McIntosh, Harlow & Martin, 1995) 
5. Fordyce Unhappiness Scale (Fordyce, 1988) 
6. The Need For Cognition Scale - (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
7. The Marlowe Crowne Scale - (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) 
8. The Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire SPQ - (Raine, 1991) 
Note, that the Schizotpal Personality Questionnaire was completed by participants in their 
own time and mailed back to the experimenter. The rate of return for this scale was much 
lower than expected. Therefore, the sample that successfully completed this scale was 
just 57 compared to 97 participants for most of the other scales. 
111. Results 
All of the variables used in the analyses presented below were first screened for outliers 
and extreme cases which could have artificially affected the correlations found. Two 
participants were excluded from these analyses as their scores were too extreme on the 
White Bear Suppression Inventory and several other inventories. 
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Since there were a large number of variables that were correlated with the scores on the 
WBSI and TCQ, a Bonferroni correction was computed to avoid capitalising on chance 
(0.05/18 = 0.003). Therefore only correlations with p values equal to or below . 003 were 
accepted as statistically significant. 
The results will be presented below in three sub-sections. In the first section the 
relationship between the scores of the WBSI and all other variables will be assessed. This 
will include the examination of pairwise correlations followed by running a regression 
analysis using significant predictors revealed by the initial correlational analysis. In the 
second section, similar correlations will be computed for the TCQ. Finally, the 
relationship between the WBSI and each of the 5 subscales of the TCQ will be explored. 
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(1) Variables correlating with the WBSI 
Table 7.1 shows that scores on the WBSI correlate positively with trait anxiety, 
neuroticism, BDI, linking, rumination, unhappiness, and schizotypal personality. All 
these correlations are highly significant (all p's equivalent or less than . 005), the 
relationship with linking was marginally significant after Bonferroni correction (p=. 004). 
In addition, the WBSI correlates negatively with the AOD subscale of state vs. action 
orientation and need for cognition. Higher values on the AOD scale indicate greater 
action orientation. The negative correlation between need for cognition and the WBSI 
suggests that the more one likes to think the less they report using thought suppression in 
everyday life. The negative correlation between AOD and the WBSI indicates that state 
oriented participants are more likely to report engaging in thought suppression in 
everyday life. 
All the variables that significantly correlated with the WBSI were then entered as 
predictors into a multiple regression model with WBSI scores as the dependent variable. 
The SPQ was not included in this regression model due to its lower response rate. 
The model was significant F (1,83) 4.43 p <. 001. (R2=. 32 adjusted R2= . 248). 
However, of all the predictors in the model only McIntosh and Martin Rumination 
Inventory and Trait Anxiety significantly and independently predicted WBSI scores. This 
suggests that the propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life is best predicted 
by anxiety (as a trait) and the tendency to ruminate (i. e. experience frequent thought 
intrusions). 
(2) Variables correlating with the Thought Control Questionnaire 
Examination of the correlations with the TCQ in Figure 7.1 reveals a very different 
picture from those obtained for the YVBSI. Thus, the TCQ correlates only with the Lie 
Scale and Rumination. However, these correlations are very weak and after applying the 
Bonferroni correction, can no longer be accepted as significant. 
(3) The relation of the WBSI with the TCQ and its subscales 
As pointed out in the introduction the TCQ has five subscales which assess mental 
control strategies via distraction, social interaction, worry, self-punishment and mental 
reappraisal. The total TCQ score is based on the sum of scores on these 5 subscales. 
Contrary to predictions table 7.1 shows that there is no reliable correlation between the 
WBSI and TCQ (r =. 08, p =. 44). In view of this absence of correlation the relationship 
between the WBSI and each of the five subscales of the TCQ was examined. 
TABLE 7.2 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE)M3Sl AND THE 
TCQ SUBSCALES. 
WBSI TCQ TCQ TCQ TCQ TCQ 
distraction Social Worry Punishment Reappraisal 
WBSI R 1 . 04 -. 20 . 22* . 
46** -. 28** 
Sig 2 tailed . 726 . 052 . 031 . 
000 . 006 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 
TCQ R . 04 1 . 05 . 
20 -. 05 -. 12 
distraction Sig 2 tailed . 726 . 625 . 
055 . 626 . 233 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 
TCQ R -. 20 . 05 1 -. 12 -. 
05 . 11 
Social Sig 2 tailed . 052 . 
625 . 248 . 
626 . 305 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 
TCQ R . 22 . 
20 _ -. 12 1 . 41** . 11 
Worry Sig 2 tailed . 
031 . 055 . 
248 . 000 . 
288 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 
TCQ R . 46** -. 05 -. 
05 . 41** . 
02 
Punishment Sig 2 tailed . 000 . 626 . 626 . 
000 . 826 
N 95 95 95 95 1 
95 95 
TCQ R -. 28** -. 12 . 11 . 11 . 02 
1 
Reappraisal Sig 2 tailed . 006 . 233 . 
305 . 288 . 826 
N 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Table 7.2 above shows that the WBSI reliably correlates with three of the TCQ subscales, 
namely worry, punishment and reappraisal. The first two correlations are positive. Thus, 
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the higher one's tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life the more likely the person 
is to report worry and punishment as their mental control strategy. In contrast, the 
correlation with reappraisal is negative indicating that the more frequently one reports 
reappraisal as a mental control strategy the less likely they are to suppress unwanted 
thoughts in everyday life. 
Finally, participants scores on these subscales of punishment, worry and reappraisal were 
entered into a multiple regression model with WBSI scores as the dependent variable. 
The model was significant, F (3,94) = 14.04 p<001, (R' of . 32, adjusted 
R2 =. 29) and 
had only two significant predictors. These were the punishment and reappraisal subscales 
of the TCQ. Therefore, 30% of the variance in WBSI scores can be explained by the use 
of punishment and reappraisal mental control strategies. 
IV. Discussion 
The results of this study clearly supports previous research on the WBSI by replicating 
the often found pattern of clear relations between various psychopathological indices and 
the propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life. Thus, the more one reports 
using thought suppression in everyday life the higher one scores on various measures of 
psychopathology such as trait anxiety, neuroticism, BDI, linking, rumination, 
unhappiness, and schizotypal personality. Even just a cursory glance at these variables 
indicates that the WBSI correlates with anything negative, so that one could almost 
substitute these variables with a latent variable such as negative affectivity. This was 
supported by the results of a factor analysis which indicated only one latent factor was 
extracted when all of the psychopathological measures were entered into the model. This 
latent variable explained 54% of the variance overall. These results also extend the 
analysis of the relationship between the use of thought suppression and psychopathology 
by showing that the use of thought suppression is also positively related to previously un- 
investigated variables such as unhappiness, rumination, schizotypal personality and 
linking. 
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One of the most important findings however was a negative correlation with action vs. 
state orientation and the results of the regression analyses. For example, the results 
clearly show that it is the state oriented individuals that suppress most in everyday life 
However, research conducted by Kuhl (1994) has shown that state orientation is a 
relatively stable global personality attribute, that on its own is related to psychopathology 
and thought intrusion. Therefore, the results seem to suggest that state oriented 
individuals begin with a predisposition to experience rumination and thought intrusion 
particularly relating to future intentions and worries. Therefore, they may instigate 
thought suppression as a coping strategy. However, this may result in paradoxical effects 
(Chapter 3 suggests that state oriented individuals show greater thought rebounds) which 
then results in greater distress, psychopathology and intrusions. 
It is important however that in the regression analysis it was only trait anxiety and 
rumination that came out as significant and independent predictors of WBSI scores. 
Therefore any possible relation existing between use of thought suppression in everyday 
life and state orientation seems to be mediated by anxiety and rumination, both of which 
are known to occur much more frequently in state oriented individuals. 
This study also clearly indicates that the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday 
life is best predicted by rumination. Therefore, it seems we may have identified one of 
the main factors in the instigation of thought suppression, as indicated by the results of 
the multiple regression, or to look at it the other way it may be that thought suppression is 
a main causal factor in rumination. In addition, there is always the possibility that some 
other yet unknown variable independently predicts both thought suppression and 
rumination. However, this seems less likely since the present study attempted to 
investigate a wide variety of variables that have previously been related to thought 
suppression both theoretically and empirically. In addition, both Martin and Tesser 
(1996) and Erber and Wegner (1996) conceive models of intentional thought suppression 
whereby rumination and thought suppression operate cyclically with one being a cause of 
the other and visa versa. Martin and Tesser (1996) see rumination as the cause of thought 
suppression which then leads to more rumination when the rebound effect occurs. In 
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contrast Erber and Wegner (1996) see thought suppression as the cause of rumination 
which then leads to more thought suppression. The data reported here can not untangle 
which of these theories is the more likely to be correct, but represents the first empirical 
demonstration of a strong relationship between the use of thought suppression in 
everyday life and rumination, and verifies the theoretical relationships previously 
specified. 
Finally, the results of the present study also shed some light on the possible relationship 
between the WBSI and the TCQ. Contrary to expectations there was no correlation 
between WBSI and total TCQ. However, it is interesting that when the subscales of the 
TCQ were examined separately and via a regression model, clear relations between the 
punishment and reappraisal subscales and the WBSI emerged. Participants using 
punishment as a mental control strategy reported greater use of thought suppression 
whereas participants using reappraisal as a mental control strategy used thought 
suppression less. The opposite directionality of these subscales can explain why the 
overall correlation may be insignificant. In addition, this opposite directionality suggests 
that using an overall TCQ score may not be warranted. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Individual differences and the use of thought suppression in everyday life in a 
sample of old adults 
Although there is a growing body of research examining the reliability and factor 
structure of the WBSI as well as its relationship with various measures of 
psychopathology there are virtually no studies that have examined the tendency to 
suppress thoughts in older people. The main purpose of this study was to see if the 
pattern of correlations found in Chapter 7 between measures of thought suppression (such 
as the White Bear Suppression Inventory and Thought Control Questionnaire) and 
various indices of personality and psychopathology could be replicated in a sample of 
older adults. There are reasons to believe they might not be. For example, Schacter 
(1996) has argued that aging has a great impact on the frontal lobes, with older adults 
having impaired frontal lobe functioning. In line with this idea it is known that the frontal 
lobes play a role in behavioural inhibition (Stuss & Benson 1987). They may also play a 
role in thought inhibition. Thus, Hasher and Zaks (1979) have shown that older adults 
have reduced inhibitory function. One could therefore suggest the older adults may well 
be less able at a suppression task than younger people. 
In addition, there is much to suggest that older adults may have more to suppress than 
younger adults. Lynch and George (2002) refer to the well-known growth in depressive 
symptomology with aging. This is in line with the prevalent view that mental health 
problems rise as age increases. However, Krishnan et al. (2002) point out that perhaps it 
is problems with physical health (known to occur with aging) that prompt depression in 
older people. In line with this suggestion Nelson (2001) has found that the rates of 
depression are higher in older people from nursing homes or medical inpatients in 
comparison to community dwelling non-institutionalised older people. In addition, 
Roberts et al. (1997) in their study attributed age related effects on depression to physical 
disabilities rather than participants chronological age per se. 
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Therefore, on a purely theoretical level, one could argue that with increasing age there is 
no doubt that one's health starts to fail and additionally others around may start to die 
(friends and family) resulting in one's increased awareness of mortality. Therefore, it 
seems logical to suggest that older people may have more worries than younger people 
with regards to their health and life coming to an end. One could therefore suggest that 
the elderly may attempt to suppress these thoughts. If one then couples this idea with the 
findings of reduced inhibitory function with an increased one can see a problem. Older 
people may have more to worry about and experience intrusive thoughts about these 
worries, yet at the same time they may have less control over these intrusions due to their 
reduced inhibitory function. In light of these ideas the aim of the present study was to 
investigate overall well being in a sample of healthy community dwelling older adults 
and examining the frequency with which they report using thought suppression and 
attempting mental control. 
The current Chapter reports the results of a correlational questionnaire study using 65 
older community dwelling adults. In line with the methods used on the sample of younger 
adults (Chapter 7) two different measures of thought suppression tendencies in everyday 
life were used. These were, The White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994) and the Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994). Using this 
methodology it is possible to examine how the propensity to use thought suppression in 
everyday life is linked to various indices of psychopathology such as depression, anxiety 
and neuroticism in older adults. As with the younger sample (Chapter 7) the results of 
this study will shed further light on the previous work of Wegner and Zanakos 1994, 
Muris et al., 1996; Rassin et al., 1999,2000,2001), all of whom have found significant 
correlations between the propensity to suppress thoughts and psychopathology, albeit 
using young samples. 
The aim of the current study was largely exploratory in its nature. Thus, specific 
predictions regarding the relations between the individual difference measures and the 
tendency to suppress thoughts were not explicitly made a priori. However, there were two 
specific predictions made regarding the older samples' scores on the WBSI and TCQ, it 
159 
was expected that the older adults would demonstrate significantly higher scores on both 
inventories assessing tendency to suppress thoughts. 
One previous study which has examined the effects of mental control on older adults is 
the study of Champion (1998). In this study 45 participants completed a laboratory 
thought suppression experiment where in period 1 all participants were suppressing 
thoughts of a white bear and in period 2 all participants were told to continue thought 
verbalisation but that they could think about anything they liked in addition they were 
asked to press a buzzer if they happened to think about a white bear. Crucially in this 
experiment the 45 participants were divided into 3 distinct age groups. Thus 15 
participants were aged between 20 and 40 years. 15 participants were aged between 41 to 
60 years and 15 participants were aged between 61 and 80 years. The results indicated 
that irrespective of verbalisation period (I vs. 2) older participants always buzzed less. 
Thus, they appeared to be better at thought suppression and experience little intrusion 
following thought suppression. Despite the usefulness of this study it did not directly 
examine a participants propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life as the 
current study aimed to. However, these results suggest an alternative prediction, that 
older participants may well either experience less thought intrusion or be more successful 
at controlling intrusions possibly resulting in less use of thought suppression in everyday 
life. 
Finally, the current study will also compare the young and older participants on their 
mean scores on the individual difference variables. As many of these individual 
difference variables measure psychopathologies one can conceptualise these scores as 
giving a general index of mental health. This will enable an examination of the general 
mental health of a sample of young adults contrasted with a sample of older adults. 
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II. Method 
(1) Participants 
Questionnaire packets were sent out to 122 adults all of whom were members of an 
existing pool of healthy and community dwelling older adults maintained at the 
Department of Psycholog . All of the older participants were retired, healthy adults. They 
did not report any vision, hearing or physical mobility problems nor any of the following: 
serious head injury, stroke, mental health and/or memory problems that had been 
diagnosed by their physician. Of these 122 participants contacted 65 participants 
completed the questionnaires and 57 participants returned the questionnaires 
uncompleted. Thus 54 % of those contacted took part in this questionnaire based study. 
The age range was from 64 to 84 years old (M = 73, SD = 5.5); out of the 65 participants, 
30 of the older adult sample were male, 30 were female and 5 did not report their gender. 
(2) Design and procedure 
This study was conducted entirely by postal questionnaire, the following inventories were 
sent out with a covering letter to participants. All participants were asked to fill in the 
questionnaires in the order they appeared (as below). It was made clear to participants 
that there was no time limit to them filling in the questionnaires and that they were to be 
completed in spare moments and sent back to the experimenter in a pre-paid envelope. 
(1) Questionnaires used 
1. Speilberger Trait and State Anxiety Inventory STAI - (Speilberger et al. 1983) 
2. White Bear Suppression Inventory WBSI - (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) 
3. Marlowe Crowne Scale - (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) 
4. Thought Control Questionnaire TCQ - (Wells & Davies, 1994) 
5. Eysenck EPQ-R - (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barett, 1985) 
6. Beck Depression Inventory BDI - (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) 
7. Need for Cognition Scale - (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
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8. State / Action Orientation Questionnaire - (Kuhl, 1993) 
9. Linking Questionnaire - (McIntosh, Harlow & Martin, 1995) 
10. Thought Action Fusion TAF - (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996) 
11. Rumination Inventory - (McIntosh & Martin, 1992) 
12. Fordyce Unhappiness Rating Scale - (Fordyce, 1988) 
13. Schizotypal Personality Inventory SPQ - (Raine, 1991) 
111. Results 
All of the variables used in the following analyses were screened for outliers and extreme 
values. Six participants were excluded as their scores as some variables were extreme 
values. The first analysis will examine how the individual difference variables correlated 
with the participants scores on the WBSI. Table 8.1 below shows these correlations. 
A Bonferroni correction was computed for all these analyses to avoid capitalising on 
chance by calculating so many correlations (Bonferoni correction = 0.05/17 = 0.003), 
therefore only correlations with p values of . 003 or below will be examined. 
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(1) Variables correlating with the WBSI 
Table 8.1 shows that the scores on the WBSI correlate positively and significantly with: 
Trait Anxiety, total TCQ, and schizotypal personality. Additionally, the WBSI correlates 
negatively with the Marlowe Crowne Scale, the Eysenck lie scale, state vs. action 
orientation, need for cognition. All of these correlations were highly significant, but the 
relationships between the WBSI , lie scale and need for cognition were only marginally 
significant p=. 006. All of the variables significantly correlating with the WBSI scores 
were entered as predictors into a multiple regression model with WBSI scores as the 
dependent variable. The model was significant F (7,49) = 3.96 p= . 002 (W = . 40, 
adjusted R2 = . 30). However, only TCQ total significantly predicted WBSI scores in this 
model. This suggests that the tendency to suppress thoughts in older adults is best 
predicted by TCQ scores. This variable explains 27% of the variance in WBSI scores. 
(2) Variables correlating with the TCQ 
Examination of the correlations with TCQ in figure 8.1 reveals that it correlates 
positively with WBSI and Trait Anxiety. Furthermore, TCQ scores correlates negatively 
only marginally with the Need for Cognition p =. 008. All of these significant correlates 
of the TCQ were entered into a regression model with the TCQ score as the dependent 
variable. This model was significant F(3,52)=6.74, p=. 00l (R' =. 29, adjusted W =. 25) 
and indicated that TCQ scores were only significantly predicted by WBSI scores. 
(3) The relation of the TCQ subscales with the WBSI 
The results have shown that the TCQ correlates with the WBSI in the older adult sample 
strongly and positively (r=. 44) but in addition the current study can also examine which 
of the TCQ subscales are contributing to the overall relationship between TCQ and WBSI 
(See Table 8.2 below). 
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TABLE 8.2 - CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE WBS1 AND THE TCQ SUBSCALES. 
WBSI TCQ TCQ TCQ TCQ TCQ 
distraction Social 
- 
Worry Punishment Reappraisal 
WBSI R . 25 .Y 9 . 31* . 22 . 36** Sig 2 tailed . 06 . 16 . 02 . 10 . 006 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
TCQ R . 25 1 -. 11 . 31* . 26 . 38** distraction Sig 2 tailed . 06 . 42 . 02 . 05 . 004 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
TCQ R . 19 -. 11 1 -. 001 . 11 . 05 Social Sig 2 tailed . 16 . 42 . 99 . 41 . 71 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
TCQ R . 31* . 31* -. 001 1 . 42** . 35** Worry Sig 2 tailed . 02 . 02 . 99 . 001 . 007 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
TCQ R . 22 . 26 . 11 . 42** 1 . 38** Punishment Sig 2 tailed . 10 . 05 . 41 . 001 - 004 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
TCQ R '38** . 05 . 35** . 38** 1 Reappraisal Sig 2 tailed 
1 
. 006 . 004 . 71 . 007 . 004 N 57 57 57 57 57 57 
Table 8.2 above shows that all correlations are positive but most of the impact comes 
through worry and reappraisal. As with the young sample a regression model was now 
created predicting WBSI scores from the TCQ subscales. The final model accepted 
contains no significant predictors but overall is still significant, mainly due to TCQ 
reappraisal being close to significance. Thus, the model is significant F (5,56) = 2.69 
p=. 03 1. The R' is . 21, the adjusted 
R' is. 13. This model explains 13% of the variance in 
WBSI scores. Indeed, if the model is re-run with only TCQ reappraisal as the predictor it 
is now significant within the model and explains I I% of the variance in WBSI scores. 
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(4) The Differences between the young and old samples on their mean scores on the 
individual difference variables 
Finally, in order to examine the psychological well-being of order adults in comparison to 
young people their mean scores on the individual difference variables were directly 
compared in a series of t-tests (see table 8.3 below for means and significance values). 
TABLE 8.3 - MEAN SCORES ON THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION OF 
AGE. EFFECTS FOR EACH VARIABLE WERE TESTED FOR SIGNIFICANCE WITH T-TESTS. 
SIGNIFICANT VALUES AFTER A BONFERONI CORRECTION WAS MADE ARE INDICATED BY A 
DOUBLE ASTERISK. 
old Younq t-value Significance 
Mean Mean 
State Anxiety 32.65 39.41 4.39 P<. 0001 
Trait Anxiety 34.61 43.29 5.6 P<. 0001 
WBSI 44.63 51.82 4.091 P<. 0001 
Social Desirability (Marlowe Crowne) 19.19 14.95 -5.88 0<. 0001 
TCQ total 57.42 65.29 5.09 P<. 0001 
TCQ distraction 16.42 15.29 -1.84 p=. 068 
TCQ social 9.58 13.46 6.31 P<. 0001 ** 
TCQ worry 9.82 10.87 2 p=. 047 
TCQ Punishment 9.28 10.62 2.66 P=. 009 
TCQ reappraisal 12.21 15.33 5.12 P<. 0001 
Psychoticism 1.81 2.57 2.33 p=. 021 
Extraversion 5.88 8.76 5.499 P<. 0001 
Neuroticism 4.16 6.97 5.36 P<. 0001 
Lie 6.33 4.16 -5.57 P<. 0001 
BDI 3.56 5.65 2.8 P=. 004 
AOF 7.44 5.2 -4.12 P<. 0001 
AOD 7.89 5.45 4.5 P<. 0001 
AOP 8.29 8.48 0,083 p=. 934 
Linking 9.28 9.03 0.415 P=. 679 
Need for Coqnition 22.18 29.66 1.2 P=. 23 
TAF moral 30.56 19.89 -6 P<. 0001 
McIntosh & Martin Rumination Scale 43.43 50.08 5.1 P<. 0001 
Fordyce unhappy 12.76 18.88 3.2 P=. 001 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 13.09 19.93 1 3.58 J p=, 001 
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The above figure shows that overall the older adults seem to show significantly lower 
scores on virtually all indices of psychopathology when compared to young participants. 
Thus the older adults show significantly lower levels of anxiety (State and Trait), 
neuroticism, depression, rumination, unhappiness, schizotypal personality and many of 
its subscales. Overall the picture is that the older adults appear to be better adjusted than 
the younger participants. Interestingly the subscales of the TCQ above show that older 
adults are less likely to use social methods of mental control or reappraisal. 
IV. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to explore the personality correlates of the tendency to use 
thought suppression in everyday life in a sample of older adults. In addition, this study 
aimed to compare the pattern of results in older adults to the results found in a sample of 
younger adults (Chapter 7). 
As described in Chapter 7, in the sample of young adults, WBSI scores were related 
positively to trait anxiety, neuroticism, BDI, linking, rumination, unhappiness, 
schizotypal personality. In addition the WBSI correlated negatively with AOF & AOD 
(State vs Action orientation). In contrast, in the sample of older adults, tested in the 
present study WBSI scores were positively related to Trait Anxiety, total TCQ, and 
Schizotypal Personality and negatively to the Marlowe Crowne Scale, the Eysenck Lie 
Scale, AOD (State vs. Action orientation) and need for cognition. 
However, when entered into a regression model only TCQ total scores significantly 
predicted WBSI scores. 
Thus, there is some commonality in young and older adults in that, WBSI scores are 
related to elevated Trait Anxiety and Schizotypal Personality in both young and older 
people. In addition, both younger and older adults demonstrate negative correlations with 
state vs. action orientation, suggesting that in both age groups it is state oriented 
individuals who suppress their thoughts the most. However, it seems that in young people 
WBSI scores are additionally related to other psychopathologies, although this may be 
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due to the elderly showing less psychopathology overall (See Table 8.3). Interestingly, in 
the elderly the TCQ and WBSI are highly related, something which is completely absent 
in the young sample. Additionally, in both the young and old sample it appears that State 
oriented individuals are the ones suppressing most. Of key importance is that in the 
elderly sample the WBSI scores correlate strongly and negatively with the Marlowe 
Crowne scores. This cautions us to be wary of the older adults data as it is clear they are 
attempting to answer the questions in a manner which shows them in a favourable light. 
Interestingly, the younger sample are not answering in a socially desirable manner and 
may therefore represent a more accurate picture of the relationships between individual 
differences and psychopathology. 
The current data shows that the mental control strategies and indeed their very 
deployment is different in a sample of older adults when compared to a sample of 
younger adults. When examining the findings in relation to the mean differences on the 
scales themselves, the older adults report using thought suppression much less than the 
younger adults and indeed they report much lower levels of all psychopathologies. There 
are two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, perhaps the older adults are 
genuinely more mentally healthy than the younger adults and as a result of their reduced 
anxiety, depression, rumination and neuroticism have no need to suppress their unwanted 
thoughts as they have less of them to start with. The second explanation considers the fact 
that the older adults may in fact be similar to the younger adults in their levels of 
psychopathology but may under-report these levels when answering these questionnaires. 
This latter argument will be explored in detail in the next Chapter on Repression. 
Finally, one finding of interest is that this study suggests the strategies of mental control 
used by young and old adults are different. The TCQ was designed to measure a person's 
use of various strategies of control, thus it assesses control by distraction, social methods, 
worry, punishment and reappraisal. Table 8.3 examined the mean scores of older and 
younger participants on these sub scales and showed that whilst young and old make 
similar use of distraction, worry and punishment the older adults make significantly less 
use of social and re-appraisive methods of mental control. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
Psychological well-being and repressive coping style in young and old adults 
Two previous studies described in Chapters 7 and 8 examined the relationship between 
the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life and a variety of individual 
difference variables in a sample of young and older adults. The results showed that the 
variables predicting the use of thought suppression in the older sample were different 
from the variables predicting the use of thought suppression in younger adults. One 
unexpected finding from the previous chapter was that the older sample demonstrated 
significantly greater levels of emotional well being (as assessed by lower scores on 
virtually all indices of psychopathology) than the younger sample. At the same time, 
older adults showed significantly higher scores on the Marlowe Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale that measures the extent to which people try to present themselves in a 
favourable light. 
However, high scores on the Marlow Crowne scale have been shown to be one of the 
crucial components in defining a person with a Repressive coping style (Weinberger et al. 
1979). Another feature necessary to be classed as a repressor is the presence of low 
scores on a measure of trait anxiety. It would appear that the majority of older adults 
show this very pattern, low scores on trait anxiety and high scores on the Marlow Crowne 
scale. Therefore the question arose as to whether the older adults were genuinely 
reporting their true level of mental health or were repressors. 
In addition, the previous study (Chapter 8) also demonstrated that older adults have much 
higher scores on TAF moral. This subscale of Thought Action Fusion assesses the extent 
to which one believes thinking about an act is as bad as engaging in the actual act. For 
example, if one thinks about being unfaithful to their partner is this as bad as actually 
being unfaithful? Or if one thinks about shouting at a friend for no reason is this as bad as 
actually shouting at the friend? With this in mind the results of Chapter 8 indicate that 
older adults have a greater tendency to believe that thinking about something negative is 
as bad as actually engaging in the act. In contrast younger adults do not show this 
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tendency, viewing thought as less negative than actual action. Therefore, it seems for an 
older person to have a negative thought about a possible action may be more worrying 
and threatening if they truly believe that merely having the thought is bad. One could 
suggest that older participants may therefore be motivated to avoid having such thoughts 
and this could be achieved through either conscious thought suppression or an 
unconscious automatic repression. 
One further finding which supports the interpretation that older adults may be more 
repressive is that in the older sample the use of thought suppression was negatively 
correlated with the participants scores on Marlowe Crowne scale. This negative 
relationship in the older sample suggests that as the Marlowe Crowne scores rise the use 
of thought suppression falls. This exact relationship would be expected if one were trying 
to present oneself in an overly favourable light. Thus, the greater ones scores on Social 
Desirability scales the more one may deny having negative intrusive thoughts. This 
finding also suggests that repressors may make less use of intentional thought 
suppression, this will be investigated in the present study. One previous study by 
Champion (1998) has investigated repression and thought suppression in a laboratory 
experiment and found that repressors were consistently better at laboratory thought 
suppression tasks. However, this data needs to be viewed with caution, as it is subject to 
two alternative explanations. It could be that repressors are genuinely better at 
suppressive forms of mental control, or perhaps more likely they deliberately under- 
report thought intrusion to appear better at the task of thought suppression. 
The present study therefore had two main aims. The first aim was to assess the rates of 
repression in both the young and older adult samples on the basis of the method 
developed by Weinberger et al. (1979). Using this method repressors are classified as 
people who score above the upper quartile on measures of defensiveness (as assessed by 
the Marlowe Crowne scale, Crowne & Marlowe, 1964) and below the median on an 
anxiety inventory (the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Inventory or the Speilberger et al. (1983) 
STAI - Trait anxiety inventory). In the current study the Speilberger et al. (1983) measure 
of trait anxiety was used to classify repressors and non-repressors as it is more often used 
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in studies of anxiety. In addition several studies in the repression literature have reported 
using the STAI for classification of repressive coping style (Derakshan and Eysenck, 
1998; Tornarken and Davidson, 1994). 
The second aim was to examine which individual difference variables were related to 
being a repressor or non-repressor in both younger and older adults. Thus, the repressors 
and non-repressors in both the younger and older adult samples will be compared on the 
basis of their mean scores on the individual difference measures collected. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
The sample of young participants consisted of 97 participants who took part in the large 
scale study outlined in Chapter 2. Two of the younger participants were excluded from 
this study due to very extreme values on some of the individual difference measures. 
Therefore, the final sample of young adults consisted of 95 participants. The sample of 
older participants consisted of 65 older adults who took part in a questionnaire study 
described in Chapter 8. However, 9 participants were excluded from the older sample as 
they filled the questionnaires in incorrectly or had extreme scores on the individual 
difference measures. Therefore, the final sample for the older adults comprises of 56 
participants. Both young and older ýamples completed several individual difference 
questionnaires including the WBSI, Marlowe-Crowne Scale and Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(See Chapter 8 method section pl6l). 
(2) Assessment of the repressive coping style in young and old samples 
The first task was to identify the repressors and non-repressors within these samples. This 
was done using a method previously developed by Weinberger et al (1979). The sample 
of young adults (N = 95) was first dichotomised according to the normative values from 
the original scales. Thus, participants scoring below the normative median for the 
Speilberger et al. (1983) trait anxiety inventory (35.82) and above the upper quartile on 
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the Marlowe Crowne scale (19.5) were classed as repressors. The rest of the sample were 
classed as non-repressors. 
The sample of older adults (N = 56) was dichotomised once again according to the 
normative values from the original scales. Regarding the Marlowe Crowne scale quartile, 
there is no normative data on an elderly sample, and therefore the cut off remains 19.5. 
However, there is normative information for an older sample on the Speilberger trait 
anxiety inventory where the median score is 32.82. This value was used to dichotomise 
the older adults into a high and low anxiety group. Therefore, repressors in the older 
sample will be participants scoring below 32.82 on the Trait Anxiety Inventory and above 
19.5 on the Marlowe Crowne scale. The rest of the older adult sample were classified as 
non-repressors. 
111. Results 
(1) The prevalence of repression in young and old sample 
As a result of procedures described in the previous section, in a sample of young adults, 9 
participants out of 95, were classified as repressors. Thus, only 9.5 % of the sample were 
repressors and 90.5 % were not. This percentage, is in line with the findings of previous 
studies which suggest that repressors represent between 10 to 20 % of the general 
population (Myers, 2000). In contrast, in a sample of older adults 20 out of 56 
participants were classified as repressors. Thus, 36% of the sample were repressors and 
64% were not. Therefore, in the present study the rate of repression is four times higher 
in the older sample in comparison to the young sample. 
(2) Comparison of repressors and non-repressors in the young sample 
Next, it was interesting to compare the mean scores on the individual difference variables 
separately for young repressors and young non-repressors. Table 9.1 shows the means 
and the results of statistical analyses in the young sample. When examining the means of 
repressors and non-repressors in Table 9.1 it is clear that some differences exist in several 
of the individual difference variables used. For example, in addition to Trait Anxiety, 
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young repressors have lower scores than non-repressors on State Anxiety, depression, 
neuroticism, Fordyce Unhappiness Rating, schizotipy, AOF scale of state vs. action 
orientation and linking. On the other hand, they have higher scores not only on Social 
Desirability (which is expected given that they were classed as repressors partly on the 
basis of high scores on this scale), but also on the Eysenck Lie Scale. Their scores on 
Need For Cognition as well as Thought Action Fusion (TAF) are also markedly higher 
than those for non-repressors, however, these differences are not significant possibly due 
to lack of power. Moreover, if one uses the Bonferroni correction to control for multiple 
comparisons made, young repressors score significantly lower than young non-repressors 
only on Linking. 
TABLE 9.1 - THE MEAN SCORES ON INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION OF 
GROUP (NON-REPRESSORS VS. REPRESSORS) IN A SAMPLE OF YOUNG ADULTS. THE 
SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS MARKED WITH TWO ASTERISKS REPRESENT THE VALUES REMAINING 
SIGNIFICANT AT. 05 LEVEL AFFER A BONFERONI CORRECTION. TRAIT ANXIETY AND 
MARLOWE CROWNE SCORES DO NOT APPEAR BELOW AS THESE WOULD BE DIFFERENT BY 
DESIGN. 
Young sample non repressor non repressor repressor repressor t- value Sio ificance 
N Mean N Mean 
STATEANX 86 40.02 (sd 9.43) 9 33.56 (sd 7.95) 1.98 P=. 05 
WBSI 86 52.45 (scl 9.31) 9 46 (sd 11.06) 1.96 P=. 05 
TCO total 86 65.24 (sd 9.67) 9 65.78 (sd 8.01) -0.16 P=. 875 
Psychoticism 86 2.62 (sd 1.86) 9 2.11 (sd 1.54) 0.78 P-. 437 
Extraversion 86 8.65 (sd 3.49) 9 9.78 (scl 3.38) -0.92 P-. 358 
Neuroticism 86 7.2 (sd 3.02) 9 4.67(2.45) 2.43 P=. 01 
Lie 86 3.94 (scl 2.41) 9 6.22(1,92) -2.73 P=. 007 
BDI 86 6.05 (sd 5.16) 9 1.89 (sd 2.02) 2.34 P-. 01 
AOF 84 4.93 (scl 3.02) 9 7.78 (scl 4.18) ý2658 P=. 01 
AOD 84 5.26 (scl 3.06) 9 6.33 fsd 3.16) -0.85 P-. 40 
AOP 84 8.45 (sd 2.04) 9 8.78 (sd 1.8) -0.459 D-. 64 
NEED4COG 88 27.73 (sd 36.71) 9 47.22 (sd 30.82) -1.53 p=. 13 
SPQ so 21.2 (scl 11.73) 5 8 (scl 5.43) 2.46 D-. 01 
LINKING 75 9.44 (scl 3.35) 9 5.44 (sd 4.69) 3.2 P=. 002 
taf moral 75 19.47 (sd 9.27) 9 24.56 (sd 9.79) -1.56 o-. 16 
Rumination scale 76 50.29 (sd 6.76) 9 48.33 (sd 4.8) 0.841 p-. 40 
Fordyce unhappy 76 19.67 (sd 11.82) 9 12.22 (scl 9.39) 1.82 p-. 072 
IQ 70 106.75 (14.28) a 113.12 (20.7) -1.14 p=. 259 
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(3) Comparison of repressors and non-repressors in the older sample 
The above analysis comparing younger non-repressors and repressors on their mean 
scores on the individual difference measures collected in this study was also calculated 
for the older adult sample. 
When examining the means of repressors and non-repressors in table 9.2 it is clear that 
differences exist on several of the individual difference variables used. Thus, older 
repressors score lower than older non-repressors on WBSI, TCQ, neuroticism, 
depression, linking, rumination, unhappiness and SPQ. Furthermore, older repressors 
have higher scores than older non-repressors on Eysenck Lie Scale, State vs. action 
orientation (AOF, AOD, AOP) and need for cognition. 
If one uses a Bonferoni correction to adjust for the high number of comparisons being 
made older repressors score significantly lower than non-repressors on neuroticism and 
depression. In addition, older repressors score significantly higher than non-repressors on 
Eysenck Lie Scale, State vs. action orientation (AOD). Finally, older repressors have 
lower scores on the WBSI, TCQ and SPQ which are of borderline statistical significance. 
174 
TABLE 9.2 - THE MEAN SCORES ON THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE MEASURES AS A 
FUNCTION OF GROUP (NON REPRESSORS VS. REPRESSORS) IN A SAMPLE OF OLDER ADULTS. 
SIGNIFICANCE VALUES MARKED WITH A DOUBLE ASTERISK REPRESENT VALUES REMAINING 
SIGNIFICANT AT. 05 LEVEL AFTER A BONFERONI CORRECTION. TRAIT ANXIETY AND 
MARLOWE CROWNE SCORES DO NOT APPEAR BELOW AS THESE WOULD BE DIFFERENT BY 
DESIGN. 
Older sample non repressor non repressor repressor repressor It - value ificance Sicin 
N Mean N Mean 
g 
STATEANX 36 35.61 (sd 8.59) 20 26.8 (sd 5.51) 4.11 - . 
001 -. 001 
WBSI 36 46.36 (sd 7.56) 20 40.2 (sd 9.03) 2.72 - .. 
009 . 009 
TCQ total 36 59.33 (sd 7.1) 19 53.21 (sd 9.53) 2.7 D-. 009 
Psychoticism 36 1.74 (sd 2.3) 
---LO- 
1.9 (sd 1.52) -0.276 D-. 78 
Extraversion 35 5.51 (sd 3.02) 20 - 
6.8 (sd 3.71) -1.39 - 
p=. 168 
Neuroticism 35 5.17 (sd 3.26) 20 - 
2.15 (sd 2.03) 4.23 
- 
P=. 001 
Lie 35 5.49 (sd 2.64) 20 8.1 (sd 2.17) -3.7 t)-. 001 
BDI 35 4.17 (sd 2.8) 20 2.05 (sd 1.67) 3.52 P=. 001 
AOF 34 6.76 (sd 3.05) 19 8.84 (sd 2) -2.66 P-. 01 
AOD 34 6.85 (sd 2.63) 19 10.21 (sd 1.51) -5.57 - 
P-. 001 
AOP 34 7.71 (sd 2.29) 19 9.15 (sd 1.77) -2.39 p-. 021 
NEED4COG 35 15.6 sd 37.05) 19 34.74 (sd 26-22) -2.28 - 
p-. 027 
LINKING 35 9.48 (sd 9.49) 20 7.25 (sd 4.19) 1.99 p-. 05 
taf moral 36 30.38 (sd 12.11) 18 32.67 (sd 11.96) -0.65 p-. 51 
-Rumination scale 
32 44.82 (sd 8.62) 20 41.05 (sd 6.39) 1.69 -. 097 
Fordyce unhappy 36 1 . 61 (sd 11.07) 
20 9.6 sd 7.65) 1 1.8 1 p-. 078 
-= E- =SPQ 
- 
I 
36 14.78 (sd 7.63) 19 
- 
8.79 (sd 5.22) 
- 
1 
3.06 p-. 004 
In comparison to the young sample, the results of the old sample are stronger and more 
straightforward. This may reflect the fact that in the older sample there are a higher 
proportion of repressors and therefore higher power. In this sample, repressors seem to 
rate themselves as having significantly less psychopathogy (anxiety - State, neuroticism 
and depression. In addition, older repressors score significantly higher than non- 
repressors on Eysenck Lie Scale, State vs. action orientation (AOD). The borderline 
significant differences found between the WBSI scores and TCQ scores of repressors and 
non-repressors both indicate that it is the non-repressors who endorse using suppressive 
forms of mental control. 
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Overall, it would appear that repressors do have different scores on the individual 
difference variables in both young and old samples when compared to non-repressors. 
Therefore the final analysis was designed to compare the scores of young and old 
participants scores on these individual difference measures with the repressors from both 
samples removed. If the presence of the large number of repressors is the factor reducing 
the older samples scores on the various measures of psychopathology one would expect 
that the previous significant differences existing between the scores of young and older 
participants should be reduced by removing the repressors (See Table 9.3 below). 
TABLE 9.3 - MEAN SCORES ON THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE MEASURES AS A FUNCTION OF 
AGE (YOUNG NON-REPRESSORS VS. OLDER NON-REPRESSORS). SIGNIFICANCE VALUES 
MARKED WITH A DOUBLE ASTERISK REPRESENT VALUES REMAINING SIGNIFICANT AT. 05 
LEVEL AFrER A BONFERONI coRREcriON. 
Younq Younq non repressor Old 
-Old 
non repressor t- value Sionificance 
non repressor N Mean non repressor N Mean 
STATEANX 86 40.02 (sd 9.43) 36 35.61 (sd 8.59) 2*4 P-. 018 
TRArTANX 86 44.3 (sd 9.46) 36 38.22 (sd 7.7) 3*2 P-. 002 
WBSI 86 52.45 (sd 9.31) 36 46.36 (sd 7.56) 2.81 D-. 006 
Marlowe 86 14.25 (sd 4.57) 36 17.44 (sd 4.6) -4o48 
1C Q total 86 65.24 (sd 9.67) 36 59.33 (sd 7.1) 2; 93 D-. 004 
Psychoticism 86 2.62 (sd 1.86) 36 1.74 (sd 2.3) 2AI p-. 037 
Extraversion 86 8.65 (sd 3.49) 35 5.51 (sd 3.02) 4.85 D-. 001 
Neurntiriq 86 7.2 (sd 3.02) 35 5.17 (sd 3.26) 3.45 P-. 001 
Lie 86 3.94 (sd 2.41) 35 5.49 (sd 2.64) -3.18 p-. 002 
BDI 86 6.05 (sd 5.16) 35 4.17 (sd 2.8) 2*27 P=. 025 
AOF 84 4.93 (sd 3.02) 34 6.76 (sd 3.05) ý2*6 P-. 01 
AOD 84 5.26 (sd 3.06) 34 6.85 (sd 2.63) -2.51 P-. 13 
AOP 84 8.45 (sd 2.04) 34 7.71 (sd 2.29) 1948 P-. 14 
NEENCOG 88 27.73 (sd 36.71) 35 15.6 (sd 37.05) P-. 12 
UNKING 50 21.2 (sd 11.73) 35 9.48 (sd 9.49) P-. 83 
taf moral 75 19.47 (sd 9.27) 36 30.38 (sd 12.111 I n. -nni 
Rumination scale 76 50.29 (sd 6.76) 32 44.82 (sd 8.62) 
1 
11A 
I 
n.. nni 
Fordvce unhappy 76 19.67 (sd 11.82) 36 14.61 (sd 11.07) 2.57 
1 
1)-. 01 
SPQ 50 1 21.2 (sd 11.73) 36 1A '70 fýA 7 All 
I 
n- 004 
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However, Table 9.3 shows that even when the repressors are removed from the older and 
younger samples the older sample still scores significantly lower than the young sample 
on Trait Anxiety, Extraversion, Neuroticism and Rumination. But the older sample scores 
higher than the younger sample on the Marlowe Crowne scale, Eysenck lie scale and 
TAF moral. This pattern argues against repression being entirely responsible for the 
differences between young and older participants on the indices of psychopathology. 
IV. Discussion 
To our knowledge no published study has yet investigated the prevalence of repression in 
a sample of older adults. The aim of the present study was to directly compare the 
prevalence of repression in a sample of younger and older adults, and to compare In 
repressors and non-repressors in both samples on a number of individual difference 
measures. The results demonstrate that whereas 9.5% of the younger sample were classed 
as repressors 36% of the older sample are classed as repressors. Thus according to the 
present data the prevalence of repression is as many as 4 times higher in older 
participants. 
It could be argued that as a result of this finding the older participants may well be being 
avoidant when one examines their significantly lower scores on the psychopathology 
indices in comparison with the younger participants (See Chapter 8). However, in order 
to investigate this question the current study directly compared the younger non- 
repressors with the older non-repressors and found that the older adult group still 
displayed significantly lower scores on most of the psychopathological indices (see Table 
9.3). Thus, after repressors are removed the older participants still show significantly 
lower scores on Trait anxiety, Extraversion, Neuroticism and Rumination. In addition, the 
older participants show higher scores on Marlowe Crowne scale, Eysenck lie scale and 
TAF moral. Once again the higher scores in the older participants on the Marlowe 
Crowne scale and lie scale suggest that the older participants may well be deliberately 
distorting their values on these psychopathology scales to appear more healthy than may 
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be warranted, although due to repressor removal one could discount the effects of 
repression. 
In the literature on the elderly and Lie scales (Eysenck lie scale and Marlowe Crowne 
Scale) one previous study has reported that significant positive correlations exist between 
scores on lie scales and age (Ray, 1988). Importantly, Ray (1998) examined the 
correlation between lie scales and age in seven different samples, six of the seven 
samples found significant positive correlations. This positive correlation suggests that 
one may become more defensive (conscious use of lying and/or unconscious use of 
repression) with increasing age. The current study cannot systematically evaluate the 
effects of increasing age as here two separate samples of older and younger participants 
were chosen both to fall within clearly defined age bounds. As a result the current study 
had virtually no participants falling between the ages of 35 and 65. Therefore an 
interesting avenue for future research is to determine whether the tendency to use a 
repressive coping style increases with age. 
The current study however does provide preliminary evidence suggesting that repression 
may occur more in older adult samples. Many questions stem from this analysis. For 
example, if older participants do genuinely have greater rates of repression, one would 
need to ascertain whether repression rises with increasing age or whether there is 
something about the current generation of older adults that makes them more repressive 
when compared to the current generation of younger adults. One unpublished study by 
Champion (1998) on repression and aging can give some insight into this question. In this 
study there were 45 participants belonging to three discrete age groups, 15 young 
participants (20 - 40 years), 15 middle aged participants (41 - 60 years), and 15 older 
participants (61 - 80 years), they found that repression increased with age. Thus, there 
were fewest repressors in the young participants, more in the middle aged participants 
and still more in the oldest participants. This is therefore preliminary evidence that 
repression may increase with aging. 
The current study also found that TAF scores were higher in the older adult sample even 
after removal of the repressors. This finding suggests that older adults view thinking 
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about an act as being almost as bad as actually engaging in that act. This finding may 
explain some of the discrepancies found between younger and older participants in their 
scores on the individual difference measures collected. Thus, younger participants have 
low scores on TAF moral suggesting that they rarely view thinking of an act as bad in 
itself, in contrast the older sample (even the older non-repressors) seem to view thinking 
of unpleasant acts as being tantamount to actually carrying out the suggested acts. With 
this distinction in mind it is therefore not surprising that-given this propensity the older 
adults may well chose to deny having these thoughts at all. 
In summary the current study suggests that older adults score significantly lower than 
younger adults on many psychopathological indices even after repression has been taken 
into account. However, the fact that the older adults still show significantly greater scores 
on the Eysenck lie scale (when compared to the young sample) and Marlowe Crowne 
scale even after repressor removal suggests that one must remain cautious in interpreting 
this result as indicating genuinely greater levels of mental well being in older adults. 
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CHAPTER TEN' 
The role of thought suppression / expression in the perception of intentionality of 
completed actions 
The final two studies represent a departure from the mental control literature and were 
conducted to broaden the field of thought suppression by moving the research into 
previously unexplored directions. One central tenet of the new intentional theory of the 
rebound effect that has been outlined in this thesis is that mental control is an intentional 
act. Therefore, the final two studies have been designed to examine the impact of thought 
suppression or expression on the perception of intentionality ascribed to voluntary actions 
and on the timely execution of one's future intentions (i. e. prospective memory). 
In everyday life people often try to suppress their thoughts in an effort to avoid acting in 
a certain way. For example, one might suppress thoughts of having an extra drink in 
order to avoid actually having the extra drink. In a similar vein, one may try to avoid 
thoughts of smoking when trying to stop. However, it is also the case that many times in 
life these self-regulatory efforts do not work (Baumeister, Heatherton and Tice, 1994). 
Frequently, the result is that one does end up having had the extra drink or smoking 
despite their best efforts to the contrary. In addition, on finding that they have engaged in 
a counter intentional act people often tend to claim it was not them who did it. For 
example, a person who is on a diet and has been suppressing thoughts of eating chocolate 
but nevertheless does end up eating chocolate will often assert that it was unintentional 
and 'just happened'. The central question then becomes whether this is how the person 
really feels, (i. e. does it really feel like the act of eating the chocolate was unwilled) or is 
the person just lying to themselves and others in an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957). 
'The research reported in this chapter represents published work (Wegner & Erskine, 
2003) see appendix N for the original article. 
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The current study aimed to explore these very questions, by examining how the control of 
mental contents may affect the perception of intentionality of supposedly voluntary 
actions. For example, if there is a pen on the desk and someone picks it up whilst firmly 
holding in mind the intention of picking it up, the act feels like a completely controlled 
and intentional act. However, if one picks up the pen whilst thinking of what to have for 
dinner or deliberately trying not to think of picking it up the act may feel as if it just 
happened with very little sense of one having consciously willed the act. It was therefore 
reasoned that, perhaps acts that are carried out whilst not thinking about them lose the 
feeling of having been willed. 
This argument would be consistent with new models of how humans infer causality, 
which are based on the principals thought to govern the perception of causality more 
generally (Hume, 1888; Kelly, 1972; Michotte, 1954,1962). Thus, Wegner and 
colleagues (Wegner 2001,2003; Wegner & Wheatley 1999) have suggested that crucial 
among the sources of information we use to infer causality are prior consistent thoughts 
of the act, that occur temporarily before the act, and that there are no alternative causes 
apparent 
Therefore, one can see how avoiding thinking about an act while, at the same time, 
engaging in it could lead to a feeling that one had not willed the act. This would be due to 
the fact that one would have blocked the prior consistent thoughts of the act from 
occurring. In contrast, completing an act whilst holding in mind the intention to perform 
the act should lead to an inflated sense of having willed the action, due to the strong 
presence of consistent thought just prior to the action occurring. 
This analysis suggests an interesting idea, that perhaps people can make themselves 
voluntarily feel their actions are occurring involuntarily. In a recent article, Wegner and 
Erskine (2003) have labelled this phenomenon "voluntary involuntariness". The idea of 
"voluntary involuntariness, " then, turns on two different definitions of voluntary. The 
exertion of mental control that occurs when a person attempts to influence the availability 
of thoughts about action may be voluntary in the sense that it is goal-directed. This goal- 
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directed activity could potentially undermine the person's experience of voluntariness 
during subsequent action. To the extent that a person might be able to inhibit awareness 
of the elements underlying the inference of conscious will-awareness of the thought, the 
action, or their interrelation- the person might voluntarily create a sense of 
involuntariness. 
The current study explores the effects of various mental control instructions on 
perception of intentionality of a variety simple actions carried out in the laboratory. 
Thus, participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental 
control instructions. They were asked in advance of each task either to suppress thoughts 
of their intention to perform the task, to concentrate on such thoughts, or to monitor their 
thoughts without trying to change them. Following each task, participants rated their 
experience of will for the action (on a scale from "it just happened" to "I did it on 
purpose, intentionally"). They subsequently were led to perform the actions again 
without instructions, again reporting experienced will. 
The predictions are that acts completed whilst suppressing the intention to act should be 
rated as significantly less intentional than acts completed under no mental control 
instructions (baseline control condition). Furthermore, acts completed whilst holding in 
mind the intention to act should be rated as significantly more intentionally completed 
than acts undertaken with no mental control instructions. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
Twenty-four Harvard University undergraduates (16 female and 8 male) volunteered to 
participate in return for course credit or $6. All participants completed the experiment 
correctly and no one was excluded from the sample. 
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(2) Tasks 
Ten tasks were used, one for practice and nine for the experiment. The tasks were 
adapted from studies in the Zeigarnik effect literature (Lewis & Franklin, 1944; Reeve, 
Cole, & Olson, 1986; Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1935) and involved relatively simple actions. 
The practice task was copying a shopping list, and the experimental tasks included: 
copying a geometric figure; circling the vowels in a short paragraph; completing a 
wooden puzzle for children; lifting a brick to a height of 10 inches and setting it down 
again; alphabetizing 10 letters on index cards; spiraling a pipe cleaner around a pencil 
and taking it off; rolling an elongated piece of clay into a ball; winding loose thread on to 
a spool; and completing a set of 5 simple anagrams. Participants performed these tasks in 
one of 3 possible fixed orders. 
(3) Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the experiment each 
participant was informed that the aim of the study was to find out how thinking about 
tasks affects perceptions of one's role in performing these tasks. The experimenter 
explained that the main dimension of interest was how some tasks feel more intentional 
than others, and then went on to say: "Some everyday tasks feel fully intentional, like 
writing a difficult essay (one does these things), whereas others feel as if they just happen 
or "run off" with little feeling of intentionality (e. g., driving or brushing one's teeth). " 
To make sure participants understood the distinction they were asked to rate four simple 
everyday actions in terms of how intentional they usually feel on a 9-point scale with 1= 
itfelt like itjust happened, and 9= itfelt like I did it on purpose, intentionally. The four 
practice actions they rated were eating popcorn at the cinema, walking down stairs, 
watering the plants, and dreaming (cf. Malle & Knobe, 1997). The rating scale for these 
items was the same scale used to rate the intentionality of the subsequent experimental 
tasks, and was based on measures used to assess involuntariness in hypnosis (e. g., Lynn, 
Nash, Rhue, Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984) and the experience of intention and conscious 
will in automatisms and everyday actions (e. g., Malle & Knobe, 1997; Wegner & 
Wheatley, 1999). 
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If at this juncture it was clear that participants understood the distinction, they were 
invited to proceed with the practice task (copying a shopping list). After completing the 
practice task they were given the intentionality scale and asked to rate their experience. 
Participants were then introduced to the main experimental manipulation as follows: 
"In the tasks we will begin in a moment I will be asking you to either monitor your 
thoughts before and during the task or to suppress or to concentrate on the intention to 
perform the act. You will have 10 seconds before each task to practice the mental task. If 
I ask you to suppress the intention to perform the action it is vital that you try to suppress 
this thought during the few seconds before the act but also during performance of the 
action. Equally, if I ask you to concentrate on the intention to perform the action it is vital 
that you try to keep this thought in mind during the few seconds before the act but also 
during performance of the action. For monitoring, you only have to monitor your 
thoughts and notice what you are thinking without trying to change them at all. " 
In addition to these general instructions, specific instructions were given to participants 
just before each action. Three tasks were performed with suppression instructions, 3 with 
concentration instructions, and 3 with monitoring instructions. 
For suppression, the instructions were: 
"During performance of the next action I would like you to try not to think about your 
intention to perform the action while doing it. Thus, your task is to suppress any thoughts 
about the intended behavior while performing if'. 
For concentration, the instructions were: 
"During performance of the next action I would like you to try to think about your 
intention to perform the action while doing it. Thus your task is to concentrate on 
thoughts about the intended behavior while performing if'. 
For monitoring, the instructions were: 
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"During performance of the next action I would like you to monitor your thoughts 
without trying to change them. Just notice what you are thinking about while performing 
the behavior, whatever this may be". 
Following each instruction, the experimenter said: 
"You will have a few seconds to settle into this task, at the end of which I will press this 
buzzer telling you to carry out the action. " When approximately 10 s had elapsed, the 
experimenter pressed a buzzer. All participants did successfully perform all assigned 
tasks. 
Participants completed the nine experimental tasks in one of three fixed orders. The order 
of the thought instructions was fully counterbalanced such that, across participants, each 
of the nine tasks was suppressed, expressed, and monitored an equal number of times 
across the three task orders. After each task, participants were asked to rate their 
experienced intentionality for the task on the rating scale. They were asked a further 
question which depended on the thought instructions they had received for that task. If 
they had been suppressing thoughts of the intention they were asked to rate "How hard 
were you trying to suppress the thought given to you? " on a scale from I (not very hard) 
to 9 (extremely hard). If they had been concentrating on thoughts of the intention, they 
were asked to rate "How hard were you trying to express/ concentrate on the thought 
given to you? " Finally, if they had been monitoring their thoughts, they were asked to 
rate "What were you thinking about before and during enactment of the task? " on a scale 
from 1 (thinking exclusively about something other than the task) to 9 (thinking 
exclusively about the task). 
After all of the tasks had been completed with the respective thought instructions, the 
experimenter reset all of the tasks so that they could be undertaken a second time. 
Participants were then asked to run through all of the tasks again, this time with no 
thought instructions so they could think what they wanted. Participants were told they 
could complete the tasks in any order providing eventually they had done them all. After 
each task participants again rated the intentionality of their action. 
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111. Results 
Initial analyses showed that participants took their instructions seriously. Participants 
indicated trying fairly hard to concentrate on the thought in concentration trials (M = 6.14 
on the 9-point scale), and also trying fairly hard to suppress the thought in suppression 
trials (M = 6.63). They reported thinking primarily about the action rather than other 
things on the monitoring trials (M = 6.26). These thought manipulations did not 
influence action per se, however, as all participants carried out all tasks. Participants' 
initial level of intentionality on the practice task was near the scale midpoint of 5 (M 
5.67) and the means for all the tasks across conditions were near this value. Initial 
analyses also indicated, however, that one of the experimental tasks (anagrams) elicited 
high intentionality ratings overall, so further analyses were conducted with this task 
excluded. 
Mean intentionality pooled across tasks was examined in a3 order of tasks x3 instruction 
(concentration vs. monitoring vs. suppression) x2 action (target action vs. later action) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the latter two variables. 
Although there were significant main effects of action and instruction, and also 
significant interactions of order with each of these variables, these are best interpreted in 
light of the significant interaction of instruction and action, F (2,42) = 8.46, p <. 001, eta 
squared = . 29. Task order did not qualify this effect, so the influence of order will not be 
examined further. The means are shown in Figure 10.1 below. 
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Fi(; UREIO. I- MEAN INTENTIONALITY EXPERIENCED FOR ACTIONS PERFORMED DURING OR AFTER EACH OF 
THREETHOUGHT INSTRUCTIONS (CONCENTRATE ON THOUGHT OF INTENTION, MONITOR THOUGHTS, OR 
SUPPRESS THOUGHT OF INTENTION). ERROR BARS REPRESENT STANDARD ERROR. 
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The influence of thought instructions on intentionality of the target action was examined P-1 Cý 
by simple main effects and contrast analysis. Suppression instructions reduced 
intentionality for the target action (M = 5.03) below the level prompted only by 
monitoring (M = 5.83), F (1,21) = 4.63, p <. 05, and also below the level yielded by 
concentration (M= 6.28), F (1,21) = 13.07, p< . 002. Intentionality levels for the target 
action during monitoring and concentration did not differ significantly. 
The influence of thought instructions can also be seen in comparisons between 
intentionality experienced for the target action, and intentionality for that action 
performed later without instructions. Concentration yielded greater intentionality for the 
target action (M= 6.28) than the later action (M=4.95), F(l, 21) = 20.54, p <. 001, and 
monitoring also yielded greater intentionality for the target action (M= 5.83) than the 
later action (M=4.93), F(l, 21) = 9.66, p<. 005. However, suppression did not have 
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Concentration Monitoring Suppression 
such an effect, and even produced a tendency in the opposite direction. Intentionality for 
the target action during suppression (M = 5.03) was nominally lower than intentionality 
for the same action following suppression (M = 5.50), F (1,21) = 1.82, p <. 18. 
Contrasts between intentionality levels experienced for the later action did not yield any 
reliable effects. However, it is noteworthy that intentionality of the later action after 
suppression tended to be greater (M = 5.50) than the combined mean intentionality of the 
later action after monitoring and concentration (M = 4.94), F (1,21) = 2.50, p =. 13. 
Finally, correlations were computed to examine relations between the thought reports 
during the various task instructions and experienced intentionality. The most telling 
finding was that thoughts about the target action in the monitoring condition were 
strongly related to feelings of intentionality during enactment, r (24) = . 75, p <. 01. 
Reports of how hard people concentrated were similarly related to the experience of 
intentionality during concentration, r(24) =39, p<. 01. Reports of trying hard to 
suppress, however, were not related to intentionality during suppression, r (24) = . 22, ns. 
This correlation might be expected to be negative, in that motivation to suppress might 
enhance suppression success and thus undermine apparent mental causation. However, 
trying hard to suppress does not guarantee successful suppression (Wegner & Zanakos, 
1994), and the lack of a link from motivation to reported intentionality may be 
understood in this light. 
IV. Discussion 
The main aim of the current study was to examine whether engaging in various actions 
whilst under different mental control instructions can affect one's perception of having 
"caused" the act. It was predicted that acts completed whilst trying not to think about 
them would be rated as having been less willed and feeling more as if they just happened. 
In contrast, it was predicted that acts completed whilst holding the intention in mind 
would come to feel more intentional, and more wilful. The results of this study supported 
these predictions. Acts completed whilst trying not to think about them were rated as 
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feeling significantly less wilful and as if they were just happening, when compared to the 
control group which merely carried out the acts with no specific mental control 
instructions. Importantly acts completed whilst holding in mind the intention to perform 
the act were rated as feeling more wilful and intentional, when compared to the control 
group (no mental control instructions). 
These results support Wegner and Wheatley's (1999) theory of apparent mental 
causation. According to this theory acts occurring without prior consistent thought and 
with many alternative explanations for the act should feel as if they are not caused by the 
person themselves. The current experiment extends this analysis by demonstrating that 
(via mental control) one can lead oneself to a place where it feels as if one is not the actor 
willing various acts, but is an innocent bystander where they act with little feeling that 
they have indeed acted. As stated in the introduction it seems one can indeed experience a 
state of "voluntary involuntariness". 
One issue which may weaken the conclusions drawn from the present study is the 
influence of experimental demand. The participants in this study were exposed to clear 
demands to control their own thoughts, and given the repeated measures design were 
exposed to all conditions. It is therefore possible that some participants became aware of 
the comparisons the experimenter was likely to draw among each of the experimental 
conditions. Although, participants were not made aware of any experimental hypotheses 
linking the thought instructions to possible influences on the experience of intentionality 
for each of the actions, it is reasonable to believe participants may have been able to infer 
these. 
Despite this possibility there are reasons to believe this was not the case in the current 
study. Firstly post experimental probing revealed that only four participants had an idea 
about the experimental hypotheses, but even these participants who guessed that the 
different mental control instructions may effect later intentionality ratings, did not 
correctly identify the expected direction of intentionality rating movement. Thus, they 
didn't know which mental control processes would result in enhanced intentionality and 
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which would result in reduced intentionality. A second argument against an experimental 
demand explanation concerns the nature of the actions undertaken. All of the actions 
undertaken in the present study were very simple everyday acts with no associated 
negativity or positivity. This is important because one can imagine that engaging in a 
counter intentional negative act in everyday life (e. g. having an affair) makes one 
strongly motivated to reduce the feels of intentionality to reduce cognitive dissonance and 
guilt. In the current experiment there was no such associated negativity and therefore 
little reason for people feel a need to change their intentionality ratings. 
Another observation on the role of demand in this study centres on the apparent 
counterdemand effects of mental control on actions when mental control is rescinded. 
Although the observed effects were not strong, there was a tendency for suppressed 
intentions to rebound, yielding enhanced voluntariness for actions once the suppression 
instruction was no longer in operation. This ironic effect (Wegner, 1994) cannot as easily 
be traced to demand, as it does not follow from the instructions participants were given, 
and even appears to oppose them. The possibility of such post-suppression ironic effects 
on intentionality deserves scrutiny in further research. 
It remains a question for future research whether suppression or concentration prompted 
spontaneously, without social pressure, and without any pressure to report consequent 
changes in voluntariness would have influences on voluntariness like those observed for 
instructed mental control in this experiment. 
The results of this study therefore suggest that instances of people engaging in counter- 
intentional acts and then proclaiming "it wasn't me" may not simply reflect lying on the 
part of the person. If the person was attempting not to undertake the act via thought 
suppression it is quite possible that the phenomenological sense of intentionality is indeed 
lessened. 
In summary, this study, only begins to reduce the mystery that has previously surrounded 
experiences of involuntariness. The present research opens these phenomena to new 
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understanding through the idea that people might visit changes in intentionality upon 
themselves through the exercise of mental control. In a larger sense, these data also 
comprise evidence pertaining to the processes addressed by the theory of apparent mental 
causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Mental control of thoughts about 
action can influence whether thoughts occur in mind relevant to the action, and so can 
create significant transformations in the experience of will. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
The role of thought suppression / expression in remembering one's future 
intentions 
The study described in Chapter 10 examined the effects of thought suppression or 
expression on the perception of intentionality for one's own actions. The results of that 
study demonstrated that, in addition to the rebound effect, mental control can have other 
subtle effects on people's perceptions and behaviour. The final study of this thesis was 
designed to examine this idea further by investigating the effects of thought suppression 
expression on prospective memory i. e. remembering to carry out previously intended 
actions at some point in the future. The basic idea behind this study, outlined in Chapter 
1, is quite simple. Since thought suppression can result in a rebound effect whereby 
previously suppressed thoughts spring to mind with greatly enhanced frequency, could 
this effect be used positively to enhance one's prospective memory performance? 
It is known that conscious thought raises the activation levels of those thoughts (Higgins 
1989). Therefore, consciously thinking about one's future intention during the retention 
interval should improve one's prospective memory performance (e. g. Kvavilashvili, 
1987; Harris & Wilkins, 1982). However, because thought suppression often results in 
hyperaccessibility so that thoughts can become even more activated than when being 
consciously thought about (Wegner & Erber, 1992). One may suggest, that thought 
suppression could perhaps result in even better prospective memory performance than 
conscious thought expression (i. e. rehersal). Erskine and Kvavilashvili (2000) tested this 
idea in their study in which participants had to undertake an action (circle a response) 
whenever they encountered the target "white beat" in an ongoing sentence verification 
task. During an interval between receiving prospective memory instructions and the onset 
of the sentence verification task, however, all participants had to perform a 5-minute 
thought verbalisation task, either suppressing or expressing a certain thought. Half of the 
participants in each of two groups had to suppress / express the prospective memory 
target "white bear" and another half - the irrelevant target "brown sugar". Both 
conscious thought of the prospective memory target or suppression of the prospective 
192 
memory target resulted in no better prospective memory performance than groups 
suppressing or expressing totally irrelevant stimuli (brown sugar). 
This counterintuitive finding has experimental support from another study investigating 
the effects of reminders on prospective memory performance (Guynn et al., 1998). The 
results of this study showed that target only reminders (i. e. reminders including the 
prospective memory target but not the associated action) did not enhance prospective 
memory performance relative to no reminders. However reminders including the 
prospective memory target and associated action (i. e. the whole intention) did enhance 
prospective memory performance relative to no reminders. Guynn et al. (1998) explain 
this finding by suggesting that simply activating the target is insufficient to improve 
prospective memory performance. They go on to suggest that for reminders to be 
effective they need to contain a representation of both the prospective memory target and 
the associated intention. 
The aim of the present study was to examine whether suppressing a whole intention (i. e. 
a prospective memory target and associated action) during the retention interval could 
subsequently enhance prospective memory performance during a later ongoing word 
association task. Thus, in the current experiment the ongoing task consisted of generating 
associated words to words presented on screen at a rate of one word every six seconds. 
Six prospective memory targets (animal words) were embedded in this ongoing task. 
Participants had to remember to press the space bar every time an animal word came up 
(prospective memory task). As in the previous study of Erskine and Kvavilashvili (2000) 
the design was a2 group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 intention (relevant, animal vs. 
irrelevant, food) between groups ANOVA. Thus, one group suppressed the prospective 
memory target and intention, one group expressed the prospective memory target and 
intention, another group suppressed an irrelevant intention and target and the final group 
expressing an irrelevant intention and target. 
It was therefore hypothesised that there would be a main effect of type of manipulated 
target (relevant vs. irrelevant intention). Thus, those participants who were suppressing or 
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expressing the relevant prospective memory intention (remembering to press the space 
bar on seeing an animal word) would demonstrate better prospective memory 
performance than those who were expressing/suppressing an irrelevant intention (the 
intention to eat later on today). Most importantly however, it was expected that, due to 
the rebound effect, those participants who were suppressing the prospective memory 
intention would demonstrate better prospective memory performance than those 
participants who were merely expressing the prospective memory intention (i. e. a group 
by intention interaction). 
An additional aim of the experiment was to examine the post-suppression rebound effect 
via yet another implicit measure. Thus, not only could the effects of thought suppression 
or expression on prospective memory performance be examined, but additionally one 
could also examine whether rebound effects occurred in the suppression group in the 
post-suppression period when participants were engaged in the word association task. 
This represents an important question because the study of Erskine and Kvavilashvili 
(2000) that failed to find a memory enhancing effect of suppression did not directly 
measure whether the rebound effect occurred during the sentence verification task. 
Therefore, one could question whether under these new circumstances rebound effects 
will occur at all. One advantage of choosing a word association task was that it provides a 
method by which the rebound effect can be implicitly checked. Here the number of food 
words produced by participants previously asked to suppress their intention to eat later on 
can be compared with the number of food words produced by participants expressing the 
intention to eat later on. If more food associates are produced in the suppression period 
this would represent a rebound effect. The same comparison cannot be made for the 
animal words as with animal words participants had the animal intention to remember as 
well which adds another source of possible contamination. Therefore, we chose to 
examine only the number of food responses participants made in the word association 
task as a function of group. 
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(1) Summary 
In summary, the current study was designed to ascertain whether suppression or 
expression of a prospective memory target and intention during the retention interval 
could enhance prospective memory performance relative to a group which suppressed or 
expressed an irrelevant intention (to eat later on). In addition, using the current 
methodology would allow for an implicit test of the rebound effect in the group which 
suppressed or expressed the irrelevant intention (to eat later on). If a rebound effect is 
present one would expect the group suppressing the intention to eat would generate more 
food related words in the later word association task than the group expressing the 
intention to eat later on. 
11. Method 
(1) Participants 
A total of 88 undergraduates volunteered to take part in return for; C3 (51 Females, 37 
Males). All participants completed the protocol correctly but three participants were 
excluded due to being outliers on the number of buzzer presses during thought 
expression. 
(2) Materials and Apparatus 
A buzzer was used which the participants pressed every time they thought about or 
mentioned the target thought given them to express or suppress. A tape recorder was used 
to record participants' thought verbalisations. 
The main experimental task consisted of a computer programme written using 
SUPERLABTM which displayed words on screen at a rate of I word every 6 seconds. The 
computer recorded the time taken from displaying the word to the participants' verbal 
response to this word. Finally a stopwatch was used to time all of the various tasks. 
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Six prospective memory targets (animal words) were all chosen to be of similar length, 
frequency of use in English language (Toglia and Battig, 1978). In addition, ten words 
designed to provoke food related responses were chosen to be of similar frequency of use 
to the animal target words. These food related words were all chosen to not be foods 
themselves but to be words with a food associate in the top ten associated words. A 
constraint added was that the food associate should not be the most associated word. 
Finally, 104 other words were chosen to be un-associated to foods or animals and to be a 
similar frequency of use to the animal and food provoking words. These words were all 
chosen using Toglia and Battig (1978), Postman and Keppel (1970), the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database and Wordnet. 
(3) Design 
The experimental design was a2 group (suppression vs. expression) x2 intention 
(relevant vs. irrelevant) x2 word association task (version 1 vs. version 2) between 
subjects design. There were II participants in each of the resultant 8 cells. 
(4) Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. On arrival at the laboratory participants were 
introduced to the aims of the study. They were informed that the main aim of the study 
was to investigate two separate but related issues. The first issue concerned examining 
how good the participant was at mental control (i. e. their ability to suppress or express 
thoughts successfully). The additional interest was to investigate how controlling ones 
thoughts impacted on performance on subsequent cognitive tasks after suppression or 
expression had been discontinued. Participants were instructed that in order to test their 
ability at mental control they would have to try to verbalise their thoughts aloud whilst 
simultaneously suppressing or expressing a thought that would be given to them. They 
were informed that there would be a3 minute practice verbalisation period, followed by a 
further 5 minutes of verbalisation where they would also be suppressing or expressing a 
given construct depending on experimental group. 
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Next participants were told that after the period of thought verbalisation they would be 
required to carry out a fairly simple computerised word association task which consisted 
of having participants watch a computer screen that displayed a new word on screen at a 
rate of I word every six seconds. When each new word appeared on screen the 
participant was asked to verbalise out loud the first word that came to their mind. 
Participants were informed that they would have an opportunity to practice all of the 
various tasks before completing the real tasks. If it was clear that participants understood 
they were asked to sign the consent form. Once signed participants were given a short 
subject information questionnaire. This consisted of a 10 item questionnaire. Most of the 
information contained in this questionnaire would not be used in the experiment, its main 
purpose was to check that all participants had the intention to eat later on in the day as 
this was to be the irrelevant intention participants could be asked to suppress or express. 
If any participant said they did not intend to eat later on today (only 2 participants said 
this) they were automatically placed in the relevant intention condition and therefore not 
asked to suppress or express the intention to eat later on today. 
At this stage the participant was introduced to a practice version of the word association 
task which did not contain any of the stimuli from the main test presented later in the 
experiment. It was explained that the task was to say the first word that came to mind 
whenever they saw a new word presented on the screen and that each word would remain 
stay on screen for 6 seconds. Participants were told that there were no restrictions on the 
words they could say. Specifically, some of the words they might say will be associated 
to the word on screen and this was fine, but it was equally correct if the associate they 
produce had no relation at all to the word on screen. It was explained that what was 
important was that the participant say aloud the first word that came to mind, even if they 
felt this word was silly or offensive. The computer was set to record the time it took 
participants to produce this first word, therefore participants were asked to try not to 
make any other sounds as the microphone was very sensitive and any other sounds could 
trigger it before the verbalisation was recorded. 
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Once it was clear the participant understood the task, the practice word association task 
commenced. This practice task comprised of 10 words appearing in a random order. 
After this practice task the experimenter discussed any problems and the participant was 
informed that the task they had just practiced would occur later in the course of the 
experiment. The experimenter then went on to say: 
"by the way, an additional interest of this experiment is to look at how 
people remember to do things in the future. In order to study your ability to 
remember to do things in the future I want you to remember to press the 
space bar whenever you see a word depicting an animal on the screen in the 
word association task that you will be doing later on. You may do this 
before or after verbalising your associate. Is that ok? " 
Once the participant understood the experimenter went on to say: 
"however, before I can give you this word association task I want you 
first to do the task in which you will be thinking aloud. Within the next 
three minutes you will be left alone in this room and you will have to 
speak aloud into this tape recorder describing all the thoughts that come 
to your mind. You may think about anything you wish and you do not 
have to explain orjustify the thoughts at all. There are no restrictions, 
qualifications, conventions or expectations. Now I will start the tape and 
leave the room, you may begin. " 
After the 3 minute practice verbalisation task the experimenter returned and gave 
instructions for the next 5 minute verbalisation task which varied depending on 
experimental group: 
Suppression of relevant intention group 
"Now I would like you to continue expressing your thoughts for five 
more minutes, But this time I would like you to try not to think about 
your intention to press the space bar whenever an animal word comes up 
in the word association task. So your task is to think aloud and to avoid 
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any thoughts about your intention to press the space bar in response to 
animal words in the word association task. If you do happen to think 
about this or mention it please could you press this buzzer. " 
Expression of relevant intention group 
"Now I would like you to continue expressing your thoughts for five 
more minutes, But this time I would like you to try to think about 
your intention to press the space bar whenever an animal word comes 
up in the word association task. So your task is to think aloud and to 
concentrate on thoughts about your intention to press the space bar in 
response to animal words in the word association task. If you do 
happen to think about this or mention it please could you press this 
buzzer. " 
Suppression of irrelevant intention group 
"Now I would like you to continue expressing your thoughts for five 
more minutes, But this time I would like you to try not to think about 
your intention to have food later on today. So your task is to think 
aloud and to avoid any thoughts about your intention to have food 
later on today. If you do happen to think about this or mention it 
please could you press this buzzer. " 
Expression of irrelevant intention group 
"Now I would like you to continue expressing your thoughts for five 
more minutes, But this time I would like you to try to think about 
your intention to have food later on today. So your task is to think 
aloud and to concentrate on thoughts about your intention to have 
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food later on today. If you do happen to think about this or mention 
it please could you press this buzzer. " 
Once it was clear that the participant understood their new instructions the experimenter 
started the tape recorder and left the room for the 5 minute verbalisation period. On 
returning the experimenter explained that they would now move on to the computerised 
word association task. At this stage no mention was made of the former prospective 
memory instructions. Additionally, it was explained to participants that although the 
computer would record the reaction time taken for them to verbalise their associate to the 
word on screen, it would not record the actual word they said. Therefore, the 
experimenter said he would be sitting in the comer writing down all the words that they 
would say aloud in response to the words presented on the computer screen. Once clear 
they understood the computerised word association task commenced. 
At the end of the word association task each participant had to answer some questions 
depending on whether they forgot or remembered to carry out the prospective memory 
task during the word association task. For those participants who forgot to press the space 
bar on all six occasions the first question was to indicate if there was anything else they 
had been asked to do in addition to producing associated words in the word association 
task. If the participant could not provide an answer they were then asked whether there 
was anything they had to do if they saw a particular word. If the participant could still 
not recall their previous intention they were asked what they were asked to do when they 
saw an animal word. If the participant still did not respond they were given a description 
of three possible actions from which they had to choose the correct action (say the word 
aloud, press any letter key or press the space bar). 
If the participant remembered to press the space bar on at least one occasion the 
experimenter asked them whether they thought about this intention only on encountering 
an animal word in the actual computerised task, or if they thought about this intention at 
other times as well. If the participant indicated that they had thought about the intention 
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at other times as well they were asked to indicate how often they had been thinking about 
the intention. These ratings were made on a7 point scale (I = not at all, 7= all the time) 
At this stage participants were debriefed and the real purpose of the study was fully 
explained to them. 
III. Results 
The results are presented in three sections. In the first section the number of buzzer 
presses is examined to assess how well participants followed the thought suppression 
expression instructions. The second section examines prospective memory performance 
as a function of the independent variables. 
Two versions of the computerised word association task were used, however all analyses 
showed that the version employed made no difference to any of the statistical analysis, 
therefore all analyses reported are collapsed over version of the word association task. 
(1) Performance in suppression and expression tasks 
The first analysis examined whether participants had followed the experimental 
instructions during the thought suppression or expression period. As it has already been 
shown in previous studies, the number of buzzes as a variable in thought suppression 
experiments is nearly always positively skewed. Therefore following the same procedure 
as in the former studies, the number of buzzes was square root transformed. After 
transformation boxplots were used to screen for outliers. These boxplots suggested that 3 
outliers remained even after transformation. These were therefore removed from all 
further analyses. For the sake of clarity where means are reported they will be reported in 
the untransformed format. 
The mean number of buzzer presses as a function of group and type of intention are 
presented in Figure 11.1 below. The mean number of buzzer presses were entered into a2 
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group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 intention (relevant vs. irrelevant) between 
subjects ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of group F (1,77) = 46.42 p <. 0001, eta- in 
squared = . 38. Those participants in the suppression group buzzed significantly fewer 
times (M = 5.21) than those in the expression group (M = 16.21). There was no main 
effect of intention or interaction (F's < I). Thus, the results show that participants did 
follow the experimental instructions. 
Fi(; URE 11.1 - THE MEAN NUMBER OF BUZZER PRESSES IN A 5-MINUTE THOUGHT VERBALISATION TASK AS A 
FUNCTION OF GROUP (SUPPRESSION VS. EXPRESSION) AND INTENTION (RELEVANT VS. IRRELEVANT) 
(2) Prospective memory performance 
Performance on the prospective memory task was measured by the number of times (out 
of 6) that participants remembered to press the space bar when encountering the animal 
word. The animal words used were: wolf, camel, horse, crow, snake and spider. Overall 
there was a quite variable pattern of responding, thus, 21 participants (24.7%) forgot to 
repond on all occasions, 53 participants (62.4%) responded to some of the prospective 
memory targets but not all, and II participants (12.9%) responded to all targets. For the Zý LI 
participants who forgot on all six occasions, 18 remembered when asked the first probing 
question "was there anything else you had been asked to do in addition to producing 
associated words in the word association task". 2 participants remembered on the second 
more specific question "was there anything you had to do if they saw a particular word? " tý 
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and I remembered at level on the fourth question "they were given a description of three 
possible actions from which they had to choose the correct action (say the word aloud, 
press any letter key or press the space bar)". 
A2 group (suppression vs. expression) by 2 intention (relevant vs. irrelevant) ANOVA 
was performed on this data. Results indicated no main effect of group F (1,85) = 1.57, 
p=. 2 1. Thus, overall those who expressed (M = 3.2 1) performed no differently from those 
who suppressed (M = 2.72). This was expected as here performance was averaged across 
the type of intention (relevant vs. irrelevant). Surprisingly, however, there was no main 
effect of construct F (1,85) = 1.72, p=. 19. Those who manipulated (suppressed / 
expressed) an intention relevant to the prospective memory task (M = 3.21) were no 
better at remembering the prospective memory task than those who suppressed / 
expressed an intention that was unrelated to the prospective memory task (i. e. having 
food later on M=2.72). Finally, although the interaction approached significance F 
(1,85) = 3.1 p=. 08, it was in the opposite to anticipated direction. Thus, the group 
expressing food seems to have performed more poorly relative to all other groups, but Zn in 
manipulating (suppressing / expressing) the relevant intention did not result in better 
performance than a group suppressing the intention to eat later on (see Figure 11.2). In Z-- eý 
FmuRE 11.2 -THE MEAN NUMBER OF PROSPEC71VE MEMORY RESPONCES ASA FUNCrION OF GROUP 
(SUPPRESSION VS. EXPRESSION) AND INTENTION (RELEVANT VS. IRRELEVANT) 
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These results indicate that even actively thinking about the to be performed intention (i. e. 
rehersal) in the retention interval between prospective memory instructions and the onset 
of the ongoing task (Le word association task) does not improve prospective memory 
performance. Interestingly, the current study also took measures of whether participants 
thought about the relevant intention only when they saw an animal word or at other times 
as well during the word association task. Therefore it was possible to examine whether 
thinking about the relevant intention at some points during the ongoing word-association 
task would result in enhanced prospective memory performance. 
Those who reported thinking about the relevant intention at other times as well 
demonstrated better prospective memory, remembering to respond to 4.27 of the 6 
possible animal target words compared to the group which reported only thinking of the 
relevant intention when they saw an animal (M = 3.1). This difference was statistically 
significant t (60) = -2.56 p =. 013. 
(3) Assessing the rebound effect with an implicit measure in the irrelevant intention 
condition 
The final analysis examined whether the expression or suppression instructions resulted 
in the rebound effect or priming. This was done by examining participants frequency of 
producing food associates to the words in the word association task. The mean number of 
food associates produced in the word association task was entered into a2 group 
(suppression vs. expression) x2 intention (relevant vs. irrelevant) between subjects 
ANOVA. This revealed no main effect of group (17<1). However, there was a main effect 
of intention F(1,81) = 5.50, p =. 02. Those participants in the irrelevant intention group 
who manipulated (suppressed or expressed) the intention to eat later on produced more 
food words (M = 2.27) in the word association task than those in the relevant intention 
condition who manipulated the animal intention (M = 1.47). There was no group by 
intention interaction (17<1), indicating that the main effect of intention was equally 
present in both suppression and expressing conditions. 
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Thus, the results are indicative of simple priming as manipulating the irrelevant intention 
resulted in production of more food words, but no rebound in that this effect was no 
stronger in the suppression group than in the expression group. 
IV. Discussion 
The current study shows that manipulating (suppressing or expressing) an intention 
which one soon must enact during the retention interval does not help one to remember to 
enact the intention any more sucessfully than if one had suppressed or expressed a 
completely unrelated intention. This is a highly counterintuitive finding, as the general 
expectation is that if a person had to remember to buy bread on the way home, then 
thinking of this intention whilst at work would help the person to remember to actually 
buy the bread on the way home with greater success. The results of this study suggest this 
may not be the case. 
This finding is even more surprising given that there was an effect of our manipulation on 
the frequency with which people mention food items in the word association task. Thus, 
those participants who suppressed or expressed a food related intention subsequently 
generated a significantly greater number of food items in response to the word 
association task than those participants who had been manipulating the animal intention. 
Thus, it seems the experiment succeeded in demonstrating some priming of previously 
suppressed and expressed targets. If we succeeded in heightening the activation levels of 
food constructs using this method the suppression / expression of the related intention 
(concerning animals) should have similaraly resulted in heightened activation of animal 
constructs. Yet, despite this heightened activation prospective memory performance 
remained poor. The results here support the hypothesis that reminders may not always 
help one to remember future intentions. 
These findings are discrepant with the previous findings of Guynn et al. (1998) who 
demonstrated that whilst target only reminders did not enhance prospective memory 
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performance, reminders including the intention (target + associated action to be carried 
out) did improve prospective memory performance relative to a no reminder condition. 
However, these contradictory results could be explained by one important 
methodological difference between the present study and that of Guynn et al. (1998). 
Thus, in the study of Guynn et al. (1998) the reminders occurred during the ongoing task 
where the intention could be enacted whereas in the present study the rehersal occurred 
before the onset of the ongoing activity into which the prospective memory targets were 
embedded. This suggests that the timing of reminders may be the critical variable that 
may enhance prospective memory performance. 
Taken together the results of the Guynn et al. (1998) study and the current study reported 
here suggest that in order to be effective reminders need to include both the prospective 
memory target and the associated action but also to occur at a point in time when the 
actual intention can potentially be carried out. Therefore, to think of buying bread whilst 
at work may not improve the likelihood with which one actually buys the bread, but to 
think of buying bread whilst in the car on the way home should enhance the likelihood of 
actually buying the bread. Further support for the idea that reminders need to occur 
during the period when the intention can be enacted to be effective comes from the 
results reported here showing that participants who thought about the prospective 
memory task during the ongoing word association task had better prospective memory 
performance than those participants who stated they only thought about the prospective 
memory task on encountering an animal word. 
The key findings from this study are as follows. Thinking about or suppressing one's 
future intention during the retention interval may not always help one to remember to 
enact the intention. In addition, thought suppression or expression can lead to significant 
effects shown in a completely different later task (greater frequency of self generated 
food words in the irrelevant intention conditions). This last finding can be conceptualised 
as an implicit effect of thought expression or suppression, but does not represent a 
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rebound as the suppression group did not generate more food words than the expression 
group. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
General discussion 
What a man needs is simply and solely independent volition, whatever that independence 
may cost and wherever it may lead 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky 1864 Notesfrom underground 
The discussion will start by presenting a summary of the research aims. This will be 
followed by several sections discussing the major findings. For the purpose of clarity 
findings will be presented in the order in which they were presented in the thesis which 
does not necessarily reflect the level of importance of each finding. Some of the broader 
issues raised by these findings will be examined and their possible implications for 
mental control research will then be discussed. This will be followed by a short section 
examining some of the methodological problems that occurred in some of the studies. 
Finally, some general conclusions and some of the remaining questions for future 
research will be outlined. 
1. Aims of the thesis 
This thesis aimed to expand the research on intentional thought control in several 
directions. One of the major objectives was to attempt to untangle some of the 
controversy within the research on thought suppression where some studies have 
demonstrated the rebound effect (Clarke et al., 1991; Roemer & Borkovec, 1994; 
Salkovskis & Campbell, 1994; Wegner, et al., 1987) and others using similar methods 
have failed to obtain it (LoSchiavo & Yurak, 1995; Merckelbach, et al., 1991; Rutledge, 
et al., 1993). In order to solve this controversy the thesis specifically focused on 
comparing two methods used to index the rebound effect as well as the role of several 
important individual difference variables in the rebound effect. Related aims were to 
systematically evaluate the factors that could be responsible for individual differences in 
thought suppression and expression performance in the laboratory, as well as assessing 
the postsuppression rebound effect with implicit measures. 
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The second major objective of the thesis was to investigate possible relations between the 
propensity to use thought suppression in everyday life (as assessed by the WBSI) and 
various individual differences in a sample of young and older adults. In line with this aim 
the phenomenon of repression (here conceptualised as unconscious avoidance) was also 
examined with regards to its impact on the propensity to use conscious thought 
suppression in everyday life. 
A final aim was to examine thought suppression from a broader perspective and ascertain 
whether the act of mental control (suppression or expression) can have some other ironic 
effects on people's perceptions and behaviour in addition to the rebound effect. 
11. Main findings of this thesis 
1. The rebound effect: Methodological issues and individual differences 
Studies I and 3 (Chapters 3 and 5) aimed to replicate the rebound effect with a 15-minute 
delay between the verbalisation periods in a large sample using two different targets 
(present vs. absent from the room), and contrasting two difference methods of indexing 
the rebound (original method vs. modified method). In addition, measures of individual 
differences in personality and ability were taken in order to examine if the rebound effect 
is mediated by any of these variables. 
Study I demonstrated that the rebound effect found after intentional thought suppression 
can still be detected even if a 15-minute delay is placed between the two verbalisation 
periods. Most importantly, however, the results demonstrated that the rebound effect was 
dependent on the method used to measure the effect. Using the modified method of 
assessing the rebound effect no effect was obtained. However, when using the original 
method a rebound effect was clearly demonstrated with both targets. 
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This finding may explain some of the controversy reported in the literature where studies 
have failed to replicate the effect. It appears that the modified method may represent a 
more conservative method of indexing the rebound effect that is less likely to result in 
significant rebound effects even when the effect may actually be present. More 
importantly, the results from Study I suggest that the modified method may be 
inappropriate due to a confound: an increase in the target thought across period I and 
period 2 of thought verbalisation (see also Merckelbach et al., 1991). This rise could 
represent either a practice or priming effect, and clearly demonstrates that the mean 
number of thoughts expressed in period 2 is influenced by the previous period I 
expression. 
When Study I is viewed in conjunction with Study 3 (Chapter 5) which attempted to 
replicate Study 1 on a different week using different targets for suppression and 
expression, the effects of expressing twice become even more apparent. Thus, Study 3 
failed to replicate the findings from Study 1, but this was due to the expression group 
demonstrating a significant increase in the number of target thoughts (in week 2) as a 
result of the practice with expression from week I (Study 1). Taken together, results of 
Studies I and 3 suggest that thought expression is extremely sensitive to the effects of 
previous practice and using the number of buzzer presses in expression condition after 
previous expression may not be the best comparison group to assess the rebound effect. 
Therefore, the original (Wegner et al., 1987) method may well prove to be a "cleaner" 
method of assessing the rebound effect 
An additional and perhaps the most important finding of Study I was that the rebound 
effect is mediated by a specific personality variable, state vs. action orientation, 
irrespective of the method of indexing the rebound effect (modified vs. original). Thus, 
in Study 1, state oriented participants consistently demonstrated a rebound effect (eta 
squared =. 10, for modified method, and eta squared =. 15, for original method), which 
was not detectable with action oriented participants. Thus, the research has discovered an 
important individual difference factor (state vs. action orientation) that may mediate the 
rebound effect. Moreover, this interesting finding lends some support to the new 
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intentional model of the rebound effect proposed here. In this model, the rebound effect 
results from the fact that the decision to suppress a thought represents the formulation of 
an intention to suppress. Since it has been demonstrated that intentions have a privileged 
status in memory, called the Intention Superiority Effect (ISE) (Kuhl, 1994; Marsh, Hicks 
& Bink, 1998; Marsh, Hicks & Bryan, 1999) this fact alone could be responsible for the 
rebound effect. 
A possible problem with this new account of the rebound effect, based on the ISE, is that 
under this account expressed thoughts would also be subject to an ISF- Thus, the decision 
to express (or think about) a certain thought can also be viewed as formulating an 
intention to express. Therefore, one would still need to explain why suppressed thoughts 
may come to be more accessible than expressed thoughts. One explanation comes from 
the goal directed nature of mental control. For example, participants attempting 
suppression formulate an intention to suppress and then experience some intrusion of the 
thought even during active suppression. Since this intrusion represents failure to fulfil the 
goal of thought suppression one does not see a deactivation of this intention after thought 
suppression. Therefore, the intention persists at a heightened activation level akin to a 
Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927). In contrast, the intention to express a thought is 
fulfilled during thought expression. So the intention may be deactivated, as has been 
demonstrated for completed intentions (Marsh et al., 1998). In line with this argument 
Martin et al. (1993) demonstrated that participants suppressing thoughts of a white bear, 
but subsequently given feedback suggesting that they had done well at this task 
(succeeded) did not demonstrate a rebound effect, whereas participants suppressing the 
white bear but not given success feedback did show a thought rebound. 
The importance of the mediating role of state vs. action orientation in the rebound effect 
is also underscored by the fact that none of the other individual difference variables (such 
as fluid intelligence, anxiety, depression or need for cognition) had any effect on the 
rebound. Contrary to the suggestions of Rutledge et al. (1993,1996) fluid intelligence did 
not have an impact on the occurrence of the rebound effect. The mediational. effect of 
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state vs. action orientation represents evidence that rebound effects are mainly influenced 
by the activation and deactivation of constructs. 
2. Mechanisms of Thought Suppression and Thought Expression 
In addition to assessing the rebound effect the thesis explored the question of whether 
suppression and expression performance, as demonstrated in the laboratory, can be 
viewed as an ability that varies intra-individually. This is an important question with 
major implications concerning the amount of control people have over their thoughts in 
general. Therefore, Study 2 (Chapter 4) was designed to investigate which individual 
differences relate to suppression and expression performance in the laboratory. The main 
finding from Study 2 was that thought intrusion during suppression (as assessed by 
buzzer pressing) was positively correlated with later thought intrusion during expression. 
This finding is important as it suggests that the two main forms of mental control 
(thought suppression and thought expression) are not underpinned by a unitary 
mechanism. Thus, good performance at one form of mental control implies poor 
performance at the alternate form. Study 2 demonstrates that one may not be able to be 
uniformly competent at both thought suppression and expression. 
Study 2 also demonstrated that successful performance at thought suppression and 
expression are best predicted by a different set of individual difference variables. Thus, 
performance in a laboratory suppression task was shown to be predicted by state vs. 
action orientation and extraversion, and performance in an expression task was predicted 
by fluid intelligence. When one examines the factors predicting successful suppression 
performance in more depth it becomes apparent that being state oriented is a hindrance to 
successful suppression whereas being action oriented helps one to suppress their thoughts 
with greater success. Once again this is in line with Kuhl's (1994) theory of state vs. 
action orientation which proposes that state oriented individuals experience greater 
thought intrusions, have a problem with perseverating thoughts, and find it difficult to 
deactivate intentions. The results of Study 2 suggest that state oriented participants may 
also find the "deactivation" (or suppression) of thought in general to be difficult, as seen 
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in their worse performance on the suppression task. In conjunction with the findings from 
Study I it would seem that state oriented individuals are both more prone to experience 
difficulty with thought suppression during active suppression and also more likely to 
experience rebound effects during the post suppression period. In contrast, action 
oriented participants seem to have more success during thought suppression and are less 
prone to experience rebound effects. 
Thought suppression performance was also found to be affected by the personality 
dimension of introversion / extraversion. Thus, successful performance during active 
suppression was found to be related to being an extrovert and unsuccessful suppression 
performance was related to being an introvert. This finding may be explicable when one 
examines models of extraversion, which suggest that introverts may be more easily 
aroused by external events than extroverts (Eysenck, 1982; 1990). They therefore seek 
out quiet environments and may feel overwhelmed in very active situations. In view of 
these findings one could suggest that perhaps in introverts constructs are activated more 
easily. This possible ease of activation could interfere with thought suppression in 
introverts. It is therefore not surprising that introverts perform less well on a suppression 
task than extroverts. 
With regards to expression performance this was only significantly predicted by fluid 
intelligence. Thus, the greater one's fluid intelligence the better one's performance on a 
laboratory expression task. This once again, Suggests that mental control involves the 
activation and deactivation of constructs, and that fluid intelligence may be related to 
one's ability to activate constructs. Participants with higher fluid intelligence are 
apparently more likely to activate and maintain a thought in consciousness than those 
with low fluid intelligence. 
Interestingly, the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life, as assessed by the 
WBSI, was not shown to relate to a person's suppression performance in the laboratory. 
Even when the level of analysis was taken to the item level, none of the items comprising 
the WBSI were shown to relate to actual suppression in the laboratory. This suggests 
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three possibilities. Firstly, the use of thought suppression in everyday life may be 
unrelated to thought suppression ability in the laboratory (i. e. thought suppression does 
not improve with practice). Secondly, the WBSI may not assess accurately the tendency 
to use thought suppression in everyday life. A third possibility is that the measures of 
thought suppression taken in the laboratory are unreliable. The second possibility is 
discussed later in this section. All three explanations may operate, as they are not 
mutually exclusive. 
3. The tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life and individual 
differences in young and older participants. 
Studies 4 and 5 (Chapters 6& 7) were designed to examine which individual difference 
variables (psychopathology and personality) relate to the use of thought suppression in 
everyday life, as measured by the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI), in samples 
of younger and older adults. The hypothesis was that the use of thought suppression in 
everyday life would be related to various psychopathologies, most notably trait anxiety, 
depression and neuroticism, as found in previous studies (Muris et al. 1996; Rassin et al. 
1999,2000,200 1; Wegner and Zanakos 1994). However, the aim was not merely to 
replicate previous findings in this area, but also to investigate the effects of other 
individual differences (not previously investigated) such as schizotypal personality, 
extroversion / introversion, rumination, linking and need for cognition. A further 
important aim was to investigate the relation between the WBSI and another similar 
instrument designed to measure the strategies of thought suppression in everyday life, the 
Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ). 
Study 5 is one of the first explorations of the propensity to use thought suppression in an 
older adult sample. As a result, the hypotheses were mainly exploratory although it was 
expected that the tendency to use thought suppression would also be related most 
strongly to various psychopathologies as it has been shown in younger participants. 
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(1) The Younger Adult Sample 
In line with the above hypotheses, Study 5 showed that in young participants the use of 
thought suppression in everyday life was indeed related positively to several 
psychopathological variables. Thus, the frequent use of thought suppression (as assessed 
by the WBSI) was related to increased trait anxiety, neuroticism, depression, 
unhappiness, and schizotypal personality. Furthermore, the use of thought suppression 
was also related to the personality dimensions of linking, rumination, and state 
orientation. However, when WBSI scores were predicted from all of the variables 
collected, only rumination and anxiety were significant predictors, explaining 30% of the 
variance in WBSI scores. This suggests that it is mainly trait anxiety and rumination 
which mediate relations between psychopathologies and the use of thought suppression. 
The finding relating to rumination is particularly important, as both Martin and Tesser 
(1996) and Erber and Wegner (1996) propose models of intentional thought suppression 
whereby rumination and thought suppression operate cyclically, with one being a cause 
of the other and visa versa. Martin and Tesser (1996) see rumination as the cause of 
thought suppression which then leads to more rumination when the rebound effect 
occurs. In contrast, Erber and Wegner (1996) see thought suppression as the cause of 
rumination which then leads to more thought suppression. The data reported here cannot 
untangle the directionality of any possible causation, but does serve to validate these 
models where thought suppression and rumination reinforce each other. 
Study 5 showed that the two measures of the tendency to use thought suppression in 
everyday life (WBSI and TCQ) were uncorrelated. Although at first surprising, this 
finding can be explained in two ways. First there is some doubt over whether WBSI only 
measures the tendency to suppress thought in everyday life. Two studies that used factor 
analysis have suggested that, in addition to the tendency to suppress thoughts, the WBSI 
assesses a tendency to experience intrusive thoughts (Blumberg, 2000; 116ping and Jong- 
Meyer, 2002). In contrast, the TCQ appears to measure primarily the frequency with 
which people use various strategies to control their thoughts some of which do not 
involve suppression at all (e. g., social methods and reappraisal). Due to these differences 
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between the WBSI and the TCQ only two subscales of the TCQ reliably correlated with 
the WBSI scores (worry and punishment). This is an important finding as currently there 
is a tendency to believe that these two measures assess similar constructs. 
(2) The Older Adult Sample 
Study 6 (Chapter 7) attempted to replicate the pattern of correlations found in the young 
participants, in the sample of older adults (all over 65 years). Several important findings 
emerged. First, older adults had reliably lower scores than the young sample on the 
WBSI, indicating less use of thought suppression. Second, the WBSI correlated 
positively with only one measure of psychopathology (schizotypal personality). Third, 
the WBSI was correlated negatively with social desirability. Finally, and somewhat 
unexpectedly, older adults had reliably lower scores on all of the psychopathological 
measures (anxiety, depression, neuroticism, schizotypal personality). The older adult's 
low scores on the psychopathological measures and high scores on social desirability 
were suggestive that the older adults might be answering defensively in order to appear 
better adjusted. This possibility was examined by assessing the prevalence of a repressive 
coping style in both the younger and older samples (Study 7, Chapter 9). 
4. Repression 
The relationships among repression, aging and use of conscious thought suppression were 
examined in Study 7 (Chapter 9). Repressors were defined as those having high social 
desirability scores (Marlowe Crowne), but low anxiety scores (Spielberger). The results 
showed that the older adult sample contained a higher proportion of repressors (36.0%) 
than the younger sample (9.5%). Since both samples had narrowly defined age bands, the 
correlation between age and repressiveness across the age span could not be investigated. 
One possibility is that as people age they become more repressive. Such an increase in 
repressiveness with age is an interesting idea because the older adults were found to 
display significantly lower levels of virtually all psychopathologies than the younger 
sample. Ray (1988) found that age and Marlowe Crowne social desirability were 
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positively correlated in eight separate studies, suggesting indeed that defensiveness may 
increase with age. These findings therefore deserve much greater emphasis in future 
studies. 
In Study 7 the WBSI scores of young repressors were not significantly different from 
those of the young non-repressors; although there was a trend for them to be lower. There 
is a problem of power in this quasi-experiment, as the young sample contained only 9 
repressors. In the older adult sample, the YVBSI scores of repressors were significantly 
lower than the scores of non-repressors. Thus, it would seem older adults who are 
repressors report using thought suppression significantly less than non-repressors. One 
possible explanation for this finding is that the older repressors are underreporting their 
"true" use of thought suppression. Alternatively, being a repressor may protect one from 
thoughts that would otherwise need to be intentionally suppressed. Provisional support 
for this idea comes from a study by Schlagman et al. (2003) in which older adults (over 
65 years) reported very few negative involuntary autobiographical memories (5%) in 
comparison to younger adults (35%) during a one week long diary study in which 
participants had to record all those autobiographical memories that occurred involuntarily 
in the course of everyday life. In summary, it seems repressors show an inclination to use 
conscious thought suppression less than non-repressors and that repressive tendencies are 
more prevalent in older samples. 
5. Other effects of mental control 
A final aim was to examine whether mental control can have some other effects apart 
from the rebound effect on the perception of intentionality and on the ability to 
successfully enact future intentions. In line with this aim Study 8 (Chapter 10) was 
conducted to examine the effects of suppressing or expressing thoughts of an action on 
one's perception of willing the action after its completion. This study relied heavily on 
recent models of how humans infer causality in their own actions (Wegner, 2001,2003; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). All of these models suggest that prior consistent thoughts of 
the upcoming action (i. e. action previews) are necessary for one to feel that actions have 
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been willed. If these thoughts are lacking one may feel as if the action was less 
intentionally completed. The idea behind Study 8 was to discover whether participants' 
own sense of intentionality could be changed by undertaking actions whilst under 
different mental control instructions. The hypothesis was that actions completed whilst 
trying to suppress thoughts of the upcoming action (suppression condition) would 
subsequently be rated as less intentional than actions undertaken with no mental control 
instructions. In contrast, actions completed whilst holding in mind the intention to 
complete the action (expression condition) should come to feel more intentional. 
The results of Study 8 were exactly in line with the hypothesis. Acts completed whilst 
suppressing thoughts of the intention to engage in the act were subsequently rated as less 
intentional. Acts completed when holding this intention in mind were rated as more 
intentional, relative to the baseline (no mental control instructions) condition. This 
finding can potentially explain some of the numerous everyday examples of people 
engaging in counter intentional behaviour and subsequently proclaiming that it was not 
them, that the action just happened. The actions may indeed come to feel unintentional 
due to the effort expanded on mental control whilst trying not to act in that way (e. g., 
having an extra drink in the bar). 
In line with the overall aim of broadening the scope of mental control research, Study 9 
(Chapter 11) attempted to investigate whether the rebound effect could be used positively 
to help people remember their intentions. Study 9 tested the hypothesis that if suppressed 
intentions subsequently rebound, then this rebound may well help people to remember to 
act on their intentions. However, contrary to expectations, neither suppression and 
conscious expression of the upcoming intention served to enhance the prospective 
memory performance relative to suppression or expression of an irrelevant intention. As 
thought expression can be conceptualised as a reminder of the intention it seems counter 
intuitive that prospective memory was not improved. 
One problem often encountered with prospective memory experiments is ceiling effects, 
which prevent the detection of statistically reliable differences. However, the failure to 
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find significant group differences cannot be explained by ceiling effects, since all 
participants had 6 opportunities to respond to the prospective memory target, yet the 
mean response across the groups was 3. Therefore, opportunity for increasing prospective 
memory performance clearly existed. 
The fact that expression or suppression of the relevant intention did not enhance 
prospective memory performance is puzzling. However, previous research has also found 
similar results (Guynn et al., 1998). It may be that in order for reminders to be effective 
they need to occur at the 'right' time. It seems the right time may need to be during the 
period when the intention can actually be acted on. In the Guynn et al. (1998) study 
reminders (comprising of the prospective memory target and the action) that occurred 
during the period when the intention could have been acted on proved to be effective at 
enhancing prospective memory performance. The fact that in Study 9 thinking 
(expressing) about the to be enacted intention did not improve prospective memory 
performance may be because active expression (i. e. rehersal) of intentions happened 
during the retention interval and not during the critical period when the intention could be 
enacted (i. e. during the word-association task). 
The lack of rehearsal effects prior to the critical period has major implications for 
prospective memory research. Indeed, Study 9 is one of the first studies to demonstrate 
that even highly specific reminders presented during the retention interval may be 
completely ineffective at improving prospective memory performance. Study 9 therefore 
has further implications for more naturalistic research attempting to find simple means by 
which people can enhance their prospective memory performance suggesting that 
reminders need to occur in the right circumstances to be effective. 
111. Global Issues in Mental Control Research 
Having reviewed the major findings above and discussed some of the implications for 
mental control research, this section discusses the implications of the findings from a 
more global perspective. 
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1. Robustness of the Rebound Effect 
In the research on thought suppression there has been a tendency to portray the rebound 
effect as robust with serious implications for many areas of life including mental health 
and psychopathology. The present results, however, support the idea that the rebound 
effect is less robust than a cursory reading of the literature might suggest. Studies 1 and 3 
demonstrate that the rebound effect is highly method dependent as the effect was only 
found using the original but not the modified method of assessment. 
Furthermore, Study 5 which attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1, using different 
targets, failed to demonstrate a rebound effect using either method of assessment. The 
most likely reason for this failure is the strong effect of previous practice on later thought 
expression. This is a further demonstration of the fragility of the effect. Study 5 also 
suggest that once participants have already undertaken one thought suppression 
experiment they may be unsuitable for further thought suppression experiments. Thus, 
Study 5 failed to demonstrate the rebound a second time, even after a one-week delay 
between experiments. 
The intentional model of the rebound effect suggests an alternative reason for the non- 
robustness of the rebound effect. It may be that the effect is only present for some 
personality types. Study I provides some evidence that state oriented participants display 
a rebound effect, whilst the effect is absent in action oriented participants. This novel 
finding calls into question the implicit assumption that a rebound effect occurs for anyone 
attempting suppression. It may well be the case that certain people (state oriented) are 
predisposed to experience rebound after suppression and other people are not (action 
oriented). 
Interestingly, state versus action orientation alone can account for some of the studies that 
have failed to replicate the basic rebound effect. Thus, if one assumes that state and 
action oriented individuals are equally represented in the general population (something 
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which is unclear from Kuhl & Beckmanns 1994 theory) one is lead to the possibility that 
rebound effects are weak or non-existent where samples have high proportions of action 
oriented people. As is the case in Study 1, when examining the whole sample using the 
modified method of assessment no rebound effect was demonstrated. However, when the 
sample was dichotomised into state and action oriented participants and the analysis re- 
run, a medium effect was present in state oriented and none was present in action 
oriented. It is therefore possible that differences in the proprotions of state and action 
oriented participants account for whether rebound effect is found, or not. 
In summary, the review in Chapter I and the experimental findings in Chapters 3-8 show 
that the rebound effect is not as robust as often suggested (Wegner et al., 1987; Wenzlaff 
& Wegner, 2000). This research shows that the rebound effect depends on the method of 
assessment, individual differences in personality, and practice effects. The effect sizes 
were, at best, medium. 
2. Implications for Psychopathology 
After the first demonstration of the rebound effect in 1987, Wegner and his colleagues 
were keen to develop a programme of research to further explore this interesting 
phenomenon. In the course of the ensuing research and the subsequent upsurge of interest 
in mental control, one of the areas to receive intensive attention was psychopathology 
(Purdon, 1999; Purdon & Clark 1999; Wegner, 1997; Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998). If the 
rebound effect is a regular occurrence in people who suppress their thoughts then one 
could ask whether this could be used in cognitive models of psychopathologies. Several 
researchers have now begun to include the rebound effect in their cognitive models of 
various psychopathologies, most notably anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress 
disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Purdon, 1999; Rachman, 1997; 1998). It has 
been proposed that the use of thought suppression may be an aetiological factor in 
various psychopathologies, or that it can exacerbate already present disorders. The results 
221 
of the current thesis suggest that if the rebound effect is not as robust as first thought 
these models may require revision. 
In view of fragility and weakness of the rebound effect, it is unlikely that thought 
suppression is a major cause of psychopathology as, Wegner and his colleagues have 
suggested. Thus, Wegner conceptualises the theoretical relationship between thought 
suppression and psychopathogy as a causal one. Once a thought is suppressed it 
rebounds, leading to greater thought that can be viewed as a form of rumination. Thus, 
individuals on experiencing a thought rebound may begin to ruminate on why they 
cannot avoid the thought. Suppression may be re-instigated in an attempt at control, but is 
likely to only results in greater intrusion, discomfort and anxiety. The current thesis 
demonstrates some clear associations between the tendency to use thought suppression 
and psychopathology, and showing that anxiety and rumination explain a substantive 
amount of variance in the use of thought suppression. However, the causal direction of 
the association has not yet been untangled. Theoretically it would seem to make more 
sense to suggest that psychopathology leads to the use of thought suppression rather than 
the alternate direction of causality. The reasoning behind this centres on the idea that for 
a thought to be suppressed it must already be in some way intrusive and unwanted. 
Therefore, on balance, it seems that thought suppression may not necessarily be a major 
cause of psychopathology, but it is likely that once a person is experiencing troublesome 
or unwanted thoughts efforts to control these may exacerbate the problem. 
3. What does the WBSI measure? 
Another important issue raised by the results of the thesis is the question about what 
exactly is measured by the WBSI. Previous factor analyses have reported discrepancies, 
with some studies reporting a one factor solution (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; Muris et al., 
1996), others a two factor solution (1-16ping and Jong-Meyer, 2002) and still others three 
factors (Blumberg, 2000). It would appear there is confusion over exactly what the 
inventory measures. In the two previous studies that reported a multi-factor solution, an 
additional factor identified was unwanted intrusive thoughts. This is important because if 
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one examines the face validity of the items it does indeed seem that some of the items 
may be more accurately construed as measuring thought intrusion rather than a tendency 
to suppress. This idea is further supported by the results of Study 5 which demonstrated 
that WBSI scores were predicted by rumination that often represents intrusive and 
unwanted thoughts. 
Another problem with the WBSI revealed by the results of the studies is the lack of 
validity of this inventory. Thus, performance in the laboratory suppression task did not 
correlate with the WBSI scores. There is a lack of research investigating any relations 
between the tendency to use thought suppression in everyday life and actual suppression 
performance demonstrated in a laboratory task. Furthermore, when developing the WBSI 
Wegner and Zanakos (1994) did not validate their measure with actual laboratory 
suppression performance. 
4. How Much Control Do We Have Over Our Thoughts? 
One global issue, raised by the results of the current thesis, is the degree to which people 
have control over their thoughts, if at all. To put it another way, the question is whether 
people can elicit and / or extinguish thoughts from their mind at will, or whether people 
are doomed to experience thoughts over which they have no control. 
Taken together, the results that were obtained here suggest that people's actual degree of 
mental control may be somewhat limited. Study I demonstrated that suppressed thoughts 
are likely to rebound. If short-term suppression success is bought at the price of later 
preoccupation it can hardly be termed success at mental control. Furthermore, Study 2 
indicated that virtually all participants reported some thought intrusion, even during 
active suppression. This could be conceptualised as task failure. Of key importance was 
the finding in Studies I and 2 that both the propensity to experience rebound effects and 
one's performance on an actual suppression task in the laboratory were strongly affected 
by the personality dimension of state vs. action orientation. State oriented participants 
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were more likely to experience greater thought intrusion during active suppression, and 
also more likely to experience the rebound effect when compared to action oriented 
participants. This finding suggests that state oriented people may be predisposed to 
experience ironic effects, and so overall experience less control over their thoughts than 
action oriented people. This intriguing finding deserves much greater emphasis in future 
thought control research, as it implies that certain individuals may be liable to have more 
problems with mental control than others. 
When examining expression, mental control was once again far from complete. For 
example, there was a large variance in performance between individuals during a 5- 
minute thought expression period. One participant in the expression group buzzed 104 
times during the 5-minute verbalisation period and another buzzed just 3 times during the 
same 5-minute period. In addition, the only correlate of expression performance was fluid 
intelligence, with higher fluid intelligence predicting better thought expression 
performance. This may suggest that fluid intelligence is assessing a construct that 
partially measures the ease with which a person can activate thoughts and maintain these 
in working memory. However, this finding again suggests that expression of thought is a 
task over which people have only limited control. 
The results of the final two studies also seem to suggest that people may have less control 
over their thoughts and other mental processes. Study 8 (Chapter 10) illustrated that if a 
behaviour is carried out whilst thinking of something completely different (by 
suppressing thoughts about the action), the act subsequently feels as if it were less 
intentionally performed. In addition, if the behaviour is carried out whilst holding in mind 
the intention to perform it, the act subsequently feels more intentional. This finding 
suggests that either form of mental control may have a subtle effect on one's subsequent 
perception of intentionality. The interesting feature of this is that most often in everyday 
life this mechanism would operate with little conscious awareness. Thus, in everyday life, 
one acts (not really concentrating on what is in mind at the time), one then experiences 
thoughts relating to the act that suggest the act was either intentionally completed or just 
happened automatically. Because the "true" source of the feeling of will remains to an 
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extent unknown (i. e. what was in mind at the time of enactment), this suggests that 
thought control can lead to later perceptions and thoughts which are to some extent 
mysterious and perceived as un-caused. 
Study 9 (Chapter 11) provides further support for this interpretation by demonstrating 
that conscious thought or thought suppression of an upcoming intention did not help one 
to remember to perform the intention any more successfully than two other groups of 
participants suppressing or expressing a completely irrelevant intention. Often, in 
everyday life, individuals seem to hold the implicit assumption that conscious thought 
about an upcoming intention should help one to enact it with greater success. Thus, one 
may attempt mental control in the service of prospective memory, yet be unaware that 
this behaviour does not actually increase the likelihood of enactment. 
These final two studies suggest than the cognitive architecture of humans and the poor 
assessment of co-variation often means mental control has strange and unanticipated 
effects, which the person does not necessarily associate with the act of mental control. 
Again, this analysis suggests that thought control does not involve a mechanism which 
can be applied at will without consequence. The consequences of mental control, 
however, will vary depending on its form (suppressive or expressive) and its purpose 
(suppressing a single unwanted thought or suppressing an intention to act in a particular 
way). 
The idea that thought is a domain over which people have little control has empirical 
support from experiments conducted by Logan (1983,1985b). In a series of experiments 
participants were asked to make speeded category and rhyme judgements about word 
pairs. In addition, participants had to inhibit their responses to particular word-pairs. 
Whether the thought stopped when relevant responses / actions were inhibited or 
continued to completion was assessed by examining memory for the words presented in 
the task. The underlying assumption was that if thoughts did not continue to completion 
memory performance should be worse for inhibited actions than for words where 
responses were not inhibited. The results indicated no difference in memory performance 
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for completed and inhibited words. These findings were taken as evidence that thoughts 
are "ballistic" continuing to completion even in cases where the associated action is 
successfully inhibited. These findings represent further evidence of a dichotomy between 
thought and action with control of thought being much more capricious than control of 
action. 
In summary, it would seem the present thesis challenges the view that thought is a 
domain over which one has a large degree of control. The present analysis suggests that 
the very act of mental control is both difficult and often unsuccessful. Furthermore, even 
when mental control is partially successful, it often results in paradoxical effects that 
seem to undermine the notion that we are indeed in control of our thoughts. 
IV. Potential Problems of Methdology and Interpretation 
One potential problem is the reliance on self-report data as the dependent variable in most 
of the studies. In an attempt to address this criticism, Study 4 (Chapter 6) sought to assess 
the activation of previously suppressed or expressed thoughts using an implicit measure, 
the reaction time to recognise stimuli as words or non-words in a Lexical Decision Task. 
It was hypothesised that previously manipulated (suppressed or expressed) target words 
would show faster recognition latencies due to the heightened activation accrued from 
previous use. Unfortunately this study did not yield statistically significant results. Both 
previously suppressed and expressed targets produced a slowing relative to distracters. 
This slowing in response to previously manipulated targets (suppressed or expressed) 
most likely represents conscious interference as the participant may notice the target as 
previously manipulated causing the slowing. This result therefore cautions against using 
Lexical Decision Tasks to assess construct activation in cases where there is a possibility 
that the association between the previous task and the Lexical Decision Task will be 
noticed. 
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A further problem related to the use of self-report data as a dependent variable is that 
performance on suppression and expression tasks examined in Study 2 has not been 
tested for reliability. Performance on the suppression task in Study 2 was only 
investigated in one five-minute period of suppression. It is therefore an open question as 
to whether there is a reliable suppression performance that varies between individuals. 
However, the design of the large scale investigation, as described in Chapter 2, permits 
exploration of the reliability of expression performance. This is because participants 
expressed a different target on two separate weeks, therefore if there is a reliable measure 
of expression performance which varies between individuals this should be detected in 
this study. Importantly, the correlation between expression performance across the two 
weeks was . 54. This implies substantial stability, and hence reliability, in a measure of 
expression performance over two weeks. The correlation between two periods of 
suppression, using different targets and weeks needs to be examined in future research. 
V. Final Conclusions and Future Directions 
This thesis has produced a set of interesting findings that have important implications for 
thought suppression research. It has also raised several questions that merit further 
investigation, these will now be discussed. 
The results suggest that some of the controversy in the thought suppression literature may 
be explained by the methods used for indexing the rebound effect. The modified method 
appears to be flawed by having a comparison group that expresses twice. The original 
method of Wegner et al. (1987) may represent a "cleaner" method of assessment. 
However, even the original Wegner et al. (1987) method is not without its problems. 
Thus, the main reason for the development of the modified method was the criticism that 
in the original method the rebound effect is assessed by comparing an expression group 
in period I and another expression group in period 2 (after prior suppression), thus these 
two groups have had differential practice with the task of thought verbalisation. One 
group has verbalised twice and the other group only once. One method of assessment that 
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may overcome some of the problems inherent in all current paradigms is as follows. 
During period I one group suppresses and the other group merely verbalises all their 
thoughts out loud as in the previous practice period. In period 2 both groups express and 
are compared to index the rebound effect. Using this method, both groups have equal 
practice with the verbalisation task and one also avoids the problems inherent in 
expressing thoughts twice. 
However, it is clear that all of these assessment methods still share the reliance on self 
reported thought as the dependent variable. Future research needs to make much greater 
use of implicit methods of rebound effect assessment. The key study demonstrating the 
rebound effect with implicit measures during the post suppression period still awaits 
investigation. The current thesis suggests that in designing this study the implicit task 
chosen is of paramount importance. Thus, here a Lexical Decision Task proved to be a 
poor choice for assessing construct activation after previous suppression or expression. 
The studies examining the effects of individual differences clearly show that state 
oriented individuals are more likely to display rebound effects. In addition, action 
oriented participants were reliably more successful at laboratory suppression than state 
oriented participants. This dimension needs to receive much greater attention in thought 
suppression research as the results of this thesis suggest it may be a key mediational 
variable with the potential to explain several thought control phenomena. 
Future studies also need to examine in depth whether there is indeed a consistent 
suppression and expression performance that varies between individuals. Furthermore, 
research is necessary to delineate which personality variables are related to suppression 
and expression ability. Interestingly the current studies found no relationship between 
suppression performance in the laboratory and the use of thought suppression in everyday 
life. If thought suppression is an ability that improves with practice, future research will 
need to demonstrate such relationships. In line with this it is clear that more precise 
measures of the tendency to suppress thoughts in everyday life need to be developed 
which are not contaminated by a tendency to experience intrusive thoughts. 
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One further important direction for future research is to examine in detail the relationship 
between thought suppression and aging. Currently there are no published studies 
examining mental control and thought suppression in older adults. In view of the 
interesting finding that older adults score significantly lower on the WBSI but show a 
much greater proportion of repression this research is clearly needed. 
Perhaps the most exciting idea stemming from this research is the possibility that the 
effects of mental control investigated in this thesis may generalise to overt behaviour. 
The idea is simply that the likelihood of enacting a behaviour may become greater if one 
tries not to carry out the act by suppressing it. In short, can there be rebound effects in 
intentional behaviour? Although not part of the current thesis these questions and other 
similar ideas represent important questions for the future. 
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State / Trait Anxiety Inventory 
DIRECHONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves 
are given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the 
right of 
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are no 
right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the 
answer which seems to describe your present feelings best. 
1.1 feel calm QI 02 Q3 Q4 
2.1 feel secure 1 2 3 4 
3.1 am tense 1 2 3 4 
4.1 am regretful 1 2 3 4 
5.1 feel at ease 1 2 3 4 
6.1 feel upset 1 2 3 4 
7.1 am presently worrying over possible misfortunes 1 2 3 4 8. 
9.1 feel anxious 1 2 3 4 
10.1 feel comfortable 1 2 3 4 
11.1 feel self-confident 1 2 3 4 
12.1 feel nervous 1 2 3 4 
13.1 am jittery 1 2 3 4 
14.1 feel "high strung" 1 2 3 4 
15.1 am relaxed 1 2 3 4 
16.1 feel content 1 2 3 4 
17.1 am worried 1 2 3 4 
18.1 feel over-excited and "rattled" 1 2 3 4 
19.1 feel joyful 1 2 3 4 
20.1 feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
269 
STAI FORM X-2 
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves 
a. re given below. Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the 
right of 
the statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 
describe 
how you generally feel. 
211 feel pleasant 1 2 3 4 
22.1 tire quickly 1 2 3 4 
23.1 feel like crying 1 2 3 4 
25.1 am loosing out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough 1 2 3 4 
26. If feel rested 1 2 3 4 
27.1 am "calm cool, and collected" 1 2 3 4 
28.1 feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them 1 2 3 4 
29.1 worry too much over something that really doesn't matter 1 2 3 4 
30.1 am happy 
3 1.1 am inclined to take things hard 1 2 3 4 
32.1 lack self confidence 
33. If feel secure 1 2 3 4 
34.1 try to avoid facing a crisis or difficulty 1 2 3 4 
35.1 feel blue 1 2 3 4 
36.1 am content 1 2 3 4 
37. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and bothers me 1 2 3 4 
3$. 1 take disappointments so keenly that I can't put them out of my mind 1 2 3 4 
39.1 am a steady person 1 2 3 4 
40.1 get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and 
interests 1 2 3 4 
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White Bear Suppression Inventory 
This survey is about thoughts. There are no right or wrong answers, so please respond honestly to 
each of the items below. Be sure to answer every item by circling the appropriate letter beside 
each. 
A BCDE 
Strongly Dis agree Neutral or Agree Strongly 
Disagree Don't Know Agree 
ABCDE 1. There are things I prefer not to think about. 
ABCDE 2. Sometimes I wonder why I have the thoughts I do. 
ABCDE 3. 1 have thoughts that I cannot stop. 
ABCDE 4. There are images that come to mind that I cannot 
erase. 
ABCDE 5. My thoughts frequently return to one idea. 
ABCDE 6.1 wish I could stop thinking of certain things. 
ABCDE 7. Sometimes my mind races so fast I wish I could 
stop it. 
ABCDE 8. 1 always try to put problems out of mind. 
ABCDE 9. There are thoughts that keep jumping into my 
head. 
ABCDE 10. There are things that I try not to think about. 
ABCDE 11. Sometimes I really wish I could stop thinking. 
ABCDE 12. 1 often do things to distract myself from my 
thoughts. 
ABCDE 13. 1 have thoughts that I try to avoid. 
ABCDE 14. There are many thoughts that I have that I don't 
tell anyone. 
ABCDB 15. Sometimes I stay busy just to keep thoughts from 
intruding on my rrýnd 
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Marlowe Crowne Scale 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read 
each item and decide whether the statement is true offasle as it pertains to you 
personally 
True False 
I. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the 
candidates: T F 
2.1 never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. T F 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not 
encouraged. T F 
4.1 have never intensely disliked someone. T F 
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. T F 
6.1 sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. T F 
7.1 am always careful about my manner of dress. T F 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a T F 
restaurant. 
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not 
seen I would probably do it. T F 
274 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because 
thought too little of my ability. TF 
11.1 like to gossip at times. TF 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in 
authority even though I knew they were right. TF 
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. TF 
14.1 can remember 'playing sick'to get out of something. TF 
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. TF 
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistatake. TF 
17.1 always try to practise what I preach. TF 
18.1 don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud-mouthed, TF 
obnoxious people. 
19.1 sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. TF 
20. When I dontt know something I don't at all mind admitting it. TF 
21.1 am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. TF 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. TF 
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. TF 
24.1 would never think of letting someone else be punished for my 
wrong-doing. TF 
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25.1 never resent being asked to return a favour. T F 
26.1 have never been irked when people expressed ideas very 
different from my own. T F 
27.1 never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. T F 
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good T F 
fortune of others. 
29.1 have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. T F 
30.1 am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me. T F 
3 1.1 have never felt that I was punished without cause. T F 
32.1 sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only T F 
get what they deserve. 
33.1 have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's T F 
feelings. 
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Thought Control Questionnaire 
Most people experience unpleasant, and/or unwanted thoughts (in 
verbal and/or picture form), which can be difficult to control. 
We are interested in the techniques that you generally use to 
control such thoughts. Below are a number of things that people 
do to control these thoughts. Please read each statement 
carefully, and indicate how often you use each technique by 
circling the appropriate number: 
1=NEVER 2=SOMETIMES 3=OFTEN 4=ALMOST ALWAYS 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time 
thinking about each one. 
WHEN I EXPERIENCE AN UNPLEASANT/UNWANTED THOUGHT: 
2 3 4 1.1 call to mind positive images instead. 
2 3 4 2.1 tell myself not to be so stupid. 
2 3 4 3.1 focus on the thought. 
2 3 4 4. 1 replace the thought with a more trivial 
bad thought. 
2 3 4 5. 1 don't talk about the thought to anyone. 
2 3 4 6.1 punish myself for thinking the thought. 
2 3 4 7.1 dwell on other worries. 
2 3 4 8.1 keep the thought to myself. 
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2 3 4 9.1 occupy myself with work instead. 
2 3 4 10.1 challenge the thought's validity. 
2 3 4 11. 1 get angry at myself for having the 
thought. 
2 3 4 12.1 avoid discussing the thought. 
2 3 4 13.1 shout at myself for having the thought. 
2 3 4 14.1 analyze the thought rationally. 
2 3 4 15.1 slap or pinch myself to 5top the thought. 
2 3 4 16.1 think pleasant thoughts instead 
2 3 4 17.1 find out how my friends deal with these 
thoughts. 
2 3 4 18.1 worry about more minor things instead. 
2 3 4 19.1 do something that I enjoy. 
2 3 4 20.1 try to reinterpret the thought. 
2 3 4 21.1 think about something elsee 
2 3 4 22.1 think more about the more minor problems 
have. 
2 3 4 23.1 try a different way of thinking about it. 
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2 3 4 24.1 think about past worries instead. 
2 3 4 25.1 ask my friends if they have similar 
thoughts. 
2 3 4 26.1 focus on different negative thoughts. 
2 3 4 27.1 question the reasons for having the 
thought. 
1234 28.1 tell myself that something bad will 
happen if I think the thought. 
1234 29.1 talk to a friend about the thought. 
134 30.1 keep myself busy. 
31. What else do you do in order to get rid of unpleasant or 
unwanted thoughts? (Please use the space below for your 
answer. ) 
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Eysenck Personality Questionnaire 
Directions -A number of statements appear below. Read each statement 
and then circle the response on the right that best applies to yourselL There 
are no correct answers. 
1. Does your mood often go up and down? YES NO 
2. Do you take much notice of what people think? YES NO 
3. Are you a talkative person? YES NO 
4. If you say you will do something, do you YES NO 
always keep your promise no matter how 
inconvenient it might be? 
5. Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no reason? YES NO 
6. Would being in debt worry you? YES NO 
7. Are you rather lively? YES NO 
8. Were you ever greedy by helping yourself YES NO 
to more than your share of anything? 
9. Are you an irritable person? YES NO 
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10. Would you take drugs which may have YES NO 
strange or dangerous effects? 
1 1. Do you enjoy meeting new people? YES NO 
12. Have you ever blamed someone for doing YES NO 
something you knew was really your fault? 
13. Are your feelings easily hurt? YES NO 
14. Do you prefer to go your own way rather YES NO 
than act by the rules? 
15. Can you usually let yourself go and YES NO 
enjoy yourself at a lively party? 
16. Are all your habits good and desirable ones? YES NO 
17. Do you often feel "fed-up"? YES NO 
18. Do good manners and cleanliness matter much to you? YES NO 
19. Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? YES NO 
20. Have you ever taken anything (even a pin or button) YES NO 
that belongs to someone else ? 
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21. Would you call yourself a nervous person ? YES NO 
22. Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and YES NO 
should be done away with ? 
23. Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party ? YES NO 
24. Have you ever broken or lost something YES NO 
belonging to someone else? 
25. Are you a worrier? YES NO 
26. Do you enjoy co-operating with others? YES NO 
27. Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions? YES NO 
28. Does it worry you if you know there are mistakes in you 
work? YES NO 
29. Have you ever said anything bad or nasty to anyone? YES NO 
30. Would you call yourself tense or "highly strung"? YES NO 
3 I. Do you think people spend too much time safeguarding YES NO 
their future with savings and insurances ? 
32. Do you like mixing with people? YES NO 
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33. As a child were you ever cheeky to your parents? YES NO 
34. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? YES NO 
35. Do you try not to be rude to people? YES NO 
36. Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you? YES NO 
37. Have you ever cheated at a game? YES NO 
38. Do you suffer from "nerves"? YES NO 
39. Would you like other people to be afraid of you? YES NO 
40. Have you ever taken advantage of someone? YES NO 
41. Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people? YES NO 
42. Do you often feel lonely? YES NO 
43.1s it better to follow society's rules than go your own way? YES NO 
44. Do other people think of you as being very lively? YES NO 
45. Do you always practice what you preach? YES NO 
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46. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt? YES NO 
47. Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you YES NO 
ought to do today? 
48. Can you get a party going? YES NO 
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Beck Depression Inventory 
Instructions : This is a questionnaire. On the questionnaire are groups of statements. 
Please read the. entire group of statements in each category. Then pick out the one 
statement in that group which best describes the way you feel today, that is, right now! 
Circle the number beside the statement you have chosen. If several statements in the 
group seem to apply equally well, circle each one. 
Be sure to read all the statements in each group before making your choice. 
A 
3. 
B. 
3. 
C. 
3. 
I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it. 
I am blue or sad all the time and I can't snap out of it. 
I feel sad or blue. 
I do not feel sad. 
I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve. 
I feel I have nothing to look forward to. 
I feel discouraged about the future. 
I am not particularly pessimistic or discouraged about the future. 
I feel I am a complete failure as a person (parent, husband, wife). 
As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures. 
I feel I have failed more than the average person. 
I do not feel like a failure. 
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D. 
3.1 am dissatisfied with everything. 
2.1 don't get satisfaction out of anything anymore. 
1.1 don't enjoy things the way I used to. 
0.1 am not particularly dissatisfied. 
E. 
3.1 feel as thought I am very bad or worthless. 
2.1 feel quite guilty. 
1.1 feel bad or unworthy a good part of the time. 
0.1 don't feel particularly guilty. 
F. 
3. 1 hate myself. 
2. 1 am disgusted with myself. 
1. 1 am disappointed in myself. 
0. 1 don't feel disappointed in myself. 
G. 
3.1 would kill myself if I had the chance. 
2. have definite plans about committing suicide. 
1.1 feel I would be better off dead. 
0.1 don't have any thoughts of harming myself. 
H. 
3.1 have lost all of my interest in other people and don't care about them at all. 
2.1 have lost most of my interest in other people and have little feeling for them. 
I. I am less interested in other people than I used to be. 
0.1 have not lost interest in other people. 
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I. 
3. 
J. 
3. 
2. 
1. 
K. 
3. 
L. 
3. 
M. 
3. 
I can't make any decisions at all anymore. 
I have great difficulty in making decisions. 
I try to put off making decisions. 
I make decisions about as well as ever. 
I feel that I am ugly or repulsive looking. 
I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance and they make me look 
unattractive. 
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive. 
I don't feel that I look any worse than I used to. 
I can't do any work at all. 
I have to push myself very hard to do anything. 
it takes extra effort to get started at doing something. 
I can work about as well as before. 
get too tired to do anything. 
I get tired from doing anything. 
I get tired more easily than I used to. 
I don't get any more tired than usual. 
I have no appetite at all anymore. 
My appetite is much worse how. 
My appetite is not as good as it used to be. 
My appetite is no worse than usual. 
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Need For Cognition 
Directions -A number of statements appear below. Read each statement 
carefully and then circle the appropriate number on the right. There are no 
correct or incorrect answers. 
1.1 really enjoy a task that involves 
coming up with new solutions to 
problems. 
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-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
2.1 would prefer a task that is 
intellectual, difficult, and 
important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require 
much thought. 
3.1 tend to set goals that can be 
accomplished only by expending 
considerable mental effort. 
4.1 am usually tempted to put more 
thought into a task than the job 
minimally requires. 
5. Learning new ways to think 
doesn't excite me very much. 
6.1 am hesitant about making 
important decision after thinking 
about them. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
7.1 usually end up deliberating about -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
issues even when they do not 
affect me personally. 
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8.1 preferjust to let things happen 
rather than try to understand why 
they turned out that way. 
9.1 have difficulty thinking in new 
and unfamiliar situations. 
IO. The idea of relying on thought to 
make my way to the top does not 
appeal to me. 
I l. The notion of thinking abstractly 
is not appealing to me. 
12.1 am an intellectual 
13.1 only think as hard as I have to. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
14.1 don't reason well under pressure. -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
15.1 like tasks that require little 
thought once I've learned them. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
16.1 prefer to think about small, daily -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
projects to long-term ones. 
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17.1 would rather do something that 
requires little thought than 
something that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities. 
I&I find little satisfaction in 
deliberating hard and for long 
hours. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
19.1 more often talk with other people -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
about the reasons for and possible 
solutions to international problems 
than about gossip or titbits of what 
famous people are doing 
20.. These days, I see little chance for -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
performing well, even in 
"intellectual" jobs, unless one 
knows the right people 
2 1. More often than not, more 
thinking just leads to more errors. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
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22.1 don't like to have the 
responsibility of handling a 
situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 
23.1 appreciate opportunities to -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
discover the strengths and 
weaknesses of my own reasoning. 
24.1 feel relief rather than satisfaction -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
after completing a task that 
requires a lot of mental effort. 
25. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
26.1 try to anticipate and avoid 
situations where there is a likely 
chance I will have to think in 
depth about something. 
27.1 prefer watching educational to 
entertainment programmes 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
28.1 think best when those around me -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
are very intelligent. 
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29.1 prefer my life to be filled with 
puzzles that I must solve. 
30.1 would prefer complex to simple 
problems. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
3 1. Simply knowing the answer rather -4 -3 -2 -1 0 
than understanding the reasons for 
the answer to a problem is fine 
with me. 
1 
32. It's enough for me that something -4 -3 -2 -1 01234 
gets the job done, I don't care how 
or why it works. 
33. Ignorance is bliss. 
34.1 enjoy thinking about an issue 
even when the results of my 
thoughts will have no effect on the 
outcome of the issue. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
-4 -3 -2 -1 01 
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298 
State Action Orientation Questionnaire 
Directions - below are a list of statements, with two possible responses labelled B and A. 
Circle the response that is most like yourselL 
1. When I have lost something that is very valuable tome and I can't find it anywhere: 
A. I have a hard time concentrating on something else. 
B. I put it out of my mind after a little while. 
2. When I know I must finish something soon: 
A. I have to push myself to get started. 
B. I find it easy to get it done and over with. 
3. When I have learned anew and interesting game: 
A. I quickly get tired of it and do something else. 
B. I can really get into it for a long time. 
4. If I've worked for weeks on one project and then everything goes completely wrong 
with the project : 
A. It takes me a long time to adjust myself to it. 
B. It bothers me for a while, but then I don't think about it anymore. 
5. When I don't have anything in particular to do and I am getting bored : 
A. I have trouble getting up enough energy to do anything at all. 
B. I quickly find something to do. 
6. When I'm working on something that's important tome: 
A. I still like to do other things in between working on it. 
B. I get into it so much that I can work on it for a long time. 
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7. When I'm in a competition and have lost every time: 
I can soon put losing out of my mind. 
B. The thought that I lost keeps running through my mind. 
8. When I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem: 
A. It feels like I am facing a big mountain that I don't think I can climb. 
B. I look for a way that the problem can be approached in a suitable manner. 
9. When I'm watching a really good movie: 
A. I get so involved in the film that I don't even think of doing anything else. 
B. I often want to get something else to do while I'm watching the movie. 
10. If I had just bought a new piece of equipment (for example, a tape deck) and it 
accidentally fell on the floor and was damaged beyond repair: 
A. I would manage to get over it quickly. 
B. It would take me a long time to get over it. 
11. When I have to solve a difficult problem: 
A. I usually don't have a problem getting started on it. 
B. I have trouble sorting out things in my head so that I can get down to working 
on the problem. 
12. When I have been busy for a long time doing something interesting (for example 
reading a book or working on a project) : 
I sometimes think about whether what I'm doing is really worthwhile. 
B. I usually get so involved in what I'm doing that I never think to ask about 
whether it's worthwhile. 
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13. If I have to talk to someone about something important and, repeatedly, can't find 
him/her at home: 
A. I can't stop thinking about it, even while I'm doing something else. 
B. I easily forget about it until I can see the person again. 
14. When I have to make up my mind about what I am going to do when I get some 
unexpected free time : 
A. It takes me a long time to decide what I should do during this free time. 
B. I can usually decide on something to do without having to think it over very 
much. 
15. When I read an article in the newspaper that interests me : 
A. I usually remain so interested in the article that I read the entire article. 
B. I still often skip to another article before I've finished the first one. 
16. When I've bought a lot of stuff at a store and realise when I get home that I paid too 
much - but I can't get my money back: 
I can't concentrate on anything else 
B. I easily forget about it. 
17. When I have work to do at home : 
A. It is often hard for me to get the work done. 
B. I usually get it done right away. 
18. When I'm on vacation and I'm having a good time: 
A. After a while, I really feel like doing something completely different. 
B. I don't even think about doing anything else until the end of my vacation. 
19. When I am told that my work has been completely unsatisfactory: 
A. I don't let it bother me for too long. 
B. I feel paralysed. 
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20. When I have a lot of important things to do and they must all be done soon : 
A. I often don't know where to begin. 
B. I find it easy to make a plan and stick with it. 
21. When one of my co-workers brings up an interesting topic for discussion : 
A. It can easily develop into a long conversation. 
B. I soon lose interest and want to go do something else. 
22. If I'm stuck in traffic and miss an important appointment: 
A. At first, it's difficult for me to start doing anything else at all 
B. I quickly forget about it and do something else 
23. When there are two things that I really want to do, but I can't do both of them: 
A. I quickly begin one thing and forget about the other thing I couldn't do. 
B. It's not easy for me to put the thing that I couldn't do out of my mind. 
24. When I am busy working on an interesting project: 
A. I need to take frequent breaks and work on other projects. 
B. I can keep working on the same project for a long time. 
25. When something is very important to me, but I can't seem to get it right: 
A. I gradually loose heart. 
B. I just forget about it and go do something else. 
26. When I have to take care of something important but which is also unpleasant: 
A. I do it and get it over with. 
B. It can take a while before I bring myself to do it. 
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27. When I am having an interesting conversation with someone at a party: 
A. I can talk to him or her the entire evening. 
I prefer to go do something else after a while. 
28. When something really gets me down: 
A. I have trouble doing anything at all 
B. I find it easy to distract myself by doing other things. 
29. When I am facing a big project that has to be done : 
A. I often spend too long thinking about where I should begin. 
B. I don't have any problems getting started. 
30. When it turns out that I am much better at a game than the other players : 
A. I usually feel like doing something else 
I really like to keep playing 
3 1. When several things go wrong on the same day: 
A. I usually don't know how to deal with it. 
B. I just keep on going as though nothing happened. 
32. When I have a boring assignment: 
A. I usually don't have any problems getting through it. 
B. I sometimes just can't get moving on it. 
33. When I read something I find interesting: 
A. I sometimes still want to put the article down and do something else. 
B. I will sit and read the article for a long time 
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34. When I have put all my effort into doing a really good job on something and the 
whole thing doesn't work out: 
AJ don't have too much difficulty starting something else. 
B. 1 have trouble doing anything else at all. 
35. When I have an obligation to do something that is boring and uninteresting: 
AI do it and get it over with 
B. It usually takes a while before I get around to doing it. 
36. When I am trying to learn something new that I want to learn: 
AXII keep at it for a long time. 
B. I often feel like I need to take a break and go do something else for a while. 
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Linking Questionnaire 
INSTRUMONS: Which of the following two possible reactions more closely describes 
how you feel about the preceding statement? Please choose one or the other. Indicate 
your choice by checking the space next to that choice. 
1. You've won $10,000 in a contest. 
A) Now that I can afford many of the things I've always wanted, I will be much 
happier. 
B) I'm glad that I won the money, although I don't think it will influence how 
happy I am overall. 
2. Does your weight influences your happiness? 
A) I am only happy when I am at my ideal weight. 
B) It would be nice to be at my ideal weight, but I would be just as happy if I 
were not. 
3. Do you get more happiness out of pursuing your goals or as a result of reaching them? 
A) I get more happiness out of striving for my goals; reaching them is just icing 
on the cake. 
B) My happiness comes primarily from reaching my goal. 
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4. How critical for your happiness is it for you to be in a romantic relationship? 
A) It is diff icult for me to be truly happy if I do not have someone in my life. 
B) I prefer to have someone in my life, but I can be just as happy without a 
boyfriend/girlfriend. 
5. Imagine that over the next six months the following things happen: Someone gives you 
a new car, then you fail two classes, then you go on a great vacation to Hawaii, then 
someone steals your car. 
A) My happiness will swing up and down as events in my life change. 
B) These are just natural events in my life and they won't necessarily influence 
my happiness 
6. One day you realize that you have all the things you want -- the job you want, the 
spouse you want, the free time you want. 
A) This will not directly influence how happy I am, because happiness is 
something I determine, regardless of what happens to me. 
B) If I have all the things I want, then I will be very happy. 
7. How important is having money to your happiness? 
A) Being able to buy the things I want definitely makes me happier. 
B) Once I have enough money for the basic necessities of life (like food, 
clothing, and shelter), more money will not make me happier. 
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8. Your roommate is one of the most annoying, unpleasant people you have ever known. 
A) I am probably going to be unhappy whenever I'm around my roommate. 
B) I can be happy when I'm around my roommate if I really want to be. 
9. What would it take for you to be happy right now? 
A) How I respond to good and bad events in my life is more important than the 
good and bad events themselves. 
B) The best way for me to keep from being unhappy is to keep bad things from 
happening to me. The best way for me to be happier is to make good 
things happen to me. 
10. What would it take for you to be happy right now? 
A) There are certain things that must happen in my life for me to be truly happy. 
B) The only thing that is keeping me from being happy right now is myself. 
11. You just lost the job which you've had for 5 years and enjoyed very much. 
A) I'll only be happy again if I find another good job. 
B) I can be happy whether I get another good job or not. 
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12. Does being outgoing affect your happiness? 
A) I would be happier if I was more outgoing. 
B) I would be about as happy as I am now if I was more outgoing. 
13. Think about the things in your life that you really want, but just can't get. Maybe you 
want to be a good doctor, but you realize that your grades are not going to be good 
enough to get into medical school. Or maybe you want to go out with a certain person, 
but that person won't go out with you. How does this affect your happiness. 
A) The more things I want but can't get, the less happy I am. 
B) Wanting things I can't get does not make me less happy. 
14. If something bad happens in my life: 
A) I could conceivably become happier during the bad experience. 
B) It is highly unlikely that I could become happier during the bad experience. 
15. Think about the important things in your life. 
A) There are a lot of things that I have in my life that, if I were to lose them, I 
would be very unhappy. 
B) There are very few things in my life that, if I were to lose them, I would be 
very unhappy. 
309 
16. My overall life plan to be happy is better described as: 
A) Try to be happy right now, regardless of what my life is like. 
B) Strive to get my life to be so good that I will be happy without even trying. 
17. What is happiness to you? 
A) Happiness is something I get closer to each time I succeed in reaching an 
important goal. 
B) Happiness is a state of mind. I can be happy regardless of whether or not I 
reach my goals. 
18. Suppose you go blind or lose a limb, what do you think your reaction would be? 
A) Obviously, my life would not be the same as before, but I imagine I could 
still find ways to be happy. 
B) I would be severely depressed and my life would never be the same. 
310 
19. Get an image in your mind of your dream car. Suppose one day you get to own it. 
A) I would feel that I had it made and it would make me happy for a long time. 
B) I would probably enjoy it for a while, but then, as it is with most things, I'd 
get used to having it, and it would not make me happy any more. 
20. Which of the following statements seem most likely to be true? 
A) Rich people are probably happier than poor people. 
B) Rich people are not necessarily any happier than poor people. 
21. When I reach an important goal: 
A) I am pleased and savor the achievement, but I wouldn't say that my overall 
happiness is directly affected. 
B) My overall happiness is usually boosted. 
22. If I were to reach the pinnacle of success in my chosen profession: 
A) I would be happy from then on. 
B) I would not necessarily be happy all the time from then on. 
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Appendix J 
Thought Action Fusion Questionnaire 
Directions -A number of statements appear below. Read each statement and then 
circle the appropriate number on the right. 0 refers to disagree strongly and 4 
refers to agree strongly. 
Disagree 
strongly 
Agree 
strongly 
1. Thinking of making an extremely critical remark 01234 
to a friend is almost as unacceptable to me as actually 
saying it. 
(a) Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful to 01234 
me as a blasphemous action. 
(b) Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost 01234 
as unacceptable to me as actually swearing. 
(c) When I have a nasty thought about someone else, 01234 
it is almost as bad as carrying out a nasty action. 
(d) Having violent thoughts is almost as unacceptable 01234 
to me as violent acts. 
(e) When I think about making an obscene remark or 01234 
gesture in church, it is almost as sinful as actually. 
doing it 
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(f) If I wish harm on someone, it is almost as bad as 01234 
doing harm. 
(g) If I think about making an obscene gesture to 01234 
someone else, it is almost as bad as doing it. 
(h) When I think unkindly about a friend, it is almost 01234 
as disloyal as doing an unkind act. 
(i) If I have a jealous thought, it is almost the same 01234 
as making a jealous remark. 
) Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is 01234 
almost as immoral to me as actually cheating. 
(k) Having obscene thoughts in a church is 01234 
unacceptable to me. 
1. If I think of a relative / friend losing their job, this 01234 
increases the risk that they will lose theirjob. 
2. If I think of a relative / friend being in a car 01234 
accident, this increases the risk that he / she will 
have a car accident. 
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3. If I think of a relative / friend being injured in 01234 
a fall this increases the risk that he / she will have 
a fall and be injured. 
4. If I think of a relative friend falling ill this 01234 
increases the risk that he she will fall ill. 
a. If I think of myself being injured in a fall 0123 
this increases the risk that I will have a fall. 
and be injured. 
b. If I think of myself being in a car accident, 01234 
this increases the risk that I will have a car accident. 
c. If I think of myself falling ill, this increases 01234 
the risk that I will fall ill. 
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Rumination Inventory 
Directions: Indicate how well each of the statements below describes you by 
placing a checkmark on the corresponding line. 
1.1 seldom think about things that happened in the past. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
2.1 often get distracted from what I am doing with thoughts 
about something else. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
3. If I don't want to think about something, I'm able to just 
stop thinking about it. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
317 
4.1 often think about what my life will be like in the future. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
5. When I have a problem, I tend to think about it a lot of the 
time. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
6.1 rarely become "lost in thought. " 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
7. When I know that I am going to have an important talk or an 
argument with someone in the near future, I rehearse in my 
mind what I will say and what they will probably say in 
response. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
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8. Sometimes I feel like I have no control over my thoughts. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
9.1 have no trouble focusing all of my attention on one thing. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
10. When I don't understand something that happens, I tend to run 
it over in my mind until I can make sense out of it. 
like in the future. 
Does not 
describe Describes 
me well me well 
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Fordyce Unhappiness Ratings 
On the average, what percent of the time do you feel happy, what 
percent of the time do you feel unhappy, and what percent of the 
time do you feel neutral? Your percentages should add up to 
100%. 
Happy 
Unhappy % 
Neutral 
Total 100 
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322 
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire 
PLEASE ANSWER EACH ITEM BY CIRCLING Y (YES) OR N (NO). ANSWER 
ALL ITEMS EVEN IF UNSURE OF YOUR ANSWER. WHEN YOU HAVE 
FINISHED, CHECK OVER EACH ONE TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED 
THEM. 
Do you sometimes feel that things you see on the TV or read in the 
newspaper have a special meaning for you? YN 
2.1 sometimes avoid going to places where there will be YN 
many people because I will get anxious. YN 
3. Have you had experiences with the supernatural? YN 
4. Have you often mistaken objects or shadows for 
people, or noises for voices? YN 
5. Other people see me as slightly eccentric (odd). YN 
6.1 have little interest in getting to know other people. YN 
7. People sometimes find it hard to understand what I am YN 
saying. 
8. People sometimes find me aloof and distant. YN 
9.1 am sure I am being talked about behind my back. YN 
10.1 am aware that people notice me when I go out for 
a meal or to see a film. YN 
I get very nervous when I have to make polite 
conversation. YN 
12. Do you believe in telepathy (mind reading)? YN 
13. Have you ever had the sense that some person or force is around you, even though 
you cannot see anyone? YN 
14. People sometimes comment on my unusual mannerisms 
and habits. YN 
15.1 prefer to keep to myself. YN 
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16.1 sometimes jump quickly from one topic to another 
when speaking. YN 
17.1 am poor at expressing my true feelings by 
the way I talk and look. YN 
18. Do you often feel that other people have got it in 
for you? YN 
19. Do some people drop hints about you or say things 
with a double meaning? YN 
20. Do you ever get nervous when someone is walking 
behind you? YN 
21. Are you sometimes sure that other people can tell 
what you are thinking? YN 
22. When you look at a person, or yourself in a mirror, 
have you ever seen the face change right before 
your eyes? YN 
23. Sometimes other people think that I am a little 
strange. YN 
24.1 am mostly quiet when with other people. YN 
25.1 sometimes forget what I am trying to say. YN 
26.1 rarely laugh and smile. YN 
27. Do you sometimes get concerned that friends or 
co-workers are not really loyal or trustworthy? YN 
28. Have you ever noticed a common event or object 
that seemed to be a special sign for you? YN 
29.1 get anxious when meeting people for the first time. YN 
30. Do you believe in clairvoyanay (psychic forces, 
fortune telling)? YN 
31.1 often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud. YN 
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32. Some people think that I am a very bizarre person. 
33.1 find it hard to be emotionally close to other people. 
34.1 often ramble on too much when speaking. 
35. My "non-verbal" communication (smiling and nodding 
during a conversation) is poor. 
36.1 feel I have to be on my guard even with friends. 
37. Do you sometimes see special meanings in 
advertisements, shop windows, or in the way things 
are arranged around you? 
38. Do you often feel nervous when you are in a group 
of unfamiliar people? 
39. Can other people feel your feelings when they are not there? 
40. Have you ever seen things invisible to other people? 
41. Do you feel that there is no-one you are really close 
to outside of your immediate family, or people you 
can confide in or talk to about personal problems? 
42. Some people find me a bit vague and elusive during 
a conversation. 
43.1 am poor at returning social courtesies and gestures. 
44. Do you often pick up hidden threats or put-downs from 
what people say or do? 
45. When shopping do you get the feeling that other 
people are taking notice of you? 
46.1 feel very uncomfortable in social situations 
involving unfamiliar people. 
47. Have you had experiences with astrology, seeing the 
future, UFOs, ESP or a sixth sense? 
48. Do everyday things seem unusually large or small? 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
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49. Writing letters to friends is more trouble than it 
is worth. 
50.1 sometimes use words in unusual ways. 
51.1 tend to avoid eye contact when conversing with 
others. 
52. Have you found that it is best not to let other 
people know too much about you? 
53. When you see people talking to each other, do you 
often wonder if they are talking about you? 
54.1 would feel very anxious if I had to give a speech 
in front of a large group of people. 
55. Have you ever felt that you are communicating with 
another person telepathically (by mind reading)? 
56. Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually 
strong? 
57.1 tend to keep in the background in social situations. 
58. Do you tend to wander off the topic when having a 
conversation? 
59.1 often feel that others have it in for me. 
60. Do you sometimes feel that other people are watching 
you? 
61. Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant 
sounds that you are not normally aware off? 
62.1 attach little importance to having close friends. 
63. Do you sometimes feel that people are talking about 
you? 
64. Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can 
almost hear them? 
65. Do you often have to keep an eye out to stop people 
from taking advantage of you? 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
YN 
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66. Do you feel that you are unable to get "close" to 
people? YN 
67.1 am an odd, unusual person. YN 
68.1 do not have an expressive and lively way of speaking. YN 
69.1 find it hard to communicate clearly what I want to 
say to people. YN 
70.1 have some eccentric (odd) habits. YN 
71.1 feel very uneasy talking to people I do not know 
well. YN 
72. People occasionally comment that my conversation is 
confusing. YN 
73.1 tend to keep my feelings to myself. YN 
74. People sometimes stare at me because of my odd 
appearance. YN 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND COOPERATION! 
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Abstract 
Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following mental 
control instructions. In advance of each task, they either suppressed thoughts of their 
intention to perform the task, concentrated on such thoughts, or monitored their thoughts 
without trying to change them. Suppression resulted in reduced reports of intentionality 
as compared to monitoring, and as compared to concentration. There was a weak trend 
for suppression to enhance reported intentionality for a repetition of the action carried out 
after suppression instructions had been discontinued. 
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Voluntary Involuntariness: Thought Suppression and the Regulation of the Experience of 
Will 
Can we intend not to intend? Try not to try? Voluntarily behave involuntarily? 
At first blush, these possibilities sound paradoxical if not absurd, more like philosophers' 
puzzles than questions of relevance to scientific psychology. However, it is possible to 
frame these questions in a way that does make sense, and further, in a way that promises 
to explain some previously puzzling phenomena. The capacity of the will to cancel itseýf 
may underlie phenomena in which people experience involuntariness for actions despite 
external indications that the action has arisen voluntarily. To test this possibility, the 
present study examined whether trying not to think about one's intention can induce an 
experience of involuntariness for the intended action. 
Experienced Involuntariness 
The feeling that an action is "happening" rather than that one is "doing if' can 
occur under a variety of conditions. People can experience such involuntariness when 
they are performing complicated, lengthy, goal-directed actions, and even when they are 
fully able to report the conscious goal of the action. Experiences of involuntariness occur 
regularly in hypnosis (Gorassini & Perlini, 1988; Kihlstrom, 1985; Kirsch & Lynn, 
1999), for example, and have been considered a signal characteristic of the hypnotic state 
(Lynn, Rhue, & Weekes, 1990). Hypnosis may not always prompt the occurrence of a 
suggested behavior (e. g., the person's arm rising), but it regularly yields experiences of 
involuntariness when such behavior occurs (i. e., the person feels the arm rising without 
conscious will). 
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Involuntariness is also characteristic of several unusual phenomena classed as 
automatisms. People report reduced or absent experiences of conscious will in trance 
channeling (Brown, 1997), spirit possession (Boddy, 1994), automatic writing (Koutstaal, 
1992; Zusne & Jones, 1989), table-turning (Carpenter, 1875), water dowsing (Vogt & 
Hyman, 1959), and other autornatisms such as Ouija-board spelling and pendulum 
divining (Ansfield & Wegner, 1996; Spitz, 1997). There are also circumstances leading 
people to experience enhanced conscious will for events or actions over which they have 
no demonstrable control (Langer, 1975; Thompson, Armstrong, & Thomas, 1998; 
Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). Such circumstantial variation in experienced voluntariness, 
both its reduction and its enhancement, suggests that the experience of conscious will is 
not an infallible indicator of the conscious causation of the action. Rather, experiences of 
involuntariness or voluntariness may be better understood as the outputs of a mental 
process that estimates degrees of apparent mental causation. 
What then drives these estimates? The early insight of Hume in A Treatise on 
Human Nature (Hume, 1888) was that the "constant union" and "inference of the mind" 
that underlies the perception of causality between physical events must also give rise to 
perceived causality in "actions of the mind. " Drawing on this idea, the theory of 
apparent mental causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999) suggests that the 
experience we have of causing our own actions arises whenever we draw a causal 
inference linking our thought to our action. When thought seems to cause action, we 
experience will. Principles guiding such inferences can be drawn from principles of 
attribution and inference that govem cause perception more generally (Gilbert, 1995; 
Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1972; Michotte, 1963). 
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According to this theory, when a thought appears in consciousness just prior to an 
action, is consistent with the action, and is not accompanied by salient alternative causes 
of the action, we experience conscious will and ascribe authorship to ourselves for the 
action. In contrast, when thoughts do not arise with such priorii)4 consistency, and 
exclusivity, we experience the ensuing actions as less willed or voluntary. In essence, this 
theory suggests that voluntariness is experienced primarily when thought about action is 
the primary candidate for having caused the action that is observed. 
In commonplace actions, we often do have thoughts of action that are consistent, 
prior, and exclusive. We may think of going into the bedroom before we do so, for 
example, so when we indeed go, we quickly conclude that we did it. If we were not 
thinking of going into that room but nonetheless found ourselves standing there looking 
at the bed, the lack of consistency between our thought and action would undermine our 
feeling of conscious will for the action. If we thought of going to the room only after the 
action, in turn, we would have the requisite consistent thought-but its lack of 
appropriate priority would yield little sense of will for the action. And of course, if we 
were conveyed into the room by someone else (say, a pushy lover), even if we had 
thought of going and had been quite happy with the idea, we might find our experience of 
will undermined because the thought was not an exclusive cause. 
The application of these principles of inference suggests that experiences of 
voluntariness or involuntariness are guided by perceptions of mental causation, not by 
actual mental causation. There is considerable evidence suggesting that the manipulation 
of access to information about consistency, priority, and exclusivity is indeed what 
underlies the experience of involuntariness in hypnosis and in many of the automatisms 
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(Wegner, 2002). When thoughts are made to seem inconsistent with an action, when the 
order of thought and action is somehow obscured, or when plausible causes of action 
other than thought are introduced to the person's awareness, experiences of 
involuntariness ensue. These distortions can be created through interpretive sets (e. g., 
Lynn et al., 1990; Spanos & Katsanis, 1989) and through direct manipulations of 
information availability (e. g., Wegner, Fuller, & Sparrow, 2003). 
This insight suggests, then, how it might be that a person could experience 
voluntary involuntariness. If the person actively attempted to control the circumstances 
surrounding an action to influence own perception of the action's causal origins, the 
experience of will might thus be influenced by active, voluntary processes. The idea of 
64voluntary involuntariness, " then, turns on two different definitions of voluntary. The 
exertion of mental control that occurs when a person attempts to influence the availability 
of thoughts about action may be voluntary in the sense that it is goal-directed. This goal- 
directed activity could potentially undermine the person's experience of voluntariness 
during subsequent action. To the extent that a person might be able to inhibit awareness 
of the elements underlying the inference of conscious will-awareness of the thought, the 
action, or their interrelation-the person might voluntarily create a sense of 
involuntariness. 
Suppression ofIntention 
The idea that people could attempt to influence their own experience of actions 
has surfaced before in the literature on involuntariness. Hilgard (1986) proposed that 
"selective inattention" might be active in producing the experience of involuntariness in 
hypnosis, and several other analyses of hypnosis have drawn on the idea that people 
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might be actively involved in interpreting their behavior as unwilled (Comey & Kirsch, 
1999; Gorassini & Perlini, 1988; Kirsch & Lynn, 1999; Lynn, 1997; Ruehle & 
Zamansky, 1997). The role of active interpretation of cues to involuntariness has also 
been noted in commentaries on spirit possession and mediumistic trance (Halperin, 1995; 
Hughes, 199 1). How could people control their minds in this way? 
Perhaps the most direct form of mental control is thought suppression-trying not 
to think about something. When people suppress a simple thought, they are able to do so 
in some ways but not in others. People who are instructed to suppress the thought of a 
white bear while reporting their stream of consciousness aloud tend to mention white 
bears about once per minute (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987)-which is, of 
course, more than they would do so without any such instruction. There is evidence that 
intentional suppression ironically enhances the accessibility of the unwanted thought by a 
variety of measures, and is particularly likely to do this when the person is under mental 
load (Wegner, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993). This 
effect is not as clear, however, when it comes to consciously reported thinking (Wegner 
& Smart; 1997). Suppression instructions actually reduce self-reported thinking as 
compared to instructions to concentrate on a thought, and they can also reduce thinking 
as compared to instructions to monitor the thought (see reviews by Abramowitz, Tolin, & 
Street, 2000; Wegner, 1992; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Perhaps people who try to 
suppress thoughts of an intended action might reduce those thoughts below normal levels 
(even while not eradicating them completely). 
There is a further possibility raised by the literature on thought suppression. A 
frequent finding in this research is that thoughts once suppressed tend to rebound after 
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suppression is discontinued (Wegner et al., 1987). It may be that the suppression of an 
intention could result in the rebound of intention-related thoughts when suppression is no 
longer in mind. Such a rebound could function, then, to enhance the experience of will 
for any occurrences of the associated action during this post-suppression period. The 
voluntary suppression of thought could reduce experienced voluntariness for action 
initially, then, but perhaps increase the sense of voluntariness for subsequent instances of 
the action. The present study examined the influence of suppression of intention on the 
experience of will for a current action, and on this experience for an action undertaken 
when suppression was discontinued. 
Previous research on thoughts of action has not examined how such thoughts 
impinge on the experience of will. The general finding in this area is simply that 
intentions are difficult to put out of mind once they are formed. This phenomenon, 
known in the history of psychology as the Zeigamik effect, involves a tendency for 
interrupted or uncompleted actions to engender a strong motivation to complete the 
action (Ovsiankina, 1928; Zeigarnik, 1927). In addition, current research on prospective 
memory shows that intentions may have a privileged status in memory by being stored at 
heightened levels of activation. This intention superiority effect (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; 
Marsh, Hicks, & Bink, 1998) provides further evidence that intentions may be hard to 
suppress. It is an open question, then, whether people can suppress thoughts of actions as 
they perform them, so as to influence their experience of will. This experiment was 
designed as a first step in addressing this question. 
Method 
Overview and Design 
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Participants were asked to carry out a series of simple tasks while following 
mental control instructions. They were asked in advance of each task either to suppress 
thoughts of their intention to perform the task, to concentrate on such thoughts, or to 
monitor their thoughts without trying to change them. Following each task, participants 
rated their experience of will for the action (on a scale from "it just happened" to I did it 
on purpose, intentionally"). They subsequently were led to perform the actions again 
without instructions, again reporting experienced will. 
Participants 
Harvard University undergraduates (16 female and 8 male) volunteered to 
participate in return for course credit or $6. All participants completed the experiment 
correctly and no one was excluded from the sample. 
Tasks 
Ten tasks were used, I for practice and 9 for the experiment. The tasks were 
adapted from studies in the Zeigarnik effect literature (Lewis & Franklin, 1944; Reeve, 
Cole, & Olson, 1986; Rickers-Ovsiankina, 1935) and involved relatively simple actions. 
The practice task was copying a shopping list, and the experimental tasks included: 
copying a geometric figure; circling the vowels in a short paragraph; completing a 
wooden puzzle for children; lifting a brick to a height of 10 inches and setting it down 
again; alphabetizing 10 letters on index cards; spiraling a pipe cleaner around a pencil 
and taking it off, rolling an elongated piece of clay into a ball; winding loose thread on to 
a spool; and completing a set of 5 simple anagrams. Participants performed these tasks in 
one of 3 possible fixed orders. 
Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. At the beginning of the experiment each 
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participant was informed that the aim of the study was to find out how thinking about 
tasks affects perceptions of one's role in performing these tasks. The experimenter 
explained that the main dimension of interest was how some tasks feel more intentional 
than others, and then went on to say: "Some everyday tasks feel fully intentional, like 
writing a difficult essay (one does these things), whereas others feel as if they just happen 
or "run off' with little feeling of intentionality (e. g., driving or brushing one's teeth). " 
To make sure participants understood the distinction they were asked to rate four simple 
everyday actions in terms of how intentional they usually feel on a 9-point scale with I 
itfelt like itjust happened, and 9= itfelt like I did it on purpose, intentionally. The 4 
actions they rated were: eating popcorn at the cinema, walking down stairs, watering the 
plants, and dreaming (cf Malle & Knobe, 1997). The rating scale for these items was the 
same scale used to rate the intentionality of the subsequent experimental tasks, and was 
based on measures used to assess involuntariness in hypnosis (e. g., Lynn, Nash, Rhue, 
Frauman, & Sweeney, 1984) and the experience of intention and conscious will in 
automatisms and everyday actions (e. g., Malle & Knobe, 1997; Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999). 
If at this juncture it was clear that participants understood the distinction, they 
were invited to proceed with the practice task (copying a shopping list). After 
completing the practice task they were given the intentionality scale and asked to rate 
their experience. Participants were then introduced to the main experimental 
manipulation as follows: 
In the tasks we will begin in a moment I will be asking you to either monitor your 
thoughts before and during the task or to suppress or to concentrate on the 
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intention to perform the act. You will have 10 seconds before each task to practice 
the mental task. If I ask you to suppress the intention to perform the action it is 
vital that you try to suppress this thought during the few seconds before the act 
but also during performance of the action. Equally, if I ask you to concentrate on 
the intention to perform the action it is vital that you try to keep this thought in 
mind during the few seconds before the act but also during performance of the 
action. For monitoring, you only have to monitor your thoughts and notice what 
you are thinking without trying to change them at all. 
In addition to these general instructions, specific instructions were given to 
participants just before each action. Three tasks were performed with suppression 
instructions, 3 with concentration instructions, and 3 with monitoring instructions. For 
suppression, the instructions were: 
During performance of the next action I would like you to try not to think about 
your intention to perform the action while doing it. Thus, your task is to suppress 
any thoughts about the intended behavior while performing it. 
For concentration, the instructions were: 
During performance of the next action I would like you to try to think about your 
intention to perform the action while doing it. Thus your task is to concentrate on 
thoughts about the intended behavior while performing it. 
For monitoring, the instructions were: 
During performance of the next action I would like you to monitor your thoughts 
without trying to change them. Just notice what you are thinking about while 
performing the behavior, whatever this may be. 
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Following each instruction, the experimenter said: "You will have a few seconds to settle 
into this task, at the end of which I will press this buzzer telling you to carry out the 
action. " When approximately 10 s had elapsed, the experimenter pressed a buzzer. All 
participants did successfully perform all assigned tasks. 
Participants then completed the 9 experimental tasks in one of 3 fixed orders. The 
order of the thought instructions was fully counterbalanced such that, across participants, 
each of the 9 tasks was suppressed, expressed, and monitored an equal number of times 
across the three task orders. After each task, participants were asked to rate their 
experienced intentionality for the task on the rating scale. They were asked a further 
question which depended on the thought instructions they had received for that task. If 
they had been suppressing thoughts of the intention they were asked to rate "How hard 
were you trying to suppress the thought given to you? " on a scale from I (not very hard) 
to 9 (extremely hard). If they had been concentrating on thoughts of the intention, they 
were asked to rate "How hard were you trying to express/ concentrate on the thought 
given to you? " Finally, if they had been monitoring their thoughts, they were asked to 
rate "What were you thinking about before and during enactment of the task? " on a scale 
from I (thinking exclusively about something other than the task) to 9 (thinking 
exclusively about the task). 
After all of the tasks had been completed with the respective thought instructions, 
the experimenter reset all of the tasks to their original states. Participants were then asked 
to run through all of the tasks again, this time with no thought instructions so they could 
think what they wanted. Participants were told they could complete the tasks in any order 
providing eventually they had done them all. After each task participants again rated the 
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intentionality of their action. 
Results 
Initial analyses showed that participants took their instructions seriously. 
Participants indicated trying fairly hard to concentrate on the thought in concentration 
trials W= 6.14 on the 9-point scale), and also trying fairly hard to suppress the thought 
in suppression trials W=6.63). They reported thinking primarily about the action rather 
than other things on the monitoring trials W=6.26). These thought manipulations did 
not influence action per se, however, as all participants carried out all tasks. Participants' 
initial level of intentionality on the practice task was near the scale midpoint of 5 W= 
5.67) and the means for all the tasks across conditions were near this value. Initial 
analyses also indicated, however, that one of the experimental tasks (anagrams) elicited 
high intentionality ratings overall, so further analyses were conducted with this task 
excluded. 
Mean intentionality pooled across tasks was examined in a3 (order of tasks) X3 
(instruction: concentration, monitoring, or suppression) X2 (action: target action vs. later 
action) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated measures on the latter two 
variables. Although there were significant main effects of action and instruction, and 
also significant interactions of order with each of these variables, these are best 
interpreted in light of the significant interaction of instruction and action, F (2,42) 
8.46, p <. 001,02 = . 29. Task order 
did not qualify this effect, so the influence of order 
will not be examined further. The means are shown in Figure 1. 
The influence of thought instructions on intentionality of the target action was 
examined by simple main effects and contrast analysis. Suppression instructions reduced 
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intentionality for the target action (M = 5.03) below the level prompted only by 
monitoring (M= 5.83), F(l, 21) = 4.63, p <. 05, and also below the level yielded by 
concentration (M = 6.28), F (1,2 1) = 13.07, p< . 002. Intentionality levels for the target 
action during monitoring and concentration did not differ significantly. 
The influence of thought instructions can also be seen in comparisons between 
intentionality experienced for the target action, and intentionality for that action 
performed later without instructions. Concentration yielded greater intentionality for the 
target action (M = 6.28) than the later action (M = 4.95), F (1,2 1) = 20.54, p< . 00 1, and 
monitoring also yielded greater intentionality for the target action (M= 5.83) than the 
later action (M = 4.93), F (1,2 1) = 9.66, p< . 005. However, suppression did not have 
such an effect, and even produced a tendency in the opposite direction. Intentionality for 
the target action during suppression (M = 5.03) was nominally lower than intentionality 
for the same action following suppression (M = 5.5 0), F (1,2 1) = 1.82, p<. 18. 
Contrasts between intentionality levels experienced for the later action did not 
yield any reliable effects. However, it is noteworthy that intentionality of the later action 
after suppression tended to be greater (M = 5.5 0) than the combined mean intentionality 
of the later action after monitoring and concentration (M = 4.94), F (1,2 1) = 2.5 0, p< 
. 13. 
Finally, correlations were computed to examine relations between the thought 
reports during the various task instructions and experienced intentionality. The most 
telling finding was that thought during the monitored actions was strongly related to 
feelings of intentionality during enactment, r(24)=. 75, p <. Ol. Reports of how hard 
people concentrated were similarly related to the experience of intentionality during 
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concentration, r(24)=. 79, p<. Ol. Reports of trying hard to suppress, however, were 
not related to intentionality during suppression, r (24) =. 22, ns. This correlation might 
be expected to be negative, in that motivation to suppress might enhance suppression 
success and thus undermine apparent mental causation. However, trying hard to suppress 
does not guarantee successful suppression (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), and the lack of a 
link from motivation to reported intentionality may be understood in this light. 
Discussion 
People in this study who were asked not to think about their intention before they 
performed an action described the action as seeming less intentional as a result. 
Suppressed thought of intentions yielded reduced reports of intentionality as compared to 
concentration on intentions, and as compared to simple monitoring of thoughts as well. 
There was a weak trend for suppression during an initial action to enhance experienced 
intentionality during a subsequent repetition of that action once suppression instructions 
had been discontinued. So, although it is possible to produce "voluntary involuntariness" 
through thought suppression, such suppression did not have an effect over time, and may 
yield a rebounding sense of intentionality for actions that were previously put out of 
mind. 
As with any study of the influence of instructional sets, these results must be 
considered in light of the potentially powerful role of experimental demand. Certainly, 
participants in this experiment were exposed to clear demands to control their own 
thinking. Moreover, the repeated-measures design of the study guaranteed that 
participants were also made aware of the different instructional sets and the comparisons 
the experimenter was likely to draw among them. Participants were specifically not 
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alerted to any experimental hypothesis relating the thought instructions to possible 
influences on experiences of intentionality for the actions, but it is reasonable to suggest 
that such influences were not difficult for them to infer. One might expect that, on being 
asked not to think of one's intention to act, for example, one's level of intentionality 
might be expected to decrease. Similarly, participants could have inferred that an 
instruction to concentrate on their intention might be expected to enhance their 
experience of intentionality. The influence of mental control instructions could thus be 
understood as an effect of demand characteristics of this experiment. 
The role of demand in the results should be appreciated, however, in terms of two 
key observations. First, it is important to recognize that the processes labeled as 
"demand" in psychology experiments may mirror in many respects the essential 
processes underlying the social manipulation of experiences of will in natural contexts. 
Experiences of involuntariness are often precipitated in real-world circumstances by 
influential figures who, like an experimenter, offer strong instructions and expectations 
designed to influence the person's exertion of mental control, and even to mold the 
person's interpretation of the effects of such control. Just as experiments have 
demanding experimenters, for instance, hypnosis has forceful hypnotists. In the case of 
the automatisms, in turn, channeling occurs at the urging of guides and coaches, dowsing 
and divining experiences happen at the behest of models and mentors, and Ouija-board 
spelling occurs in the presence of expectant audiences (Wegner, 2002). Social pressures 
in our experiment may well be critical in the production of voluntary involuntariness 
because just such pressures are present to promote the effect in most of its other 
manifestations. Participants in our study may have been motivated to suppress thoughts 
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because of demand, and may, too, have been motivated to report reduced intentionality 
following suppression due to demand. There are several circumstances, of course, in 
which people engage in mental control spontaneously, exerting influence on their 
thoughts without external instigation (Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Personal fears might 
prompt suppression, for example, or desires could yield concentration. It remains a 
question for future research whether suppression or concentration prompted 
spontaneously, without social pressure, and without any pressure to report consequent 
changes in voluntariness would have influences on voluntariness like those observed for 
instructed mental control in this experiment. 
A second observation on the role of demand in this study centers on the apparent 
counter-demand effects of mental control on actions when mental control is rescinded. 
Although the observed effects were not strong, there was a tendency for suppressed 
intentions to rebound, yielding enhanced voluntariness for actions once the suppression 
instruction was no longer operative. This ironic effect (Wegner, 1994) cannot as easily 
be traced to demand, as it does not follow from the instructions participants were given, 
and even appears to oppose them. The possibility of such post-suppression ironic effects 
on intentionality deserves scrutiny in further research. 
This study, in short, only begins to open the veil of mystery that has previously 
surrounded experiences of involuntariness. Many of the phenomena of involuntariness 
have historically been resistant to empirical analysis, relegated instead to catalogs of 
psychological anomalies (Spitz, 1997; Zusne & Jones, 1989). The present research opens 
these phenomena to new understanding through the idea that people might visit changes 
in intentionality upon themselves through the exercise of mental control. In a larger 
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sense, these data also comprise significant evidence pertaining to the processes addressed 
by the theory of apparent mental causation (Wegner, 2002; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Mental control of thoughts about action can influence whether thoughts occur in mind 
relevant to the action, and so can create significant transformations in the experience of 
Will. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean intentionality experienced for actions performed during or after each of 
three thought instructions (concentrate on thought of intention, monitor thoughts, 
or suppress thought of intention). Error bars are standard error. 
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